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Jurisdictional Statement 
This Court has jurisdiction pursuant to Section 78A-4-103(2)(a)(i)(A) of 
the Utah Code, and Section 10-3-1106(6), which provides that the Court of 
Appeals may review the final action or order of a municipal personnel appeals 
board. 
Statement of the Issues 
This case involves the following issues: 
Issue 1: Whether the Appeals Board erred in concluding that Petitioner's 
supervisor acted within his authority by ordering Petitioner to stay in a meeting 
on Januacy 25, 2016. 
Preservation: This issue is preserved. (R.702-13, Tr. 316:3-327:13; R.749, 
Tr. 363:10-18.) 
Standard of Review: When reviewing a municipal employee appeal board's 
application of general law, appellate courts use a correction of error standard. See 
Taylorsville City v. Taylorsville City Emp. Appeal Board, 2013 UT App 69, ,r 16, 
116 P.3d973. 
Issue 2: Whether the Appeals Board erred in considering matters that 
were outside the scope of the March 21, 2016 Notice of Disciplinacy Action. 
Preservation: This issue is preserved. (R.406-07, Tr. 20:21:3; R.428-29, 
Tr. 42:1-43:10; R.759, Tr. 373:21-25.) 
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Standard of Review: Appellate courts are authorized by statute to review 
the decision of a municipal employee appeal board to determine if it abused its 
discretion or abused its authority. U.C.A. § 10-3-1106(6)(c)(ii). An abuse of 
discretion will be found where the board's decision "exceeds the bounds of 
reasonableness and rationality." Rosen v. Saratoga Springs City, 2012 UT App 
291, ,r 8, 288 P .3d 606. 
Determinative Provisions 
ThP. following provisions are set forth at Addendum C: 
U.C.A. § 10-3-1106 Discharge, suspension without pay, or involuntary h·ansfer -
Appeals ... Board- Procedure 
Vernal City Personnel Manual§ 5.01 .010 Annual Vacation Leave - Purpose 
Vernal City Personnel Manual§ 5.01.040 Annual Vacation Leave - Accumulation 
Vernal City Personnel Manual§ 5.01.060 Annual Vacation Leave- Scheduling 
Vernal City Personnel Manual § 5.06.030 Administrative Leave - Pending 
Disciplinary Action 
Vernal City Personnel Manual§ 12.05.030 Discipline - Causes for Disciplinary 
Action 
Vernal City Personnel Manual§ 12.05.050 Discipline - Pre-Disciplinary Hearing 
with Employee 
Vernal City Personnel Manual§ 12.05.050 Discipline - Pre-Disciplinary Hearing 
with Employee (Superseded Nov. 2016) 
Vernal City Personnel Manual§ 12.05.065 Discipline - Types of Disciplinary 
Action 
Statement of the Case 
1. Nature of the Case and Course of Proceedings 
Petitioner Russel Augustus was terminated from his position as an 
Equipment Operator II for Vernal City on March 21, 2016 by a Notice of 
Disciplinary Action issued by City Manager Ken Bassett. Thereafter, pursuant to 
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Section 10-3-1106 of the Utah Code and Section 12.06.010 of the Vernal City 
Personnel Manual, Petitioner appealed his termination to the Vernal City Appeals 
Board. 
A hearing was held before the Appeals Board on May 3, 2016, wherein 
testimony and evidence were received. Oral argument was heard, and the 
Appeals Board granted the pnrties leave to file additional written argument on 
specific subjecls. After deliberating, the Appeals Board decided to affirm 
Petitioner's termination, and issued its Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and 
Order Re: Termination Appeal on June 29, 2016. 
Petitioner has timely petitioned for review. 
2. Statement of Facts 
Petitioner ("Mr. Augustus") was employed by Vernal City (the "City") for 
approximately five years, as an Equipment Operator II. (R-415, Tr. 29:1-7.) Mr. 
Augustus reported to Glade Allred (Mr. Allred), who was the Superintendent of 
the City's Streets Department. (R.414, Tr. 28:18-25.) Mr. Allred viewed Mr. 
Augustus as a good, capable worker, and gave him above average performance 
evaluations for the last two years of his employment. (R.309-12; R.314-19; R-417, 
Tr. 31:1-5; R.664-65, Tr. 278:20-279:19; R.666-67, Tr. 280:10-281:5) 
The events material to this appeal began on January 25, 2016, when Mr. 
Allred met separately with Mr. Augustus and his co-worker, Michael Leigh ("Mr. 
3 
Leigh")1, regarding an incident that had occurred on January 21, 2016. (R.192-
217; R.462-63, Tr. 76:24-77:9; R.469-70, Tr. 83:23-84:3; R.553, Tr. 167:8-11; 
R.554, Tr. 168:3-9.) The morning of January 21, Mr. Allred had instructed Mr. 
Leigh to go with Mr. Augustus and hang banners "on the west end" of the city. 
Mr. Augustus and Mr. Leigh did start working on the west end as 
instructed, but at some point decided to take the City bucket truck and drive to 
the east end, to check on some banners on the east side of town that Mr. Leigh 
had previously put up backwards. (R.538-39, Tr. 152:19-153:2; R.545-46, Tr. 
159:21-160:7; R.570, Tr. 184:9-14; R.572, Tr. 186:13-25.) On the way to fix the 
banners, they went by the City's "1500 East yard," to observe a co-worker, BJ 
Partridge ("Mr. Partridge"), who w~s tl1ere operating City equipment. (R.546, Tr. 
160:8-11.) Once at the 1500 East yard, they stopped while Mr. Augustus took 
video of Mr. Partridge's activities, before continuing on. (R.550, Tr. 164:16-24; 
R.574, Tr. 188:8-15.) 
Mr. Allred learned that Mr. Augustus and Mr. Leigh had been at the 1500 
East yard taking video, from Mr. Partridge. (R.421-22, Tr. 35:23-36:12.) This 
report is what led Mr. Allred to meet with both employees on January 25. (R.675-
76, Tr. 289:17-290:10.) 
1 Although his name is spelled "'Lee" throughout the transcript, the name is spelled "Leigh" and 
pronounced the same as "Lee." 
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Mr. Allred first met with Mr. Leigh, in the morning of January 25. In his 
testimony, Mr. Leigh described a meeting in which he perceived that he was 
being accused of doing something wrong by doing anything on January 21 other 
than putting up banners. (R.554-55, Tr. 168~14-169:9.) At the conclusion of the 
meeting, Mr. Allred directed Mr. Leigh to leave work and call Mr. Allred the next 
morning to find out ifhe should come back to work or not. (R.555, Tr. 169:10-12.) 
Mr. Allred called Michael Leigh shortly afterward, however, and directed him to 
"stay home for the rest of the week." (R.555, Tr. 169:15-21.) 
After meeting with Mr. Leigh, Mr. Allred tried three times to reach Mr. 
Augustus, unsuccessfully, first by radio and then two more times by phone. 
(R.422-26, Tr. 36:23-40:4.) Finally, about 11:30am that morning, Mr. Allred 
encountered Mr. Augnsb1s at the City's Public Works yard, and told him that they 
needed to meet. (R.426, Tr. 40:5-21.) Mr. Augustus, however, suddenly had to 
leave to attend to a sick daughter. (R.426-27, Tr. 40:21-41:6.) Mr. Allred told Mr. 
Augustus that he had been trying to reach him on his phone, and Mr. Augustus 
replied, "I haven't had my cell phone." (R.426, Tr. 40:16-25.) 
Mr. Allred and Mr. Augustus were able to meet at about 3:30pm on 
January 25. (R.427, Tr. 41:7-9.) First, Mr. Allred addressed his earlier inability to 
reach Mr. Augustus, and the latter again explained, "My phone's been off all day," 
and "I haven't had my phone." (R.192.) 
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Later, it was discovered that Mr. Augustus had used his phone three times 
that morning. First, at 9:00am he received a call and excused himself from a 
morning meeting. (R-466, TR. 80:15-21.) Then, between 9:26am and 10:02am, 
Mr. Augustus exchanged text messages with city employee Sherry Montgomery. 
(R.167, R.411, Tr. 25:12-22; R-466, Tr. 80:3-14.) Mr. Augustus testified in detail 
that he pulled to the side of the road and took a break during this exchange, and 
then returned to clearing snow. 2 (R.578, Tr. 192:3-17.) Finally, Mr. Augustus 
called his wife at about 11: 15am, after returning to the yard, because their 
daughter was having a medical emergency. R467. 
Following that, Mr. Allred proceeded into a series of questions about Mr. 
Augustus' activities on January 21. (R.201.) At times during the conversation, 
Mr. Augustus admitted to going by the 1500 East yard, saying, "At some 
point. .. we went down past 1500 East yard and went down to check the banners," 
and "We went to check to see if those banners were upside down or backwards or 
something over [by] [t]he east end, by Top Stop." (R.201; R.209-13; R.581, Tr. 
195:12-25.) At other times, he said that be did not know, or did not remember. 
(R.209-13.) 
Mr. Allred described Mr. Augustus' answers as "very elusive and very 
vague." (R.443, Tr. 57:17-20.) For hi~ part, however, Mr. Augush.Is testified that 
he was confused because they had worked on banners multiple days that week, 
2 The two calls from Mr. Allred took place at 10:15am and 10:29am, respectively. (R.173.) 
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and because Mr. Allred's questions themselves were vague, rapid-fire and not 
chronological. (R.470;, Tr. 84:2-9; R.474, Tr. 88:1-2~; R.50~, Tr. 117:9-14; R.505-
06, Tr. 119:14-120:11; R.507, Tr. 121:21-24; R.582, Tr. 196:1-23; R.583, Tr. 197:17-
21.) He also testified that he was affected by fatigue as a re:•;:;u]l of fowing worked 
14 hours the previous day, and pain from a neck injury that affected his sleep the 
previous night. R504-05, Tr. 118:13-119:13. Additionally, he was emotionally 
upset as a result of his daughter's medical emergency earlier that day. Rsos, Tr. 
119:5-13. 
Mr. Augustus also became concerned over the course of the meeting that 
what was happening might not be appropriate. (R.586, Tr. 200:9-13.) He asked 
Mr. Allred, at various times, if he was "on trial," or "under investigation." (R.195; 
R.211.) Also, Mr. Allred was recording the entire meeting, but when Mr. 
Augustus asked if he was, Mr. Allred tried to mislead him by saying, "Here, I'll 
turn the recorder on right now. I got one right down here. Let me turn it on. 
Okay, I am recording this meeting." (R.195-97; R.687-88, Tr. 301:18-302:23.) 
At approximately 4:00pm, Mr. Augustus indicated to Mr. Allred that he 
was going to leave, as it was the end of his shift. (R.216-17; R.431, Tr. 45:2-7.) 
Mr. Allred directed Mr. Augustus to stay for the duration of the meeting, and Mr. 
Augustus refused. (R.216-17; R.431, Tr:45:2-10.) Mr. Augustus explained in his 
testimony that he had become very upset, and decided to leave in order to avoid a 
"fight" with Mr. Allred. (R-493-94, Tr. 107:22-108:20; R.590, Tr. 204:6-13.) He 
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also had the distinct feeling that he was facing some kind of punishment or 
discipline, and that it was not being handled through the appropriate process. 
(R.587-89, Tr. 201:5-203:2.) 
As Mr. Augustus was leaving the room, Mr. Allred informed him that if he 
chose to leave, it would be considered insubordination and would place him at 
risk of termination. (R.217; R.431, Tr. 45:7-9.) Mr. Augustus responded, "Have 
fun with that." (R217; R.431, Tr. 45:10.) 
Mr. Augustus believed that he was entitled to leave, in part, because he 
knew that there was a right to receive notice and a hearing before being 
disciplined. (R.588-89, Tr. 202:14-203:6.) No such notice had been given. 
(R.506, Tr. 120:12-14.) 
As Mr. Augustus went to find someone in human resources, he 
encountered Assistant City Manager Alan Parker, and explained what had 
happened. (R.590-91, Tr. 204:16-7.) Mr. AugushlS asked ifhe had done the 
wrong thing, and Mr. Parker responded, "No ... tl1e right thing to do was come and 
talk to me." (R.591, Tr. 205:8-17.) By speaking to Mr. Parker, Mr. Augustus 
believed that he was exercising his right to make an informal grievance, pursuant 
to city policy. (R.591-92, Tr. 205:19-206:5.) 
After Mr. Augustus left the January 25 meeting, Mr. Allred decided to place 
him off duty. (R.697, Tr. 311:1-7.) Prior to this, Mr. Allred had prepared 
typewritten notes to reference in the meeting. (R.332-38; R.676, Tr. 290:11-18.) 
The typewritten notes include a notation that reads, "No paid time contact ... call 
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before coming in." (R.338.) Mr. Allred testified that this reflected typical options, 
in case he had to "go there." (R.698-99, Tr. 312:6-313:1.) Mr. Allred also testified 
that, over 31 years with the City, he and Mr. Bassett had developed an 
understanding that, "when you run into these kinds of sihiations, that that is one 
of the tools you have available, is that the vacation is given." (R.704-05, Tr. 
318:18-319:9.) 
In an email sent by Mr. Allred to Mr. Bassett on the evening of January 25, 
2016, Mr. Allred stated that he had "pondered the situation," and became 
"concerned ... about having either of these two employees back here h~fore the 
first of the week." (R.340.) He went on, "I want to protect Vernal City's interest 
and have therefore sent a text to both individuals," directing them to take the rest 
of the week off. (R.340; R.702-03, Tr. 316:23-317:7.) Mr. Augustus remained off 
duty on these terms until City Manager Ken Bassett formally placed him on 
administrative leave on January 29, 2016. (R.3.) 
Mr. Allred acknowledged being aware that the policy of the City was to use 
vacation for rest and relaxation, but then testified that imposing mandatory 
vacation could be for that purpose, or for some other purpose, depending "on 
what you're doing." (R.705-06, Tr. 319:22-320:6.) Then, asked "[I]sn't it at your 
discretion to provide the employee rest ancl relaxation," Mr. Allred responded 
that he "felt it was in the best interest of Vernal City that they take some time and 
that they-they take a few days off." (R.709, Tr. 323:2-19.) 
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That interest, Mr. Allred testified, was to give himself "time to try to figure 
out what was going on and why." (R.711, Tr. 325:21-25.) While Mr. Allred did 
testify that he thought that Mr. Augustus got "very, very angry," and ··needed lo 
get away from the sihlation," he also admitted that Mr. Leigh did not become 
"overly heated" in his meeting with him, but he still placed Mr. Leigh off duty -
or "on vacation" - as well. (R.555, Tr. 169:10-12; R.709, Tr. 323:20-22; R.712, Tr. 
326:8-21.) 
On March 21, 2016, following a pre-disciplinary hearing, Ken Bassett 
issued a Notice of Disciplinary Action to Mr. Augustus, terminating his 
employment and outlining the reasons for the termination. (R.177-84, R.449-50, 
Tr. 63:12-17.) The Notice of Disciplinary Action indicated that Mr. Augustus was 
being terminated for the following misconduct: 
A. Incident #1: 12.05.030 (D) Inefficiency or inability to satisfactorily perform 
assigned duties (failing to satisfactorily perform his duties when he decided 
to instead go to the 1500 East yard and take photos of Mr. Partridge); (M) 
Misusing, destroying or damaging any City property or the property of any 
employee (using the City's bucket truck for a purpose unrelated to his job 
duties); and (N) Deliberately restricting output (taking Mr. Leigh away 
from his duties) 
B. Incident #2: 12.05.030 (W) Act of Dishonesty related to job performance 
(telling Mr. Allred that he couldn't remember going to the 1500 East yard 
or taking photographs or videos, when in fact he could remember.) 
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C. Incident #3: 12.05.030 (AA) Displaying insubordinate behavior Oeaving 
the January 25 meeting after being told to stay, and after being informed 
that leaving would constih1te insubordination and grounds for discipline.) 
D. Incident #4: 12.05.030 (A) A violation ofany of the City Personnel Policies 
or Procedures or any other administrative policies as adopted by resolution 
of the Vernal City Council (not having his cell phone available as required 
by Lhe cell pho~1e use agreement dated April 22,2013 and cell phone policy 
of the City, and choosing not to answer Mr. Allrc<l's phone calls), and 
12.05.030 (W) Act of dishonesty related to joh performance (slali.ng (\1Vkf! 
"I haven't had my cell phone;"' and µmy phone has been off all day''). 
In addition to the reasons stated in the Notice of Disciplinary Action, the 
Appeals Board expressly found as follows: 
B. Regarding the charge of "dishonesty related to job performance": 
1. Appellant was dishonest in his statements and explanations 
concerning his activities on January 21, 2015, including the reason 
for taking the city bucket truck and another city employee to 1500 
East and in his stated reasons for videoing Mr. Partridge. 
2. The Appellant stated that he would provide a copy of the video when 
he finally acknowledged that he had it, which he failed to do. 
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4. The Appellant falsely stated that his concern was the safety of an 
employee or equipment which, as outlined above, lacks any 
credibility. 
C. Regarding the charge of "insubordination": 
1. The Board has reviewed the transcript and listened to the recording 
of the meeting between the Appellant and his department head Mr. 
Allred on January 25, 2016, and finds that there is more than 
substantial evidence to show that the Appellant was insubordinate 
throughout the meeting with his supervisor. 
2. The Appellant's general tone of voice, attitude, tapping of a marker 
on the table, and refusal and failure to answer questions honestly 
and directly demonstrated a lack of respect for his supervisor. 
3. The Appellant was evasive, refused to answer questions, was 
disrespectful, ordered the supervisor to "move on" after evading 
questions, [and] cursed. 
4. The Appellant's disrespectful retort as he left the meeting "good luck 
with that" further illustrates a series of disrespectful and 
insubordinate statements and conduct by the Appellant during that 
meeting toward his supervisor, which is illustrated to some degree by 
the transcript but more forcefully by the audio recording of the· 
meeting. 
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5. The Roa rd is convinced that the purpose of the Appellant's video on 
the east side of the city on January 21, when he was assigned to work 
on the west side of the city, was not motivated by a safety concern 
but rather was an effort to undermine and get information to 
damage his department head. 
6. The Appellant's attitude during the meel i ng with Mr. Allred was 
insubordinate, confrontational, dishonest, and disrespectful. 
7. At no time following that meeting did the Appellant make any effort 
to apologize to his supervisor or to demonstrate any willingness or 
desire to work cooperatively with his supervisor or make any effort 
to resolve any concerns or differences. 
8. Had the Appellant's attitude following that meeting up to and 
through the hearing before the Board been different or more 
cooperative or upfront and honest the result might well have been 
different. Instead the Appellant has remained defiant, aggressive and 
dishonest. 
9. In the meeting with Mr. Allred, the Appellant was requested at least 
twice to provide a copy of the video that he took while driving the 
city truck, yet he did not provide that until played for the first time at 
the hearing before the Appeals Board. 
10.Mr. Augustus's actions have been targeted towards undermining his 
supervisor so that he could take over the Department. 
13 
11. Mr. Augustus's statements about his not having his phone available 
when his supervisor was attempting to contact him are untruthful 
and also insubordinate. It is clear that he had his telephone 
available since he made use of it, yet he failed to answer calls from 
his supervisor or to return calls that had been made to him. 
12. The Appellant was untruthful in claiming that his texts with Sherri 
Montgomery were during his break since the time line of those texts 
demonstrates a period in excess of a normal break. 
13. The Appellant is dishonest and insubordinate in refusing to admit 
his activities, lying about his activities, and failing lo acknowledge 
his fault and misconnn~t whP.n hP. made a mistake. His attitude 
throughout has been to cast blame on others but not to take any 
responsibility himself. 
14. The lack of respect for his supervisor is not only demonstrated by the 
transcripts and recordings prior to the hearing, but the Board notes, 
his facial expressions, demeanor and behavior at the hearing when 
answering questions regarding the events and during the testimony 
of Mr. Allred including smirking, rolling his eyes and other conduct 
and expressions further confirms a lack of respect and an 
insubordinate attitude. 
15. A continuing attitude of insubordination and disrespect was also 
demonstrated and observed by the Board during the hearing. During 
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the testimony of Mr. Bassett, Mr . .Augustus was observed to glare at 
the witness and rolled his eyes, and acted in a hostile and 
disrespectful manner. 
16. The actions of Mr. Augustus show that he is not amenable to 
supervision and cannot work there under the direction of the 
deparbnent head, Mr. Allred. This results in part from his 
insubordination and his dishonesty in dealing with his department 
head and with others and from the fact that he has not made any 
effort to resolve the issues or acknowledge his misconduct. Even at 
the hearing it was apparent that he retains a defiant, disrespectful 
attitude, and has no willingness to acknowledge his own errors. Any 
discipline less than termination would not bring about needed 
change. The Appellant's return to the road department would be 
detrimental to the morale, productivity, and operation of the 
department, and would undermine the ability of Mr. Allred to 
manage the employees. 
R.370-73. 
Furthermore, the Appeals Board made the following findings over and 
above the reasoning reflected in the Notice of Disciplinary Action: 
3. Insubordination 
a. The Board finds that Mr. Augustus behavior, statements, and actions 
demonstrate that when he ignored the directions to help finish installing 
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banners on the west side of the city and instead drove the city bucket truck 
and another city employee to the east side of the city and passed the yard 
while taking video with his city subsidized phone, his intent was to 
undermine his department head, Mr. Allred. The video that he took of 
another employee operating the city equipment, which was provided for 
the first time at the hearing before the Appeals Board demonstrates that he 
was unsafely operating the city bucket truck by videoing while driving, and 
it appears that he had planned in advance to take the video and had 
manipulated his phone while driving and prior to reaching the yard. 
b. The claims made by the Appellant that the purpose of videoing was to 
address a safety concern is entirely contradicted by his failure to provide 
that video to anyone in the city or to report his concerns to his supervisor 
or other city officials. 
c. In fact, Mr. Augustus went out of his way to avoid admitting that he had 
taken the video during his meeting with his supervisor and failed and 
refused in spite of repeated requests to provide the video taken on the city 
subsidized cell phone. In so doing he violated city policy and contradicted 
any argument that he undertook that activity for a legitimate purpose. 
d. During the interview with Mr. Allred, the Appellant was evasive and 
defensive and aggressive when questioned on those matters. 
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e. During his testimony before the hearing Board when questioned by 
opposing counsel about those matters he once again reacted in an evasive, 
confrontational manner. 
g. The events from January 21:0 2016~ and the attitude and behavior nf the 
AppP.llant from that time throu~h lhe eonclusion of the evidentiary hearing 
demonstrate more inlerest in m1der111ining his supervisor and no evidence 
whatsoever of any effort or desire to work cooperalively within the 
Department struchrre or chain of command. 
h. The Appellant's allilude, nonverbal displays, and facial expressions during 
the hearing on the stand were disturbing and pronounced and reflect an 
attitude, disrespect, and a disregard for truth. 
1. The Appellant's statement as he left the meeting with his supervisor in 
blatant disregard of the instruction that he remain at the meeting - the 
comment "good luck with that" - is consistent with the attitude and actions 
displayed at the evidentiary hearing before the Board. The "good luck with 
that" attitude which remains unchanged shows that he cannot work 
effectively under the supervision of the road department head, and that his 
continuing presence there and insolent attitude would be disruptive to the 
good order and efficient operation of the entire department. 
J. Had the Appellant at any time prior to the pre-disciplinary hearing or even 
during the evidentiary hearing demonstrated through his words and 
demeanor and behavior any change of attitude, recognition of his 
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misconduct, any desire to mend fences and work cooperatively with his 
supervisor and within the structure of the department as a positive 
productive employee the outcome might well be different. 
R.374-76. 
Finally, the Appeals Board made the following new conclusions: 
Q. The conduct of Mr. Augustus in the meeting with his department head 
on January 21, 2016 was insubordinate. The capstone was his defiant 
refusal to remain in the meeting when specifically and directly 
instructed twice to do so by his supervisor even when he was told that 
refusal to remain would be insubordination and may result in his 
termination, the comment as he walked out the door was "good luck 
with that". That was not, by any means, the only insubordination during 
that meeting however. Listening to the recording of the meeting along 
with the transcript shows that the Appellant repeatedly refused to 
answer questions, was evasive, omitted facts, was dishonest about facts 
and circumstances, demonstrated a defiant and hostile attitude towards 
his supervisor, refused to provide the video when requested to do so 
after finally acknowledging its existence, and constantly and loudly 
tapped his pen on the desk during the conversation. Throughout that 
process the Department Head remained calm and did not raise his voice 
while the Appellant became hostile and agitated after being informed 
and with full knowledge that he was being recorded. Mr. Augustus never 
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acknowledged any persona 1 responsibility or fault or error on his part 
and continued to place all of the blame on Mr. Allred consistent with his 
apparent intentional design to unclermine the authority of his 
department head. 
Summary of the Argun1.enl 
Petitioner seeks to have the decision of the Appeals Board, sustaining the 
termination of his employment with Vernal City, set aside on multiple grounds. 
This petition for review does not challenge the factual findings, but solely the 
Appeals Board's exercise of its discretion. 
First, the Appeals Board erroneously concluded that it was within the 
authority of Mr. Augustus' department head to require his presence in a meeting. 
The board could only have reached that conclusion by accepting the City's theory 
that imposing mandatory vacation in a disciplinary fashion was a permissible 
exercise of authority under its own policies. Mr. Augustus takes the Court 
through those policies so as to show that a plain language reading would never 
permit such an interpretation. Lacking the authority to act in so arbitrary a 
fashion, the department head's actions could only be described as formal 
discipline, requiring formal procedures that were not observed. 
Secon<i, the Appeals Board flagrantly exceeded its authority when it 
conducting a full review of Mr. Augustus' conduct, with no regard for his due 
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process right to notice. Many of the instances of misconduct relied upon by the 
Appeals Board had simply never been brought np hefore, which impeaches the 
fairness of the whole process. 
By reason of these errors, Mr. Augustus was deprived of a full and fair 
hearing, and is entitled to have the resulting decision set aside. If the 
insubordination charge is also dropped, it may be appropriate to immediately 
order the Appeals Board to reinstate Mr. Augustus with all of the remedies that 
entails. But if tl1e Court sees fit to permit reconsideration on remand, that 
reconsideration should be narrowly focused. 
AI·gu1nent 
The Appeals Board in Mr. Augustus' case conducted a far-ranging, 
searching examination of Mr. Augustus' conduct, \r\rithout any regard for its This 
Court's undertaking on this review is to determine "if the appeal board or hearing 
officer abused its discretion or exceeded its authority." U.C.A. § 10-3-1106. The 
egregiousness of the Appeals Board's abuses in this case should make the Court's 
job straightforward, if not simple. 
1. THE APPEALS BOARD COMMI'ITED REVERSIBLE ERROR 
WHEN IT CONCLUDED THAT PETITIONER'S SUPERVISOR 
ACTED WITHIN HIS AUTHORITY BY ORDERING PETITIONER 
TO STAY IN THE JANUARY 25 MEETING. 
Petitioner raised an argument before Lhe Appeals Board that, if Mr. Allred 
lacked lawful authority to demand Mr. Augustus stay in the January 25 meeting, 
then Mr. Augustus could not have committed the offense of insubordination, 
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because lawful authority is a necessary element of insubordination. The Appeals 
Board disagreed, reasoning that "a meeting to discuss possible misconduct or a 
direction to take paid vacation time does not constitute formal discipline 
reqniring approval of the City Manager for a predisciplinary hearing." (R.380.) It 
also concluded that the practice of a department head imposing mandatory 
vacation to allow an employee a chance to "cool off or settle down" represented a 
proper application of the City's vacation policies. These holdings reflected 
incorrect interpretations of the law, as will be explained below. 
1.1 A department head's authority to impose mandatory 
vacation is qualified by the express purpose of the vacation 
policy. 
As pointed out by the Appeals Board, Section 5.01.060 of the Personnel 
Manual adopted by the City Council does state that" As he [or she] deems 
necessary, a Department Head may require an employee to use any accrued 
vacation leave." But reading an ordinance in isolation like that violates the rules 
of statutory construction, which dictate that the plain language of a statute must 
be construed "with every other part or section so as tu produce a harmonious 
whole." Summit Operating, LLC v. Utah State Tax Com 'n, 2012 UT 91, ,r,r 11-14, 293 
P.3d 369 (rejecting a party's proposed interpretation when contrary to legislative 
intent drawn from the whole statute). 
The City Council, when it adopted the overall vacation scheme, also 
adopted Section 5.01.010, which stated their intent as requiring the use of annual 
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vacation to ensure that employees have time to "mentally and physically refresh 
themselves," and come back to work better able to do their jobs. 
Harmonizing the two provisions, the only plausible interpretation is that a 
department head, in ordering an employee to take vacation, must exercise that 
authority in furtherance of the stated legislative intent - ensuring a productive, 
healthy workforce. There may be other, tangential purposes consistent with that 
primary purpose, but use of vacation as a disciplinary tool is not one of them. 
Without any ambiguity, it is not necessary to examine the City's common practice 
to interpret the plain language of the policy. 
A proper example might be such as that contemplated in Section 5.01.040 
of the Personnel Manual, which acknowledges the possibility that management 
may want to mandate the use of vacation to avoid forfeiture. The secondary 
purpose mentioned here of managing staffing levels is consistent with the 
primary purpose of making sure employees get their rest and relaxation time in. 
In fact, Mr. Allred explained in his testimony that he made the decision to 
place Mr. Augustus off duty to protect the interests of the City, which were to 
conduct a full investigation and analysis. The mere presence of this purpose is 
enough to take the decision outside the boundaries of the vacation policy. Even if 
one of Mr. Allred's reasons was to allow Mr. Augustus time to cool off, that 
testimony was obviously self-serving and contradictory, given that he gave the 
same consequence to Mr. Leigh, who did not get "overly heated." 
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1.2 Mr. Allred's decision to place Mr. Augustus on leave was a 
disciplinary decision, not a vacation policy decision. 
Eliminating the possibility, as a matter of law, that Mr. Allred had the 
authority to impose mandatory vacation outside of the purposes of the vacation 
policy, then his decision must have been something else. 
It could not have been a decision to place Mr. Augustus on administrative 
leave, pursuant to Section 5.06.030 of the Personnel Manual, because that section 
explicitly requires the approval of the City Manager. Mr. Allred stated that Mr. 
Bassett gave him input on possible options, but that is not the same as approval. 
It is clear from the entirety of Mr. Allred' s testimony that he and he alone made 
the decision. 
The only remaining conclusion is that Mr. Allred placed Mr. Augustus on 
a disciplina1y suspension. In fact, it perfectly fits the language of the policy -
"The department head, or designee, after consultation with the City Manager, 
and in accordance with the provisions of this Chapter pertaining to formal 
disciplinary procedures, may suspend employees with or without pay." 
Personnel Manual § 12.05.065. Mr. Allred "consulted" with the City Manager, 
and he suspended Mr. Augustus with pay- albeit in the form of vacation pay. 
1.3 Mr. Allred unlawfully imposed a disciplinary suspension 
without due process. 
It is axiomatic that the policies adopted by a governmental entity define 
the process that is due. The version of Section 12.05.050 of the Personnel Manual 
that was in force at the time of Mr. Augustus' suspension stated that, 
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"[w]henever formal disciplinary measures are anticipated, excepting placement 
of the employee on probationary status, a pre-disciplinary hearing must be held 
prior to imposing disciplinary action."3 Not only did the City's policy require 
that a hearing be held, but also that the employee be given detailed notice. 
The undisputed evidence at the hearing showed that Mr. Alh·ed 
anticipated the possibility of putting Mr. Augustus on leave. He admitted that 
he alone prepared the notes that he used in the January 25 meeting, and that he 
wrote the words, "No paid time contact. .. call before coming in." He is the one 
who placed Mr. Leigh on leave for no cause other than that of the alleged 
misconduct on January 21. His sloppy method of requiring the use of vacation 
time during a suspension cannot save the City from the conclusion that Mr. 
Allred imposed formal discipline in ignorance or contempt for the duly adopted 
disciplinary procedure. 
1.4 Petitioner was not guilty of insubordination because Mr. 
Allred's order was not given with lawful authority. 
The proper definition of insubordination leads inevitable to the conclusion 
that Mr. Augustus did not engage in insubordination by walking out of the 
January 25 meeting and immediately taking a grievance to the Assistant City 
Manager. 
3 It is remarkable that the City adopted a new, updated version of Section 12.05.050 after Mr. 
Augustus' appeal, and that the language adopted appears designed to prevent the application 
of the prior language urged here. See attached addendum. 
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Section 12.05.030 of the Personnel M amm l states that "insubordinate 
behavior" is a cause for discipline, but it offers no definition. Utah's case law 
does not offer much of a definition either, other than the dissent authored by 
Justice Maughn in Elwell v. Board of Ed. of Park City: "constant or continuing 
intentional refusal to obey a direct or implied order, reasonable in nature, and 
given by and with proper authority." 6:l6 P.2d 460,469 (Utah 1981) (quoting 
Board of Trustees v. Holso, 584 P.2d 1009, 1016 (Wyo. 1978)). This definition is 
consistent with a number of decisions outside the state. See, e.g., Jackson v. 
Hazlehurst Mun. Separate School Dist., 427 So.2d 134 (Miss. 1983) (quoting Ray 
v. Minneapolis Board of Ed., 202 N.W.2d 375 (Minn. 1972)) ("constant or 
continuing intentional refusal to obey a direct or implied order, reasonable in 
nature, and given by and with proper authority"); N. Clackamas Sch. Di.st. v. Fair 
Dis. App. Bd., 567 P.2d 1091, 1092 (Or. 1977) ("an intentional and wilful refusal 
to obey, or disobedience of, an order or directive which a school board is 
authorized to give and entitled to have obeyed"); Porter v. Pepsi-Cola Bottling 
Co., 147 S.E.2d 620, 622 (S.C. 1966) ("a wilfu] or intentional disregard of the 
lawful and reasonable instructions of the employer"); Shockley v. Board of Educ., 
149 A.2d 331, 334 (Del. Super. Ct. 1959) (reversed on other grounds, 155 A.2d 323 
(Del. 1959)) ("A[n] .. .intentional refusal to obey a direct or implied order, 
reasonable in nature, and given by and with propP.r ~mthority."); State ex rel. 
Steele v. Board of Ed. of Fairfield, 40 So.2d, 689,695 (Ala. 1949) 
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("insubordination" ... unquestionably .. .includes the willful refusal ... to obey[] 
reasonable rules and regulations"); see also Black's Law Dictionary 870 (9th ed. 
2009) (defining insubordination as "[a] willful disregard of an employer's 
instructions" or "[ajn act of disobedience to proper authority"). 
The cited definitions differ in whether or not they require a continued 
course of conduct, but they are consistent in that they require that a superior's 
direction be given reasonably and with lawful authority. As discussed in the 
sections above, Mr. Allred hP.ki an illegal pre-disciplinary hearing and was neither 
reasonable nor authorizP.cl to rlo so. 
2. THE APPEAIS BOARD COMMITfED REVERSIBLE .ERROR 
WIIEN IT EXPRESSLY CONSIDERED MATTERS WELL 
OUTSIDE THE SCOPE OF THE NOTICE OF DISCIPLINARY 
ACTION. 
The other, and possibly more egregious error, committP.cl hy the Appeals 
Board, was how it reached to all corners of the hearing testimony to find reasons 
to justify Mr. Augustus' termination. That is not how the statutory scheme 
works. 
2.1 The Appeals Board was required to constrain its review to 
the reasons given in the notice. 
An appeal board is given only limited authority in an appeal of discipline. 
It may only examine the evidence to determine if the reasons given in the Notice 
of Disciplinary Action were supported by substantial evidence, and if the 
imposition was within the proper discretion of the City Manager. See Fierro v. 
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Park City Muni. Corp., 2012 UT App 304, ,r,r 25-28, 295 P.3d 696 (holding that 
appeal board's decision must be set aside where it "engaged in a ... free-wheeling 
review" rather than considering only the exact actions precisely defined in the 
termination memo"). 
The Court of Appeals in Fierro made clear that the specific actions 
identified by the terminating official are what must be considered - not the entire 
episode. See id. at ,I 5. That protection is necessary for an P.rnployee to have the 
proper benefit of his or her statutory rights. Sec id. al ,r,r 13-16_ The requirement 
of detailed notice is rooted in principle~~ of clue process. See id. at ,I 18. 
Like the tennination letter in Fierro, the Notice of Disciplinary Action 
issued to Mr. Augustus conveyed "precision, formality, and finality." Id. at ,I 23. 
It was reasonable for Mr. Augustus to see the notice as "an official and complete 
accounting" of the City's complaints against him. Id. The City should not have 
been allowed to then turn andjustify Mr. Augustus' termination on similar, but 
not identical violations. See Salt Lake Cit:y v. Gallegos, 2016 UT App 122, ,I,I 12-
13. Mr. Augustus was entitled to rely on the notice in preparing his defense. 
2.2 The reasons relied on by the Appeals Board were outside the 
scope of the notice. 
Referring to the outline given above of the conduct raised in the Notice of 
Disciplinary Action, as compared to the conduct identified in the Appeals Board's 
decision, there are many, many more instances of misconduct identified there. 
While Mr. Augustus might have divined that even some of those instances might 
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be at issue, that is not enough to satisfy the rule established under Fierro and 
related cases. Mr. Augustus was given no notice of the great majority of thcin. 
2.3 Mr. Augustus was harmed by the Board's error. 
By holding Mr. Augustus responsible for a wide array of misbehavior that 
was never even considered by the City Manager, the Appeals Board deprived Mr. 
Augustus of a fair hearing. The entire process was biased against him, and as a 
result his termination was upheld. 
Conclusion 
Two grave mistakes were made in this case by the Appeals Board. One was 
technical in nature, with regard to their misunderstanding of the concept of 
lawful authority. The other was a blatant abuse of discretion and overstep of 
authority. 
The decision of the Appeals Board should be set aside. If the Court sees fit 
to remand the case back to the Appeals Board for further consideration, then it 
should be with instructions to determine if Mr. Augustus' termination was 
warranted in the absence of the extraneous charges, and in the absence of 
insubordination. 
DATED this 8th day of February, 2017. 
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TO: Russell Augu~tiu 
FROM: Ken Bassett; City Man.ager 
DATE: MHrd1 21, 2016 
RE: Notl.ie-ofDiscipJbm._ry Actfoi'J, 
Dear Mr. Augustus, 
On Friday, March 4, 2016, ;it,9:00 ,a,P}. a pre-dis_9ipljnary heru·ing was hdd at the Vernal City 
office at 374 Ea.st Main ~gardL7.g allege.d violations-of the Vernal City polk:ks.and procedures 
manual·. This pr~-d.iscipl.inary he.mug was sched'Jied io allow you the opportunity to respond to 
allegations that you violated provisions oft.i-tis manual, specifically: 
1. 12.05.030 (D) Inefficiency or inability to satisfactorily perform assigned duties; (M) 
M1siising, clestroying or damaging ,-my City property or the properly of any employee; and 
(N) Deliberately restricting output; 
2. 12.05.030 CW) Act of Dishonesty related toj0b perfonnance. 
3. 12.05.030 (AA) Displaying insubordinate behavior; .. 
4. 12.05.030 (A) A violation of any of the City Persomiel Policies or Procedures or any other 
administrative policies as adopted by resolution of the Vernal City Cotmcil (not having 
your cell phone available as required by the cell phone use agreement dated April 22, 2013 
and cell phone policy of the City, and 1L05.030 (\V) Act of dishonesty related to job 
performance . 
Notice of Decision: 
. ··-·, 
lxic1dent #1 /"Violation #1. January 21, 2016: Iµ the pre-disciplinary hearing notice, it was 
~llegefthat ori the afternoon of January 2'1', 2016 hoth you (dr'iv.irfg) and Michael Leigh, 
(passenger), were observed traveling on 1500 East adjaceni to the Ci1y yard (Sumpsions) in the 
City bucket truck At (his particular tfrne, however, you had be-f#n given pre1iious direction· that 
your task fo be perfol'med was located on the west end of the City on Highway 40 associated with 
the banners. Also, at this· time as you were on.J.500 East adjacf';J1.l to the City yard it was- obs.er.ved 
that yo1l'-were eithel''taking photographs or video of an employee who was at that time locaied in 
that yard, specifically BJ Partridge. There had been no direction given to you be in that area Qj 
the City while, .in fact, you should hllll£' been working on JJOW, jnb duties assigned With the banners 
on west Highway 40. 
]Y.f:r. Augusttis; 'based on the information from the pfo-<lisdp1inruy hearing, the transcription ·on:iie 
interview which you had with Mr. Aflred on January 251\ your work time sheets specifically for 
J~~ary 24th i!lld your job description for the position of Street Equipment Operator II, I have 
determine.d ihat the alf egation.s ~o st.ated in ·incident #-1 and Violation # i are subslanliated 
Y-our work assignment, workingvvith Mr. Michael Leigh on January 21 s1, was that of pJitung up 
bannerS oi:l. Main Street and Highway 40 working with Jeff Gardner, who was- superv1sing that 
project. · You had been worldng on the west encl of Highway 40 that morning. The bucket truck 
which you were using had some operation problems, and you and Mr. Leigh returned the bucket 
truck to Motor Pool for repairs. I..,at~r in the day after lµnch, you and Mr. Leigp took the bucket 
truck, after it had beeu repaired1 fueled it, and immediately proceeded to go t~ :the 1500 East yard, 
(Sumpsions) at which time you stopped and purposely took pictures of BJ Partridge who was 
operatuig the loader at that site. 
In the pre-disciplin~ hearing, it was noted that qu,rio,g the intervj~w wltl~h you baa with-Mr. 
Allred on January 25 , you could not remember whether ornot you h.\14 gone to the l 500 &!st yard 
or whether you had, at that tune, taken pholo~lis / video of ML Partridge working at that site. 
At the pre-disciplinary hearing held on March 4 , however, you d1d remember that you did make 
that trip in the bucket truck with Mr. Leigh for ·J-ie purpose of taking pictlii:es of Mr.:Partridge 
workj.ng there at the 1500 East yard, I.twas represented during the pre-disciplinary hearing on 
March 4th that you were tired, and that you had worked many hours the day before, and that 
possibly was the reason why you could not remember going to 1500 East I determined, however, 
that on the evening of January 24,.20 l 6 you finished the snow plowing resp·onsibilities that you 
had and left work at approximately 7:30 p.m. after having worked 14 hours snow plowing . .I have 
concluded that this. was cert<iinly ample tin:i~ to get the sleep that you needed before yo11 caine to 
work the next morning· on-January 25th• I do not accept your reasoning· that you could not 
remember going'to tbe 1500 East yard or remember that you took photographs/ video simply 
because you were fatigued because of the hours that you had worked the day before. 
It was further repres_ented during the p~e--Oiscij:il~ary hearing on March 4th that your reasoning for 
going to the 1500 East yard in the afternoon, after lunch, in the bucket truck for the purpose of 
observing Mr. Pllliridge operating the loader-was consistent with your job description assigiirilents 
as "a sup~isor". The Vernal City job description for.a Streets Equipment Operator II indicates 
"acts as -lead worker or supervisor as required during constmction and maintenance projects or iri 
the absence of the-street superintendent". Specifically, regarding you going to the· 1500 East yard 













and taking pictures/ video, these were not requireq. ~u_pervisory activities for that day, the street 
superintendent was not absent that day, ne;r had flllyone asked or required yo_u to superv.ise any 
aspect of your job ussignmcot •for that particular day. Your assigned duties dea1ing ,vith the 
banners and wor~g wifu Mr. Gardner had beefi;given at the beginning o~tlie w?rk day.;·however, 
it ;was yoµr cl,e_cisi()n to .go-to the 1500 E~t y·ara simply to tal~e pictures ofNrr,•.·P.artridge operating 
the loader. Tl'! doing so, you took Mr. Leigh away from his ~s~gned-dutics, n.<i w~l n3 op~roti)ig a 
pfooe of Vernal City equipment (the bucl<:~t' tn1ck") for-a pUl;p.ose lh~t \Ni.LO:: ,tiut part of yow- work 
du:litti !.ha!. j)articu lor dny . 
Mi:. Augustus, 1-.tb.erefore-find tl\at you Were t1otsatfafactorlly pt:rforining your assigned job duties, 
tbAt.y0u w~re mi&.t.1sirlg Ci(.y i_:quipn.1tn.t{the-0bµ6ket truck) for~ .J?.l.trpo~e. thA.t was not part of yqp( 
3.g.•'.Jigneli dutiesi and'thaljuu were·also fcstricting rb,e output of a fcl_low employt:e, Mid1ael Leigh, 
by not pg;rfo.i:m[ng-yoµr as.signed duties, 
Iricident' #2 / Violation #1. On Monday. _Jani)ctJJi 25'" at·appl"oximately 3,15 pm yuu w,iri: ,~s}a:.d 
to· b~ •ifr:.a mee:ting ,vilh your supervisor Glade ,iift.('.d .YJ;u oitend'edlh_ai;meetinKaf'w}ilc.Ji.~Jill'Je-
M~. Allred proceeded to ask you several questions regar.rling previo1is ii-Tcidents li(}.iicl~ }lad 
occurred as part of your .pe,formance, one of w_hich included you driving in the buckei truck on 
Tliiirsday, January 21•' wi.Jh.Michael Leigh in the vehicle with you. During the· me'efing Mr. 
Atlred asked you specifically if you had, in fact, dfi;yen the bucket truck to the-1500 East lot-in the 
afternoon. You indicated to him that yau could.not remember, when tnfact; w4nessstatements 
j,-om- two individuals indici-fieJ. ·Lhat you had -'indeed driven along 1 SOU £ct.st · by the City yai-d 
(.'>umpi.ons) Laking piciures or videos. 
1 mll stnte as I stated abo~e, in Incident·# l ,· Violation #l: 
In the pre-disciplin¾r hearurn it was· 110ted that during the interview which you had with Mr . 
Allred on January 25 you c9uld not remember whether ornot you had gone to the.1500 East yard 
0t whether you had, ·at that thne, taken photograph$ / video of tvfr. Partridge wo:k_!n.g .at. th<1-t site. 
At the pre-discipiinary bearing held on Match 4 tli, however, -you did remember that: you maue that 
trip in the bucket tiuck. \'lith Mr. Leigh for the purpose ofrak..iug pictures of Mr. '.Partridge working 
there at the 1500 East yard. It was repres_ented during tbe pre-disciplinary .hearing that you were 
tire<;! 1ifid that you had worked many hours tlie day before and that possibly was the reason that you 
could not remember going.to 1500 East. 1 detennined that on the evening ofJanuary 24, 2016·you 
finished the snow pl6wpig responsibilities that you had and left work at approximately 7:00 pm -
7·:30 pm after having-worked 14 hours snow plowing. I have concluded that this was ample-time 
to get the sleep that you needed before you came to work the next morning .on January 25m. l do 
not accept your rea;,oning that you could not remember going to the l ?00 East yard, or remember 
that you. took photographs/ video simply because you were fatigued because of the hours that you 
had worked the day before. 
Mr. Augustus, based on the .in.fomiation from the pre-disciplinary hearing, the transcription of the 
interview which you had_ wi.t)l Mr. Allred on January 25th, yom work tim~ !?hee_ts spec_ifically for 
January 25 th, I have determined that the aileg~ions so stated in Jncideot #2. I Violation #2 are 
substantiated . 
Incident #3 / Violation #3. On Janual)' 25, 20j 6 you were asked to attend a meeting in Glade 
Allr:ed's office,- your superviso,. You a/(cnd..eq ihat rP4..e,ting, however, durir1g the course of that 
meeting yo11 indicated that you were going to .leave. Mr. Allred asked you to stay because the 
meet1;1g_was nor )'el completed, butyou f'ejl anyway. Mr. Allre,l.i.ndicated to you that leaving the 
mef!ling ·could constifliie cause Jot discipliiif.11:y action up to and includi,rg termination of your 
emp/oj)ri.1enf. 
Aftcnevi(;wing ooth the Mormatioi1 from the pre-disciplinary hearing as weli as the transcription 
_oftlie-lnterview. which you had with Mr. Alh:ed. on fonuaiy 2511\ l have determined the allegations 
i.irlhcident #3 and Violation#} ate substantiat.ed. 
Mt. Allred luid indicated to you <;luring the interview !hat although yQu communicated your intent 
to leave prior to the inlerviewbetu.g completed. lie-said-you-should n9t feave'unti1 he said that:you 
wer,e allowed to leave. Fwther, the transcri.pt:i'on inn.icates that Mr. Alfred indicated that if you did 
le'aye, your action of leaving without being invited to leave would.be ao.·a:ctof ilisubordinatio(l that 
would be followed up with disciplinary action- up to. and including termination of your 
employment. · Althougp. the transcription of the tape shows that you ·and .M.r. Allred were talking 
over each other during this part of the discussion, the tape does indicate Mr. Allred's-comment "up 
to 'and iocludlng termination". You indicated 'during the pre-disciplinary hearirig that you did not 
hear th.at, although in the transcription.oft.he rape, youresponded to Mr. Allred after qe_lµ.d asked 
you to stay v,,ith the stat!;!'tnent ''p~ve fun with that". I conclude that you did receive warning from 
Mr. Allred that .disciplinary act.ion w9uld. be taken 1/-P• to and inclu<lU1g tertninatioa of ydur 
~tnploynient. I find that your statemeI1;t that you were not aw~e of Mr. Allred's directive not to 
·)eave his office is directly contrary to your following statement "have fun \,_;ith tha1", indicating to 
me that you wei:enot being honest in.-yo1lf ::i.nswers given in the pre .. dJscipiinary'hearipg. 
Jncident·#4'/ Violation #4. On January. 25; ZOU Mr. Glade Allred· attempted to call you on 
your cell phone. Later in the m,orning you appeared in Mr. Alfred's office who indicated to you 
that he had been trying to get a hold of you on your cell phune. You indicated to him that "I 
haven't had my cell pno_ne ".. However, it has oeen documentea Jhat )l.ou tex(ed Sherri 
Montgon:,ery tha{ same morning at 9:2.6 am, and several texts through 10:01. am on- 'that very 
'morning on your cell phone showing ihat you. did, 1)1 fact, have your cell phone wir.h you. 
The personnel' manual ofthe City regarding the cell p1i6ne policy is as follows: 
9.05.040 - Ein.ployee responsibilit ies. Any employee ofil1e City receiving efther a cell phone 
-allowance or a City issoed cell phone v,ill sign tl\e City cell phone use / and or allowaii.ce request 
fonn theref:?y certifying tlwt he or she . will provide their phone number within five days of 
,activation and v,:iffbe available for cnlls (in-posse:;gion of the phone an·d have if turned· on)_ when it 
may ·be teguired to be available for City business. If not available fo recdve calls or transmit 
calls, the emplovee shalt so noth:v his depmi.m.ent head. 
The Vemc_1l City cell phone allowaney and t1se igreement which you signed on April 22,.2013 
indicates that. yoµ agr(",ed to o.hid.e by all regul_at_iqns in the Vfrna:1 City personnel policies and 
procedures manual per.taiurrig to the use·of tl1e cell phone. 
--- ~ --- --- ---- - -- --












Specifically, regarding inc_idcnt #4 on Jailuaiy 25th, you indicated to Mr. Allred in the meeting with 
hiin. ~~ ' 'I havenii. had my cell phone." Further, -during the interview with Mr. Allred, you 
indicated "my _ph,one has been off all day." 
Durj.ng the pre~sciplinary. hearing, yoti did ackn:owloog'""Jbilf. yc:m had ~~t~ Shen-i Montgomery 
and. she bad texted you th~ mprning ·oflam~y 25il1• In fact, ·rvrs .. Montgomery indicated during 
tlie.i?re~disciplinary l_i.eatjl:ig ~ ti+a½ p~-occuu,~d between "9:26. an,1. ?Ild :.l•~9{ -am_. 
During the pre-discipl.i.nary hearing, you.had submitted a pl1one'1og from)ai.luary 25th produced by 
Strata Networks showing that you had riorreceived a phone call from :Mr. Allred or any texts from 
Ms. Montgomery. During the pre-disciplinary hearing .the record shows That you were asked to 
produce a more complete phone log frqn;i, Strata Networks. The City did receive ~ e-mail from 
Mr. Kesselring, your att_omey, indicating that you were having difficulty getting that record from 
Strata. Mr. Hmington responded to Mr. Kesselring indicating fo him specific directions as to 
how you might obtain that record and if you couldn't to fuither give Mr. Harrington a call and he 
would see ifhe could follow through with the request. Mr. Kessel.ring did respond indicating tbat 
no further detail of your phone log coul_d be obtii_ined without providing a subpoena I do have 
.~vidence, however, showing that Mr. Allr.ed did try to get a hold of you ilie morning of January 
251\ and also that Ms. Montgomery clid text you and you texted her back on January 25 th• I 
conclude, therefore, that yomlid ]1ave your phone during the morning of January 25th and that you 
n~d been using your phone during the rooming of January 251h. However, it was your choice not 
to answer the phone call from.Mr. Allred during foe rooming of January 251ti. 
After reviewing- the infonnatiori from the pre•disciplinary hearing, the transcription of the 
interview which you had with Mr. Allred on January 25th, the phone records of Mr. Allred and Ms. 
Montgomery, and you,r ov.,-n phone logs submitted at the hearing, I have de.terrnined that the 
allegations in Incident #4 and Violation #4 are ·substantiated. 
Decision for Disciplinary Action: Based on the,substantiation-ofthe violations of Vernal City 
personnel policies and.. procedures maruial as noted above and aft.et conside:ijng your responses to 
the above allegations cluring the pre-dis<;ipl"ina.ty bea1ing, I have detet'jrunecH;hat the allegatlons as 
listed above are, in fact, substantiated and as a result of this substanti~tjon ofthese violations it is 
my decision to terminate your emplpyQ.1ep.t with VemaJ City effective i·mmediat.e]y. 
In accordance with-Utah State law and Vernal City policJ, you have the right to file a formal 
appeal of your termination of employme.nt to the 9 crnal City Council who serves as the Appeals 
Bo.ard of the City following the exhaustipn of the gTicvance procedures as established by Vernal 
City personnel policies Cb.apter 16. Such-appeals shall be tiled with the City Recorder within ten 
( I 0) days after completing the grievance procedure. Please. contact me or Roxanne Behunin if 
there are any· questions regarding the process to·file an appeal of this de:cisiqn. Ericlbsed for your 
reference is a copy of the Utah'State code 10-3-1106 and Vemal City Code 2.80.020 - 2.80.025 
which more. specifically 011tli.nes. the app~als process . 
I 
In processing your termination -of emplc:iyment, severa1 dqcwnents wiil need to be provided. We 
will mnke these available to you. The prompt execution .of these document,; would be 
;ippreciated. Please note that health and dental benefits will continue· through March 31, 2016. 
Your final paycheckwill be issued within 72 fiours of you submitting o final time sheet. 
I ~---·, 1/' ~--c_ . 
;,~ ,\.~ 1;(._.. I ) ,;_,,,,,,,. 1d. 
K~n~ett, City Manager ~ 
Signature of Russell Augustus 
Receipt of Disciplinary Notice 
cc: personnei file 
1/} , l ;Jf__. 
nntr 
D;ite 








MICHAEL D. HARRINGTON - 12540 
ALLRED, BROTHERSON & HARRINGTON, P.C. 
Attorneys for Vernal City 
148 South Vernal Ave. Suite 101 
Vernal, Utah 84078 
Telephone: (435) 789-7800 
harrington@abhlawfirm.com 
BEFORE THE PERSONNEL APPEALS BOARD 
VERNAL CITY COUNCIL, VERNAL CITY 
UINTAH COUNTY , STATE OF UTAH 
IN THE APPEAL OF 
RUSSEL AUGUSTUS 
Background : 
FINDINGS OF FACT, CONCLUSIONS 
OF LAW, AND ORDER RE: 
TERMINATION APPEAL 
Russell Augustus, the Appellant, appealed the decision of 
the City Manager, which was issued following a pre-disciplinary 
hearing held March 4, 2016 in the Vernal City administrative 
conference room. 
The Appellant was given notice of the pre-disciplinary 
hearing on January 29, 2016. 
The Appellant was present at the pre-disciplinary hearing 
along with his attorney, Christian Kesselring. The City was 
represented by Mike Harrington. 
Witnesses were called and testified at that pre-disciplinary 
hearing and the Appellant had an opportunity to present his 
response to the issues raised by the pre-disciplinary hearing 
notice. 
The reasons for potential disciplinary action were outlined 
in the notice of the hearing and were reviewed again at the 
beginning of the pre-disciplinary hearing by the hearing officer 
Kenneth Bassett. 
A written decision and notice of disciplinary action was 
issued by Ken Bassett following the hearing, in which he reviewed 
each of the charges, and outlined briefly the findings, and found 
that each of the allegations were substantiated. 
The employee/Appellant, was advised by a written Notice of 
Disciplinary Action dated March 21, 2016 that based upon the 
substantiated violations, his employment with Vernal City 
was terminated effective immediately . 
Mr. Augustus, the Appellant, t hrough his attorney, filed a 
Notice of Appeal dated March 30, 2016. 
By stipulation the parties agreed that the hedrinq be(ure 
the Appeal Board would be held beyinning at 4 : 30 PM on May 3, 
2016 in the Vernal City Council Chambers. 
The Appellant was present, represented by his attorney 
Christian Kesselring, the City was represented by Michael 
Harrington. The Board was assisted by its legal advisor Dennis L. 
Judd. 
Each of the parties identified the witnesses they intended 
to call and those witnesses were sworn and the Hearing Board 
invoked the exclusionary rule. 
The following witnesses were called and examined: 
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The parties stipulated to the admission of a packet of 
exhibits from each party. 
Near the end of the hearing counsel for the parties 
requested an opportunity to submit a brief on several legal 
issues which the Hearing Board agreed t o allow with the briefs to 
be submitted by May 10 , 2016. Those briefs were submitted and 
were considered by the Board prior to voting and making its 
decision. 
At the conclusion of the hearing the Board met briefly to 
deliberate but, duP. to the lateness of the hour, adjourned the 
meeting and deliberations and agreed to resume deliberations on 
May 9th, 2016 at 8:00 PM to allow the Board an opportunity to 
review all of the exhibits and carefully consider the testimony 






The Board met on May 9, 2016 but had not yet received the 
briefs from the parties and after deliberating and discussing the 
evidence further, adjourned th~ meeting until May 16, 2016, at 
6:00 PM to allow opportunity to consider the briefs before making 
a fi na l decision. 
Each of the Board members has carefully considered the 
testimony and evidence presented at the hearing, as well as t he 
exhibils submitted by the parties by stipulation, and has 
listened t o the recording of the meeting between the Appellant 
and his department head Glade Allred on January 25, 2016, the 
pre-disciplinary hearing transcript, and has considered not only 
the words spoken but the demeanor and tone of voice of the 
Appellant and other witnesses from the hearing before the Board 
and the meeting on January 25, 2016 . 
The Board has considered the briefs submitted by each of the 
parties. 
The Board considered the proposed ballot and the comments 
made by counsel for each party regarding the ballot and adopted 
the ballot prepared by the legal counsel for the Board, a copy of 
which is attached. 
The standard of review used by the Board in considering the 
actions and decision of the City Manager to terminate the 
Appe l lant is abuse of discretion with the evidentiary standard of 
substantial evidence being required to support the basis o f the 
decision. 
Four (4) reasons or policy violations were noted in the 
Notice of Pre-Disciplinary Hearing and in the Notice of 
Disciplinary Action. They were : 
1 . Inefficiency or inability to sati sfactorily perform 
assigned duties; misusing, destroying, or damaging any city 
property, or the property of any employee ; deliberately 
restricting output; 
2 . Dishonesty related to job performance; 
3. InsuQordination ; and 
4. Violation of city personnel policies or procedures, 
including the cell phone policy . 
Having considered the documents filed with the Board, t he 
evidence and the argument s, and now being fuly informed, 
The Board Finds That: 
A. Regarding the charge of "inefficiency or inability to 
satisfactorily perfo~m assigned duties; mi susing, destroying, or 
darnc1ging a ny city propP.rty , or the property of any employee; 
deliberately cestricting outputu; 
1. On January 21, 2016 the Appellant was assigned to place 
banners on poles on the west side of the city under the direction 
of Jeff Gardner, who was the designated supervisor of that 
project. Mr . Augustus was operating a bucket truck owned by the 
city. 
2. Later in the morning, the bucket truck experienced 
mechanical problems and was returned to motor pool for repairs. 
While the bucket truck was being repaired, the Appellant drove a 
city pickup truck to the 1500 East Yard, reportedly to check on 
the repair of a water line leak, and, as he was driving away from 
that locdLiun with Mr. Leigh as a passenger, had a conversation 
with his supervisor Mr . Allred. 
3 . After lunch the Appellant took the bucket truck with Mr. 
Michael Leigh , another city equipment operator, as a passenger, 
fueled the truck, and then proceeded down 500 North , turning 
South on 1500 East to pass by the 1500 East Yard . The Appellant 
claims that his purpose in taking that route was to fix banners 
on the east side of town that Mr. Leigh had earlier installed 
incorrectly. There is no evj_dence th~t Mr . Gardner or Mr. Allred 
approved diverting equipment and personnel from the west side of 
town to the east side of town. 
4. The Board finds that the real reason for the diversion 
was that the Appellant desired to drive by the 1500 East Yard to 
video another city empl oyee, BJ Partridge, who was testing a 
piece of city equipment at that yard, as assigned by Mr. Allred . 
5. The video was taken using the Appellant's cell phone, 
which is a city subsidized cell phone, and as such is suhject ~o 
city cell phone policy. 
6. It appears from the video that the Appellant introduced 
at the hearing, that the Appellant was driving the city bucket 
truck while videoing with his cell phone, which is an unsafe and 
illegal practice. During the meeting between Mr . Augustus and Mr. 
Allred on January 25, Mr. Augustus refused to answer questions 
about where he took the bucket truck after lunch and claimed 
several times that he returned to the west side of the city to 
work on banners as he had been assigned. In subsequent 
proceedings, the Appellant admitted that that was not tr.ue. 
7. The Appellant later claimed that the purpose of the video 
was safety concerns, however the Board finds that the video was 
never provided to his department head if1 spite of a request that 
he do so, nor was it provided to anyone else in the city 
administration until the hearing before the Appeals Board. The 
Board finds that the Appellants stat.e1nents regarding the video 
are false. 
B. The Board notes that when questioned by his supervisor, 
Glade Allred, several days after the incident the Appellant was 
very evasive and was not truthful about the purpose of his going 







9. Mr. Augustus's claims about the reason for his taking the 
video lack credibility for at least the following reasons: 
a. If he was concerned a~out safety of persons or 
oquipment he should have immediately provided the video to Mr. 
Allred or to Allen Parker nr Ken Bassett , which he did not do and 
in fact refused to provide the video; 
b. He was evasive and untruthful about having taken the 
video, and the purposes of the video; it appears from the video 
that was provided that he was driving by the yard while takinq 
the virl~n rather than stopping in a safe manner to take the video 
and reporting his concerns immediately to appropriate city 
officials ; 
c. He failed and refused to provide the video to his 
supervisor when directly requested to do so, and claimed during 
the meeting that he did not have his cell phone and did not know 
where it was, which is a violation of city policy . 
10. The charges in Count one are established by substantial 
evidence. 
11. The Appellant was operating a large piece of city 
equipment in an area where he should not have been, occupying the 
time of that equipment and the time of himself and another city 
employee, engaging in activity which he apparently felt 
uncomfortable in reporting or admitting to his supervisor when 
questioned, at a time when he had been assigned to work at the 
opposite end of the cj,ty. 
12 . The Appellant's conduct wasted city resources and placed 
the city at risk and was contrary to his assigned work area . 
13. Mr. Augustus's statements regarding the incident l ack 
any credibility. 
B. Regarding the charge of "dishonesty related to job 
performan_ce": 
1. The Board, having reviewed the transcript of the meeting 
between Mr . Augustus and his department head Mr . Allred, and 
having heard the tone of voice and the evasiveness evidenced in 
that interview, and based upon the hearing testimony and 
exhibits, finds that the Appellant was dishonest in h is 
statements and explanations c oncerning his activities on January 
21, 2015, including the reason for taking the city bucket truck 
and another city employee to 1500 East and in his stated reasons 
for videoing Mr. Partridge. 
2. The Appellant refused to acknowledge videoing a fellow 
city employee operating a piece of city equipment, was evasive, 
and avoided or refused to answer direct questions concerning the 
incident . 
3. The Appellant stated that he would provide a copy of the 
video when he finally acknowledged that he had it, which he 
failed to do. 
4. The Appellant falsely stated that his concern was the 
safety of an employee or equipment which, as outlined above, 
lacks any credibility. 
5. At the hearing before the Appeals Board , the Board 
observed Mr. Augustus, both while he was testifying and when he 
was not testifying, and finds that his answers to questions 
propounded by the attorney for the city were evasive, that his 
demeanor evidenced lack of truthfulness , and that based upon his 
actions and statements in the recorded conversation with his 
supervisor and his testimony at the hearing it is difficult to 
afford any degree of credibility to the statements made by the 
Appellant . 
6. The Board finds that there is substantial evidence to 
support the finding that the Appellant was dishonest: 
a. He stated that he could not remember or had not gone 
by the 1500 East Yard; 
b. He claimed that he had returned to work putting up 
banners on the west side of the city, traveling along 100 North; 
c. He claimed that he did not have his telephone when 
Mr. Allred attempted to contact him on January 25; 
d . He stated that his purpose in going by the 1500 East 
yard was solely to fix banners on the East side of the city. 
e. When questioned during his meeting with his 
supervisor and at the hearing about matters that he did not want 
to admit to or discuss, Mr. Augustus was deceptive and claimed he 
couldn ' t remember, yet on t he same dates he appeared to have a 
very vivid recollection when it served his interests; 
f. The Board finds the testimony of Ricky Green, who 
reported Mr. Augustus to be dishonest to be credible; and 
g. Mr . Augustus changed his story repeatedly, and 
omitted facts and feigned lack of memory. Mr . Augustus a l so made 
misleading statements about his use of city equipment and about 
the video, and made dishonest statements about taking the video 
and about the purpose of the video. 
C, Regarding the charge of "insubordinationn: 
1 . The Board has reviewed the transcript and listened to the 
recording of the meeting between the Appel lant and his department 
head Mr . Allred on January 25 , 2 016, and finds that there is more 




• insubordinate throughout the meeting with his supervisor. 
2. The Appellant's genP.ral tone of voice, attituJe, tapping 
of a marker on the table, and refusal and failure to answer 
questjons honestly and directly demonstrated a lack of respect 
for his s upervisor. 
3 . The Appellant was evasive, refused to answer questions, 
was disrespectful , ordered the .::;upervisor to "move on" after 
evading questions, cursed, and ultimately walked out of the 
meeting after being specifically and clearly directed by his 
supervisor to remain in the meet i ng. Moreover, he did walk out 
after being advised that refusal to remain in the meeting would 
be considered insubordination and may result in his termination. 
4. The Appellant's disrespectful retort as he left the 
meeting "good luck with that" further illustrates a series of 
disrespectful and insubordinate statements and conduct by the 
Appellant during that meeting toward his supervisor , which is 
illustrated to some degree by the transcript but more forcefully 
by the audio recording of the meeting . 
5 . The Board is convinced that the purpose of the 
l\ppellant' s vi dP.o on the east side of I h~ , : I 1.y c,n January 21, 
when he was assigned to work on the west side of the city , was 
not motivated by a safety concern but r athe r was an effort to 
undermine and get information to damage his department head . 
6. The Appellant ' s attitude during the meeting with Mr. 
Allred was insubordinate, confrontational, dishonest , and 
disrespectful. 
7. At no time following that meeting did the Appellant make 
any effort to apologize to his supervisor or to demonstrate any · 
willingness or desire to work cooperatively with his supervisor 
or make any effort to resolve any concerns or differences . 
8. Had the Appellant's attitude following that meeting up to 
and through the hearing before the Board been different or more 
cooperative or upfront and honest the result might well have been 
different. Instead the Appellant has remained defiant, aggressive 
and dishonest. 
9 . In the meeting with Mr. Allred, the Appellant was 
requested at least twice to provide a copy of the video that he 
took while driving the city truck, yet he did not provide that 
until played for the first time at the hearing before the Appeals 
Board. During his testimony before the Appeals Board he claimed 
no one asked for the video which is a clear act o f dishonesty and 
false statement under oath before the Appeals Board, as shown by 
the audio recording and transcription of that meeting. 
10. From all of the evidence , including the transcripts and 
recording of the interview with his supervisor through the 
hearing before the Appeals Board , the Board finds that Mr. 
Augustus's actions have been targeted towards undermining his 
supervisor so that he could take over the Department . 
11. Mr. Augustus's statements about his not having his phone 
available when his supervisor was attempting to contact him are 
untruthful and also insubordinate. It is c l ear that he had his 
telephone available since he made use of it , yet he failed to 
answer cal]s from his supervisor or to return calls that had been 
made to him . 
12. The Appellant was untruthful in claiming that his texts 
with Sherri Montgomery were dur ing his break since the time line 
of those texts demonstrates a period in excess of a normal break. 
13 . The Appellant is dishonest and insubordinate in refusing 
to admit his activities, lying about his activities , and failing 
to acknowledge his fault and misconduct when he made a mistake. 
His attitude throughout has been to cast blame on others but not 
to take any responsibility himself . 
14 . The lack of respect for his supervisor is not only 
demonstrated by the transcripts and recordings prior to the 
hearing, but the Board notes, his facial expressions , demeanor 
and behavior at the hearing when answering questions regarding 
the events and during the testimony of Mr . Allred including 
smirking, rolling his eyes and other conduct and expressions 
further confirms a lack of respect and an insubordinate attitude . 
15 . A continuing attitude of insubordination and disrespect 
was also demonstrated and observed by the Board during the 
hearing. During the testimony of Mr. Bassett, Mr . Augustus was 
observed to glare at the witness and rolled his eyes, and acted 
in a hostile and disrespectful manner. 
16. The Vernal City Road Department is a fairly small 
department with a limited number of employees. The actions of Mr. 
Augus t us show that he is not amenable to supervision and cannot 
work there under the direction of the department head, Mr. 
Allred . This results in part from his insubordination and his 
dishonesty in dealing with his department head and with others 
and from the fact that he has not made any effort to resolve the 
issues or acknowledge his misconduct . Even at the hearing it was 
apparent that he retains a defiant, disrespectful attitude, and 
has no willingness to acknowledge his own errors . Any discipline 
l ess than termination would not bring about needed change. The 
Appellant's return to the road department would be detrimental to 
the morale, productivity, and operation of the department, and 
would undermine the ability of Mr . Allred t o manage the 
employees. 
D. Regarding the charge of "violation of city personnel 







1. There is substant ial evidence that the Appellant violated 
the City's cell phone policies and procedures as indicated in the 
Notice of Disciplinary Action and as outlined in the findings set 
forth above. The City Manager did not abuse his discretion in 
finding violations of the personnel policies including cell phone 
policy. 
E . Regarding issues raised in briefs: 
1 . A supervisor has the right and the responsibility to look 
into concerns that arise about an employee and to investigate . 
That investigation may include interviewing or questioning the 
employee or other witnesses. Such a meeting is part of the 
supervisory responsibility of the supervisor or department head, 
and is not a pre-discipli ne hearing, even if the supervisor has 
outlined a list of questions or issues of concern prior to the 
meeting. Meeting with the Appellant to give him an opportunity to 
explain what had transpired on January 21 was proper, and the 
fact that Mr. Allred had outlined some possible questions as part 
of his fact-f inding pursuit does not undermine his credibility, 
as suggested by the Appellant's brief. 
2. According to the Appellant's brief both Mr. Leigh and Mr. 
Augustus were questioned by their supervisor on January 25th 
about the same incidents and both were instructed to take some 
paid vacation time. Apparently Mr. Leigh responded differently to 
the meeting with his supervisor than Mr. Augustus such that he 
was not terminated. As outlined above, Mr . Augustus ' s attitude 
and behavior took him down an entirely different road. 
3 . Insubordination. 
a. The Board finds that Mr. Augustus behavior, 
statements, and actions demonstrate that when he ignored the 
directions to help finish installing banners on the west side of 
the city and instead drove the city bucket truck and another city 
employee to the east side of the city and passed the yard while 
taking video with his city subsidized phone, his intent was to 
undermine his department head, Mr . Allred . The video that he took 
of another employee operating the city equipment, which was 
provided for the first time at the hearing before the Appeals 
Board demonstrates that he was unsafely operating the city bucket 
truck by videoing while driving, and it appears that he had 
planned in advance to take the video and had manipulated his 
phone while driving and prior to reaching the yard. 
b . The claims made by the Appellant that the purpose of 
videoing was to address a safety concern is entirely contradicted 
by his failure to provide that video to anyone in the city or to 
report his concerns to his supervisor or other city officials. 
c. In fact, Mr. Augustus went out of his way to avoid 
admitt i ng that he had taken the video during his meeting with his 
supervisor and failed and refused in spite of repeated requests 
to provide the video taken on the city subsidized cell phone. In 
so doing he violated city policy and contradicted any argument 
that he undertook that activity for a legitimate purpose. When 
interviewed several days lat er c1hout the ev~nts on the day that 
Mr. Augu3tu3 took the video with his cell phone, he cl aimed no 
memory of thAt particular event but had good recall of t he other 
events of that samA rlay. Tf he h~d a legitimate concern about 
safety issues, it is not credible to believe that he would 
remember other insignificant events of the day but lack rer.c1l I. as 
to that matter . 
d . During the in Le.r.view with Ml.' , Allred, the Appellant 
w?.s evasive and defensive and aggressive when questioned on those 
matters. 
e . During his testimony before the hearing Board whe n 
questioned by opposing counsel about those matters he once again 
r eacted in an evasive, confrontational manner. 
f . During questioning by opposing counsel about matters 
discussed during the staff or safety meeting· early in the day the 
Appellant admitted that he missed a portion of the meeting to 
take a persona l phone call , yet insisted that he had a better 
knowledge of everything that was discussed during that meeting 
than his supervisor who was presen t for the entire meeting . 
Moreover, the Appellant became i ntransigent and his behavior and 
attitude on the stand was consistent with the t one of the 
recording of his interview with Mr. Allred and evidenced lack of 
credibility . 
g . The events from January 21 , 2016, and the attit ude 
and behavior of the Appellant from that time t h rough the 
conclusion of the evidentiary hearing demonstrate more interest 
in undermining his supervisor and no evidence whatsoever of any 
effort or desire to work cooperatively within the Department 
structure or chain of command . 
h. The Appellant ' s attitude, nonverbal displays, and 
facial expressions during the hearing on the stand were 
disturbing and pronounced and reflect an attitude , disrespect , 
and a disregard for truth. 
i. The Appel l ant's statement as he left the meeting 
with his supervisor in blatant disregard of the ins t ruction that 
he remain at the meeting - the comment "good luck with that" - is 
consistent with the attitude and actions displayed at the 
evidentiary hearing before the Board . The "good luck with that" 
attitude which remains unchanged shows that he cannot work 
effectively under the supervision of t he road department head, 
and that his continuing presence there and insolent attitude 
would be disruptive to the good order and efficient operation of 
the entire department. 





pre - disci plinary hearing or even during the evidentiary hearinq 
demonstrated through his words and demeanor and behavior any 
change of attitude, recognition of his misconduct, any desire to 
mend fences and work cooperatively with his supervisor and within 
the structure of the department as a positive productive employee 
the outcome might we l l be different . 
4. Authority to Issue Order. 
a. The Appellant has not provided any substantial 
evidence that Mr. Allred did not have proper authority to direct 
him to remain at the meeting. It is within the inherent authority 
of a supervisor to inquire into issues of concern relating to an 
employee and to request information from the employee as part of 
that process . The nature of· the work for which the Appellant is 
employed frequently requires work beyond a specific quitting 
time. 
b. Even if the Appellant were on an eight (8) hour day 
schedule he had missed several hours that day for personal 
business , and the supervisor could require him to stay . 
c . The Department head did not order Mr. Augustus to 
remain in the meeting for the purpose of providing "a foot 
massage" but rather in an attempt to pierce the intransigent 
refusal of the Appellant to honestly and directly answer 
questions propounded by his supervisor . 
d. The Board believes that is a proper exercise of 
supervisory responsibility and authority. 
5. Paid Vacation Ti me. 
a . Testimony at the hearing shows that the policy and 
long-standing practice at the city has been that department heads 
may, under appropriate circumstances , requi re an employee to take 
several days of vacation . This may be to allow the employee to 
deal with personal issues, or it may be to allow an employee time 
to cool off or settle down. That is paid time off. The direction 
to Mr. Augustus to take vacation time was consistent with that 
policy and practice . In light of the behavior and attitude of the 
Appellant, Mr. Augustus, the direction to take some paid vacation 
time off was advisable , and was not a n abuse of discretion nor 
did it exceed the authori ty of the supervisor . 
b. The application and imposition of paid v~cation time 
was allowed pursuant to city policies section 5.01.010 and action 
5.01.060, including the provision that "as he deems necessary, a 
department head may requ i r e an employee lo use any accrued 
vacation leave . " The application and interpretation of that 
policy by the department head and th~ city manager is consistent 
with long-standing application and interpretation of that policy, 
and the Appellant did not present any substantial evidence to t he 
contrary. 
F. Regarding ballot issues: 
l. Pre-Disciplinary Procedure5. 
a . Prior to imposing any discipline involving a 
suspension without pay for more thRn twn (2) days, termination, 
transfer to a position of lesser pay for disciplinary r.easons 
etc . as defined by state statute, a notice of a pre-disciplinary 
hearing including at least a brief outline of the charges or 
allegations against the employee is required. A sufficient notice 
of pre-disciplinary hearing was provided to the Appellant and he 
was given notice or an outline of the allegations against him and 
ample opportunity to prepare for that hearjng. A hearing was 
conducted at which he was represented by counsel and had an 
opportunity to present his response to the allegations as well as 
to question witnesses against him. No discipline which is subject 
to the provisions of Utah Code Ann. Section 10-3-1105 and 1106 
was imposed prior to notice and the pre-disciplinary hearing. 
Paid leave or vacation does not require a pre-disciplinary 
hearing. 
b. It is noted that Mr . Augustus repeatedly claimed 
during the hearing that he was a supervisor or second-in-command 
under the Department Head in the road department. Pursuant to 
Utah Code Annotated section 10-3-1105 (2) (c) (vi) and (vii), a 
person in that position, i.e. a deputy head of a municipal 
department or division or a superintendent, may be an at will 
employee not entitled to the procedural protections outlined in 
the statute and the city ordinance . 
2. Disparity of Discipline . 
a. At the evidentiary hearing the defendant asked 
questions about several other non-road department ·employees whose 
discipline was less than termination. The evidence shows that 
each of those other employees demonstrated an entirely different 
attitude when confronted with their mistakes and were willing to 
acknowledge that they needed to change and committed to improved 
behavior or performance . None of the other situations presented 
demonstrated a continuing defiance and disrespectful attitude and 
for that reason among others none of those cases are comparable 
to the present case of Mr. Augustus . 
b. The Appellant failed to present any substantial 
evidence that he has been treated disparately and he has failed 
to meet his burden in that regard. 
J. Proportionality. 
a . The Appellant has failed to pres ent any evidence 
that his discipline is disproportionate to the violations of 
policy which the Board finds he committed. The Boa rel 11n;rn.:i.mous.l y 
finds that the City Manager did not abuse his discretion in 




facts and circumstances. The Board is overwhelmingly convinced 
based upon its observations of Mr. Augustus during the hearing, 
his testimony at the hearing, and his attitude and statements 
during his meeting with his supervisor and his inconsistent 
statements arising from the pre-disciplinary hearing that he 
lacks credibility, that he is dishonest, and that he was and 
remains insubordinate. In general Mr . Augustus was the most 
compelling witness against himself. 
G. The Board unanimously finds that the facts support the 
charges made against the Appellant. 
H. The Board unanimously finds that the charges warrant the 
sanction imposed and that the disciplinary action of termination 
should be sustained and that the City Manager did not abuse his 
discretion in imposing the sanction of termination. In connection 
therewith, the Board has considered as requested by the Appellant 
whether the sanction imposed was proportionate to the offense and 
whether or not the sanction is consistent with sanctions imposed 
against other employees for similar conduct . 
I . The Board makes the determination and finding that in 
light of the particularly serious violat ions of dishonesty and 
insubordination combined with the other violations including 
inefficiency, misusing city property, deliberately restricting 
output, violation of the cell phone policy that the sanction of 
termination is not an abuse of discretion . 
J. The Appellant has not demonstrated that the sanction of 
termination is inconsistent with sanctions imposed against other 
employees for similar conduct. 
The Board Concludes That: 
A. The claims of the Appellant that he is a supervisor or 
second-in-command in the road Department may render him an at 
will employee pursuant to Utah Code Ann. Section 10-31105 (2) (vi) 
and (i i v) . 
B. Notwithstanding that claim, t he Appellant has been 
afforded full due process consistent wi th the case law of t he 
United States Supreme Court and the appellate courts of t he State 
of Utah and State statute and city ordi nanc e . 
C. The Appellant was given notice of a pre-disciplinary 
hearing which sufficiently outlined the alleged misconduct and 
viol ations of Vernal Ci ty personnel policies and procedures. 
D. The Appellant was given more than a month to prepare f or 
the pre-disciplinary hearing, which was held on March 4, 2016. 
E. At that hearing, the Appellant was represented by capable 
counsel, and he had an opportunity to present testimony and 
evidence in response to those allegations and to question 
witnesses against him. 
F. The City Manager conducted the hearing and made his 
determination in light of Lhe facts and j_nfo1:mation presented and 
the applicable policies and standards of the city. The standard 
of review of that decision is abuse of discretion. 
G. Mr. Augustus timely filed his Notice of Appea1 and 
alleged Lhdl Lht: City Manager ' s findings were not supported by 
the evidence and tha.l lhe di=c.i.s.i.on to impose the penalty of 
termination for the misconduct was arbitrary and capricious and 
denied Mr. Augustus due process righls. 
H. The Board has reviewed the decision of the City Manager 
first to determine if the findings are supported by the evidence. 
The findings are each supported by substantial evidence. 
I. The Board has reviewed the decision of the City Manager 
to determine if there was an abuse of discretion and if the City 
Manager acted in an arbitrary and capricious manner, thereby 
denying Mr. Augustus his due process rights. The Board finds that 
the City Manager (1) did not abuse his discretion , (2) did not 
act in an arbitrary and capricious manner, and (3) did not deny 
Mr. Augustus's due process rights under state and federal law . 
J . Both substantive and procedural due process was afforded 
to the Appellant throughout the proceedings. 
K. Mr. Augustus was provided with adequate notice, prior to 
termination or any loss of income, was provided with ample 
opportunity to prepare, and was afforded a pre-disciplinary 
hearing where he was represented by counsel . 
L. The Appellant was afforded an appeal at a time he 
stipulated to and during which he was ably represented by capable 
and effective legal counsel and was allowed to call all of the 
witnesses that he wished and to cross examine all of the 
witnesses called by t he city. 
M. The Appel l ant was afforded the opportunity to submit any 
exhibits that he wishRd for consideration by the Hearing Board 
and to submit a brief on certain issues, which was carefu lly 
considered by the Board. 
N. From the evidence presented the Board hRs found R 
violation by the Appellant of the policies outlined in the 
notices and in the notice of termination. 
O. The meeting between Mr . ~llred and Mr. Augustus was an 
appropriate exercise of supervisory responsibility by Mr. Allred 
and did not require the formalities appropriate for a 
predisciplinary hearing. 
P. The application and imposition of paid vacation time was 
• 
allowed pursuant to c i ty policies sect i on 5 . 01.010 and action 
S.01.060 . 
Q. The conduct of Mr . Augustus ~t the meeting with his 
department head on January 21 , 2016 was insubordinate . The 
capstone was his def i ant refusal to remain in the meeting when 
specifically and directly instructed twice to do so by his 
supervisor even when he was told t hat refusa l to remain would be 
insubordination and may result in his termination, the comment as 
he walked out the door was ~good luck with that". That was not, 
by any means, the only insubordination during that meeting 
however. Listening to the recording of the meeting along with the 
transcript shows that the Appellant repeatedly refused to answer 
questions, was evasive , omitted facts , was dishonest about facts 
and circumstances, demonstra ted a defiant and hostile att i t ude 
towards his supervisor, refused to provide the video when 
requested to do so after finally acknowledging its existence, and 
constantl y and loudly tapped his pen on the desk during the 
conversation . Throughout that process the Department Head 
remained calm and did not raise his voice while the Appellant 
became hostile and agitated after being infor med and with full 
knowledge that he was being recor ded . Mr . Augustus never 
acknowledged any personal responsibility or fault or error on his 
part and continued to place all of the blame on Mr . Al l red 
consistent with his apparent intentional design to undermine the 
authority of his department head. 
R. The facts do not support a claim by the Appellant that he 
believed in good faith that he was entitled to leave the meeting. 
S . Consistent with state law and city policy, the only 
disciplinary actions which invoke due process protections are: 
dismissal, demotion or reduction in pay, suspension of over two 
days without pay, or transfer to a position with less 
remuneration for disciplinary purposes . A meeting with the 
Department Head to discuss possible misconduct or a direction to 
take paid vacation time does not constitute f ormal discipline 
requiring approval of the City Manager for a predisciplinary 
hearing. 
T. The Board is not constrained strict ly by the rules of 
evidence and p r ocedure required in judicial proceedings and was 
intentionally very liberal in allowing the presentation of 
evidence, including belaboring certain issues a nd lines of 
questioning, so as to , within reason, allow the parties to 
present whatever evi dence they wish~d . Based upon the stipulation 
of the parties the Hearing Board also carefully studied all of 
the exhibits including the audio files provided and video r.lip in 
formulating its findings of fact in reaching its decision . 
De c i s ion o f t he Appea1s Board 
A. After hours of testimony at the hearing, additional hours 
of study of exhibits , and hours of deliberation, the Board 
pt .,. 
members each separately <,;a~t Lheir ballo t s i n secret . The ballots 
were delivered to the Deputy City Recorder/Clerk of the HeaLing 
who opened the envelopes in the presence of the Board and counted 
balloLs. 
B. Ballot question number 1: Do the facts s upport t he 
charges made by the Department head? 
Five (5) ballots were marked YES 
Zero (0) ballots were marked NO. 
c . Ballot question number 2: If you find that the empl oyee 
violated one or more of the Vernal Ci ty polici e s stated in the 
termination notice did t he City Manager abuse his dis cretion or 
exceed his authority in terminat i ng the empl oyee? 
Zero (0) ballots were marked YES 
Five (5) ballots were marked NO. 
D. The ballot instructed t he Hearing Board members to 
consider the following i nstruction which was added pursuant to a 
request of the Appellant: 
To decide if the Appellant ' s discipline was 
unwarranted, or if the City Manager abused his 
discretion or e xceeded his authority, consider : (1) 
when the violations of city policy are viewed as a 
whole, in light of a ll the circumstances, is t he 
punishment dispropor~ionate to the offenses such that 
the sanction of termination is unwarranted, and (2) has 
the Appellant demonstrated or shown that t he sancti on 
of termination is wholly inconsistent with sanctions 
imposed agains t other employees fo r similar misconduct? 
t he 
Christ i a n Kesselring, counsel 
f or Appellant Russell Augustus 
Hearing Board is t hat the 
Augustus , s warranted . The 
minati s sustained. 
Michael Harrington, counsel 
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Title 10. Utah Municipal Code 
Chapter 3. Municipal Government 
Current through Chapter 2, 2016 Fourth Special Session 
§ 10-3-1106. Discharge, suspension without pay, or involuntary transfer -Appeals - Board -
Procedure 
( 1) An employee to which Section 10-3-1105 applies may not be discharged, suspended 
without pay, or involuntarily transferred to a position with less remuneration: 
(2) 
(3) 
(a) because of the employee's politics or religious belief; or 
(b) incident to, or through changes, either in the elective officers, governing body, or 




If an employee other than an employee described in Subsection 10-3-1105(2) is 
discharged, suspended for more than two days without pay, or involuntarily 
transferred from one position to another with less remuneration for any disciplinary 
reason, the employee may, subject to Subsection (2)(b), appeal the final decision 
to discharge, suspendwithout pay, or involuntarily transfer to an appeal board or 
hearing officer established under Subsection (7). 
If the municipality provides an internal grievance procedure, the employee shall 
exhaust the employee's rights under that grievance procedure before appealing to 
the appeal board or hearing officer. 
Each appeal under Subsection (2) shall be taken by filing written notice of the 
appeal with the municipal recorder in accordance with procedures established by a 
municipalitywithin 10 calendar days after: 
(i) if the municipality provides an internal grievance procedure, the employee 
receives notice of the final disposition of the municipality's internal 
grievance procedure; or 
(ii) if the municipality does not provide an internal grievance procedure, the 
discharge, suspension, or involuntary transfer. 
(b) (i) Upon the filing of an appeal under Subsection (3)(a), the municipal recorder 
~ 
shall refer a copy of a properly filed appeal to the appeal board or hearing 
officer described in Subsection (7). 
(ii) Upon receipt of the referral from the municipal recorder, the appeal board or • 
hearing officer shall schedule a hearing to take and receive evidence and 
fully hear and determine the matter which relates to the reasonfor the 
discharge, suspension, or transfer. 
~ 
(4) (a) An employee who is the subject of the discharge, suspension, or transfer may: 
(i) appear in person and be represented by counsel; 
(ii) have a hearing open to the public; 
~ 
(iii) confront the witness whose testimony is to be considered; and 
(iv) examine the evidence to be considered by the appeal board. 
(b) An employee or the municipality may request the hearing described in Subsection • 
(4 )(a)(ii). 
(5) (a) (i) A decision of the appeal board shall be by secret ballot. 
(ii) The appeal board or the hearing officer shall certify a decision by the appeal 
board or hearing officer, respectively, with the recorder no later than 15 
days after the day on which the hearing is held, except as provided in 
Subsection (5)(a)(iii). 
~ 
(iii) For good cause, the appeal board or hearing officer may extend the 15-day 
period under Subsection (5)(a)(ii) to a maximum of 60 calendar days, if the 
employee and municipality both consent. 
(b) If the appeal board or hearing officer finds in favor of the employee, the appeal ~ 
board or hearing officer shall provide that the employee shall receive: 
(i) the employee's salary for the period of time during which the employee is 
discharged or suspended without pay less any amounts the employee 
earned from other employment during this period of time; or <&, 
(ii) any deficiency in salary for the period during which the employee was 
transferred to a position of less remuneration. 
(6) ~ (a) A final action or order of the appeal board or hearing officer may be reviewed by 
the Court of Appeals by filing with that court a petition for review. 
(b) A petition under Subsection (6)(a) shall be filed within 30 days after the issuance of 
the final action or order of the appeal board or hearing officer. 
(c) The Court of Appeals' review shall be: 
(i) 
(ii) 
on the record of the appeal board or hearing officer; and 
for the purpose of determining if the appeal board or hearing officer abused 
its discretion or exceeded its authority. 
(?) (a) The method and manner of choosing a hearing officer or the members of the 
appeal board, the number of members, the designation of a hearing officer's or 
appeal board member's term of office, and the procedure for conducting an appeal 
and the standard of review shall be prescribed by the governing body of each 
municipality by ordinance. 
(b) For a municipality operating under a form of government other than a council-
mayor form under Chapter 3b, Part 2, Council-mayor Form of Municipal 
Government, an ordinance adopted under Subsection (7)(a) may provide that the 
governing body of the municipality shall serve as the appeal board. 
(8) This section does not apply to an employee: 
(a) described in Subsection 10-3-1105(2); or 
(b) discharged or transferred to a position with less remuneration if the discharge or 
transfer is the result of a layoff, reorganization, or other non-disciplinary reason. 
Cite as Utah Code § 10-3-1106 
History. Amended by Chapter 321, 2012 General Session, §3, eff. 5/8/2012. 
Amended by Chapter 19, 2008 General Session 
<g Amended by Chapter 115, 2008 General Session 
2J6/2!J17 Section 5.01.010 Purpose. 
Chapter 5.01 ANNUAL VACATION LEAVE 
Section 5.01.010 Purpose. 
The purpose of annual vacation leave is to alluw an employee time to bolh mentally and physically refresh 
himself in order that he be better n.ble to carry oul lhe duties of his work. To achieve this goal, it is the intent of 
Vernal City to have the employees schedule annual vacation leave dming the course of his employment. 
(Amended 11/03/2004, Res.2004-15) 
http://vemalcity.crG'codelhumM_resoorces/Personnel/TiUe_SI01/010.html 1/1 
2/8/2JJ17 SecUon 5.01.040 Accumulaticn. 
Chapter 5.0 I ANNUAL VACATION LEAVE 
Section 5.01.040 Accumulation. 
The maximum annual leave which can be accrued is thirty (30) days or 240 hours. Any accrued annual leave 
in excess of 30 days shall be forfeited on December 31st of each year. 
The City Manager may approve up to a sixty (60) day extension period for the use of annual leave beyond 
December 31st when, in his opinion, the mandated use of such leave would create management concerns for any 
department of the City. (Amended 11/03/2004, Res.2004-15) 
(Res. 2008-46, Amended, 12/17/2008, Prior Text) 
http://vernalcfty.agfcodelhumanJescuces/Personnel!Titre_S/01/040.html 1/1 
2/&"2017 Section 5.01.060 Sc:hedullrg. 
Chapter 5.01 ANNUAL VACATION LEAVE 
Section 5.01.060 Scheduling. 
An employee's vacation shall he, a<. much as possible, scheduled for the employee's convenience. However, 
vacations ~ be scheduled through Department Heads so as not to interfere seriously with or impair departmental 
efficiency. All employees shall submit Request for Leave forms before talcing any vacation. As he deems necessary, a 
Department Head may require an employee to use any accrued vacation leave. (Form in appendix pages) (Amended 
11/03/2004, Res.2004-15) 
http://vernalcity.a-wcodelhumanJesrurces/Persomel/litle_SI01/reo.hlml 1/1 
21&'2017 Sectia, 5.06.000.Admlnlstrative leave pending dlsclplinary adia,. 
Cha,pter 5.06 ADMINISTRATIVE LEAVE 
Section 5.06.030 Administrative leave pending disciplinary action. 
Any employee may be granted administrative leave with pay pending the outcome of an investigation 
undertaken to determine if disciplinary action against the employee is warranted. The City Manager must give 
approval of such leave. (Amended 11/03/2004, Res.2004-15) 
http-J/vernalcity.ag/codEtlhumanJesources/Persomel/'Title_Sl06'030.html 1/1 
2/8/'1fJ17 Section 12.05.030 Causes fer Dlsclpllnary Action. 
Chapter 12.05 DISCIPLINE 
Section 12.05.030 Causes for Disciplinary Action. 
An employee holding any position with Vernal City may be placed on probationary stntus, transferred, demoted, 
reduced in pay, suspended with or without pay, or terminated, for any of the following reasons including, but are not 
liwit~tl lo lhe following: 
A. A violation of any of the City Personnel policies and procedures, or any other administrative policies, as adopted 
by resolution of the Vernal City Council; 
B. Neglect of duty; 
C. Refusal to obey a reasonable order by any supervisor, either written or verbal; 
D. Inefficiency or inability to satisfactorily perform assigned duties; 
E. An act hostile to public service; 
F. Falsification or unauthorized alteration of City records; 
G, Falsification of employment application; 
H. Knowingly marking the time sheet of another employee, authorizing one's time sheet to be marked by an 
unauthorized employee, or unauthorized alteration of a time sheet. 
I. Carelessness which affects the safety of personnel; 
J. Threatening, intimidating, coercing or interfering with fellow employees on the job, or the public. 
K. Theft or removal from the work area or premise without proper authorization of any City property or that of any 
employee. 
L. Gambling or engaging a lottery at any City work area. 
M. Misusing, destroying or damaging any City property or the property of any employee. 
N. Deliberately restricting output 
0. Possessing or consuming any alcoholic beverage or unlawfully manufactming, distributing, dispensing~ possessing 
or using a controlled substance in the workplace of Vernal City. 
P. Intoxication, or being under the influence of alcohol or prohibitive drugs, during work homs or in the workplace of 
Vernal City. 
Q. Immoral conduct or indecency affecting job performance or job effectiveness. 
R. Sleeping on the job during work homs. 
S. Engaging in conduct that negatively impacts the employee's ability to perform essential fimctions of his job. 
T. Using, threatening or attempting to use personal or political influence in an effort to secure special consideration as 
a City employee. 
U. Faih.rre to report to work without notification to the Department Head unless it is impossible to give such notice. 
V. Involvement in a vehicular accident involving a City vehicle, where negligence has been demonstrated by the 
employee. 
W. Act of dishonesty related to job performance. 
X. Misuse of disposed surplus property. 
Y. Sexual harassment of employees. 
Z. Using profane language. 
AA. Displaying insubordinate behavior. 
BB. Any other misconduct. 
CC. Possession of firearms, weapons or explosives on City owned property or at the work location without 
authorization of the City Manager unless specifically allowed by federal or State law. 
DD. Employment discrimination. 
ER. Moving traffic violation while operating a City vehicle. 
FF. Violation of the Information Technology Resources provisions of these policies and procedures. 
GG. Violation oflocal, State or Federal laws. 
(Amended 11/03/2004, Res.2004-15) 
(Res. 2015-03, Amended, 02/04/2015, Prior Text; Res. 2010-14, Amended, 07/08/2010, prjorText; Res. 2009-
28, Amended, 12/17/2009, Prior Text; Res. 2005-19, Am.ended, 11/02/2005, Prior Text) 
http://vernalcity.ag.fcodeJhumanJescurcesJPersonnel/Title_ 12/05'030.html 1/1 
21812017 Sectloo 12.00.050 Pr&-clsdpllnary hearing with employee. 
Chapter 12.05 DISCIPLINE 
Section 12.05.050 Pre-disciplinary hearing with employee. 
Whenever formal disciplinary measures are anticipate~ excepting placement of the employee on probationary status, 
and prior to any discharge, suspension over two (2) days without pay, or involun1ary transfer to a position with less 
remuneration for any disciplinary reason, an employee that is not exempt pursuant to Utah Code Annotated 10-3-1105 (2) 
(a) shall be provided with an opportunity for a pre-disciplinary hearing.As provided in Section 3.03.030, termination of 
probationary employee.Ii, ~inployees still in their initial probationary period shall not be entitled to n pre-disciplinary 
hearing. Requiring an employee to take paid vacation 1.imc or Rm1pending an employee wilh pay or without pay for less 
than three (3) days shall not require a pre-disciplinary notice or h~aring. 
A. The employee shall be given prior notice of the pre-disciplinary hearing nlong with an explanation uf charges, 
evidence, allegations, an explanation of the City's evidence, and reason'> for coni:;idering disciplinary action and. where 
termination is being considered, notice that such a measure is being considered The employee shall be advised that he 
or she will he given an opportunity to respond to the charges or alleeatinn~, and may bring any evidence or witnesses to 
the hearing which the employee bclieveR are relevant to the hearing. Unless there are extenuating circumstances, 
written notice of the pre-disciplinary hearing containing the information outlined above shall be provided to the employee 
at least three (3) business days prior to the date of the hearing. The notice shall state the date, time, and place of the 
hearing and the name and title of the person that will be conducting the hearing. The employee shall be given reasonable 
time to prepare for the hearing. 
B. The hearing shall be conducted by the City Manager or his designee, and shall be held for the purpose of 
allowing the employee to examine the reasons for discipline and present any information or evidence the employee 
believes is relevant to the decision. The employee may be represented by counsel at the employee's expense, however, 
such counsel may not be a participant in the pre-disciplinary hearing, but may advise client If requested by either party, 
the City Manager or his designee, in its discretion, may continue the hearing. or recess the hearing to allow further 
review or investigation of the issues if the City Manager or his designee determined that to be necessary in the interest of 
justice and to more fully evaluate the facts and circumstances. 
C. R~quirement The following items should be accomplished at the hearing: 
1. Charges, evidence, allegations or reasons shall be given orally or in writing to the employee by the Department 
Head or other appointing authority. 
2. The employee shall be given a full opportunity to respond and give an explanation of the evidence against him to 
the City Manager, verbally or in writing, or both. 
3. An employee may be compelled, orally, in writing or by implied comme~ to give statements under threat of 
disciplinary action up to and including termination, but those statements may not be used in the criminal prosecution of 
the employee. Before an employee can be disciplined for refusing to answer questions, the following must occur: 
i. the employee must be ordered to answer the questions lDlder threat of disciplinary action; 
ii. the questions must be specifically, directly, and narrowly related to the employee's duties or the employee's 
fitness for duty; and 
iii. the employee must be advised that the answers will not be used against the employee in criminal proceedings. 
D. The City will maintain a written record of the conduct of the hearing. The City may record the pre-disciplinary 
hearing and either party may, at its expense, have a transcript made from the City's recording of the hearing. 
E. A decision as to the disciplinary action lo be taken, if any, shall be ma.de by the City Manager or his dcsignee, 
and the employee shall be notified in writing within twenty (20) working days after the hearing. If formal disciplinary 
action is imposed, the City Manager or bis designee shall provide the employee written notice of disciplinary action along 
with a written explanation of any employee rights for an appeal. (Amended 11/03/2004, Res.2004-15) 
(Res. 2016-13, Amended, 11/16/2016, Prior Text; Res. 2012-10, Amended, 05/16/2012, Prior Text.; Res. 2009-
26, Amended, 12/03/2009, PriorText; Res. 2005-22, Amended, 12/07/2005, Prior Text; Res. 2005-19, 
Amended, 11/02/2005, Prior Text) 
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Section 12.05.050 Pre-disciplinary hearing with employee. 
Prior to the adoption of Res. 2016-13 on 11/16/2016, Section 12.05.050 read as follows. 
Whenever formal disciplinary measures are anticJpate~ excepting placement of the employee on probationary status, 
and prior t.o any discharge, s1ispension over two .(2) dqys Wttlloot im.v. <fr' mvoltmuny transfer to a position··witbJ~ 
nanuneration fur any ilisciplinaty reason. an employee that is not ex.empt pursuant to utnh CQde Annotat~d t 0-3-11 os (2) 
{J.) abill be pmyided with an QPDOI1lmity for a pre-djscjp]jmuv hearing. a flfB ftineiulinazy hea-ring fRS!lt he hole pri0F te 
impesine mseif,lmary action. As provided in Section 3.03.030, temrination of probationary employees, employees still in 
their initial probationary period shall not be entitled to a pre-disciplinary hearing. Regyirmg an ¢ri"iployee to take paid 
vacation time or suspending an employee with pay or without pav for · 1ess tha.n three (3) days r;haJl not require a ore-
disciplinary notice or hearing. 
A. The employee shall be given prior notice of t!i<?. pre-disciplinaiy hearing along with an explanation of 
charges, evidence, allegations, an emlanation of the City's evidence, and reasons for considering disciplinary action and, 
where termination is being considcrc~ notice that such a measure is being considered The employee shall be advised 
that he or she will be given an opporllmity to respond to the charges or allegations. and may bring any evidence or 
witnesses to the hearing which the employee believes are relevant to the hearing. Unless there arc extenuating 
cfrcumstances. written notice of the pre-disciplinary hearing containing the information outlined above sha11 be provided 
to the eJPlUoyee at least three (3) b1L5iness days prior to the date of the hearing. The notice shall state the date. time. and 
place of the hearing and the name and title of the person. that will be conducting the hearing. The employee shall be 
given reasonable time to prepare for the hearing. 
B. The hearing shall be conducted by the City Manager or his designee, and shall be held for the purpose of 
allowing the employee to examine the reasons for discipline and present any information or evidence the employee 
believes is relevant to the decision. The employee may be represented by counsel at the employee's expense. however. 
such com,sel may not be a participant in the pre-disciplinary hearing. but may advise client If rcqµest.cd bv either party. 
the City Manager or his designee in its discretion: may continue the hearing. or recess the hearing to a11ow further 
review or inyestiption of the issues if the Cin, Manae:er or hjs designee detennined that to be necessazy jn the interest of 
. iu..~ticc and to more fully evaluate the facts and circumstances, . 
C. Requirement. The following items should be accomplished at the hearing: 
1. Charges, evidence, allegations or reasons shall be given orally or in writing to the employee by the 
Department Head or other appointing authority. 
2. The employee shall be given a full opportunity to respond and give an explanation of the evidence against 
him to the City Manager, verbally or in writing, or both. 
3. An employee may be compelled, orally, in writing or by implied comment, to give statements under 
threat of disciplinary action up to and including termination, but those statements may not be used in the 
criminal prosecution of the employee. Before an employee can be disciplined for refusing to answer questions, 
the following must occur: 
i. the employee must be ordered to answer the questions under threat of disciplinary action; 
ii. the questions must be specifically, directly, and narrowly related to the employee's duties or the 
employee's fitness for duty; and 
111. the employee must be advised that the answers will not be used against the employee in criminal 
proceedings. . 
D. The City will maintain a written record of the conduct of the hearing. The City may record the me-
msciplinazy hearing and either vattv may, at its ex,pense, nave·a transcript made from the Ci'3''s recording of the hearing 
E. A decision as to the disciplinary action to be taken, if any, shall be made by the City Manager or his 
designee, and the employee shall be notified in writing withln twenty (20) working days after the hearing. If 
formal disciplinary action is imposed, the City Manager or his designee shall provide the employee written 
notice of disciplinary action along with a written explanation of any employee rights for an appeal. (Amended 
11/03/2004, Res.2004-15) 
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Chapter 12.05 DISCIPLINE 
Section 12.05.065 Types of discip1inary action. 
A. Informal disciplinary procedures can include tho following: 
1. Oral warning. Whenever grounds for disciplinary action exist, and the department head determines that more 
severe action is not immediately necessary, the deficiency demonstrated may be orally communicated to the employee. 
~ a. A memorandum of the date and content of the oral warning shall be wril~n by the department head, or 
designee. 
b. This memorandum shall be placed in a separate verbal warning folder in the personnel department and is not 
part of the employee's personnel fi1e. 
2. Written reprimand. The department head, or designee, may reprimand employees for employment 
performance related reasons. 
~ a. The department head, or designee, shall furnish the employee with an employee written reprimand notification 
setting for the reasons. 
b. A copy of the employee written reprimand notification, signed by the department head, or designee, and the 
employee, shall be sent to the personnel department and be placed in the employee's personnel file. If the employee 
refuses to sign the form, the department head, or designee, will so state. 
B. Formal disciplinary procedures can include the following: 
~ 1. Placement on probation. The department head, or his designcc, after approval of the City Manager, may 
place an employee on a disciplinary probation status for a time period not to exceed a six ( 6) month period 
2. Suspension. The department head, or designee, after consultation with the City Manager, and in accordance 
with the provisions of this Chapter pertaining to formal disciplinary procedures, may suspend employees with or without 
pay. 
3. Demotion or reduction in pay in the same grade. If in the best interest of both the employee and the City, 
~ the department head, or designee, after consultation with the City Manager and in accordance with the provisions of this 
Chapter pertaining to formal disciplinary procedures, may demote or reduce in the same grade, employees for 
employment performance related reasons. 
4. Transfer which may result in reduction in pay. If in the best interest of both the employee and the City, the 
department head, or designee, after consultation with the City Manager, and in accordance with the provisions of this 
Chapter pertaining to formal disciplinary procedures, may transfer employees, except a probationary employee, by 
furnishing the employee with written employee transfer notification. 
5. Termination. The department head, or designee, after consultation with the City Manager, and in accordance 
with the provisions of this Chapter pertaining to formal disciplinary procedures, may request to terminate an employee. 
Only the City Manager may approve the termination of an employee. 
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Thomas L. Whitley, Newcastle and William A. Harding, Lincoln, Neb., for all appellants. 
Patrick E. Hacker of Patrick E. Hacker & Associates, and Richard S. Rideout, Cheyenne, for 
appellee. 
Before GUTHRIE, C. J., and McCLINTOCK, RAPER, THOMAS and ROSE, JJ. 
ROSE, Justice. 
Defendants, members of the Board of Trustees of Weston County School District No. 1, in 
their official capacity, and A. L. Albert, individually, appeal from the judgment of the Sixth Judicial 
District Court, which reinstated the plaintiff as a teacher in the District with back pay and other 
benefits, and awarded him compensatory damages and attorney's fees. In addition to his petition 
\J for review of his termination, plaintiff asked damages in tort against the Board for malicious 
interference with his opportunity to pursue his professional career, and damages pursuant to 42 
U.S.C., § 1983, [11 against Albert, the Superintendent of the District, for attempting to deprive 
plaintiff of his teaching career on the basis of constitutionally impermissible reasons. These 
consolidated appeals concern the propriety of every aspect of the judgment below. 
We will affirm the district court judgment, which reversed the School Board's decision 
terminating the plaintiff, and which judgment also awarded damages and attorney's fees against 
Albert under the applicable federal statutes. We will reverse the judgment against the Board. 
When the issue of his termination arose, plaintiff, David L. Holso, was a continuing contract 
vJ teacher in his eighth year as an English teacher in the District. On March 12, 1975, the Board met 
in regular session to discuss contract renewals, with plaintitrs principal, Glenn Gregson, who 
presented a favorable evaluation of the plaintiff and recommended that he be retained. In spite of 
this, the members of the School Board and Superintendent Albert questioned plaintiff's 
performance as a teacher, particularly in the areas of his classroom discipline, his student grading, 
and his personal health problems. The Board directed Gregson to make a further evaluation of 
plaintiff and certain other teachers. Gregson 
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testified at the plaintiffs termination hearing and at trial that he had received lhe impression that 
the Board was 0 out to get11 Mr. Heise. On the morning of March 13, Gregson conveyed this 
impression to Holso, explaining that the Board was upset with his relationship with a female 
teacher, as well as his classroom discipline, and was also concerned about Mr. Helsa's personal 
health problems. Later that morning, plaintiff and Gregson met with Superintendent Albert to 
discuss the complaints and there is conflicting evidence concerning the substance of this 
discussion. Plaintiff testified that Albert specifically commented on plaintiffs relationship with 
another teacher, saying that he (Albert) had observed plaintiff's automobile parked overnight in 
front of the female teacher's home during the 197 4 Christmas vacation. Plaintiff further testified 
that the conversation had to do with plaintiffs health, as well as his failure to turn in a requested 
course outline. All of these matters will be discussed in greater detail later in the opinion. Mr. Holso 
further testified that Albert said he wasn't interested in Holso's explanations, and if he insisted on a 
termination t1earing there wouldn't be a school in the country that would offer him a teaching job 
after Albert got through with him. Albert denied that he discussed plaintiff's purported immorality, 
or that he threatened plaintiff. He insisted that the reason he pursued plaintiff's termination was 
because Gregson had changed his mind and was urging that Helsa be fired. Gregson consistently 
denied this and testified that he had Never recommended plaintiff's termination. 
On the afternoon of March 13, Albert and Gregson met with the attorney for the School Board, 
which meeting culminated in the mailing of a letter to plaintiff, the substance of which was that 
Albert was recommending plaintiff's termination to the Board for the following reasons: 
"1. Your physical handicap and your neglect of the care of your health which results in (a) an 
unusual number of absences from the classroom; (b) an inability to work up to your potential after 
your return from absences and when your health is neglected. 
112. Insubordination including but not limited to (a) failure to follow directions in the preparation and 
coordination of outlines of course contents; (b) failure to hold meetings as directed; (c) failure to 
attend meetings or contribute to meetings when you do attend. 
"3. Other conduct that constitutes good and just cause for termination." 
Concerning the general allegation of other "good and just cause," Albert testified at the 
termination hearing that plaintiff's alleged immorality was included as one of the significant 
reasons for his recommendation. Also included as is disclosed by the Board's findings was an 
allegation that plaintiff's grading of students was questionable. 
Due to the rumors which had circulated concerning lhe termination proceedings initiated 
against him, plaintiff, on April 3rd, spent portions of several class periods answering student's 
questions and explaining his understanding of the grounds for his termination. Although testimony 
at the hearing varied as to the amount of time spent in such discussions and on the question of 
whether plaintiff initiated the discourse, none of the students who testified thought plaintiff had 
attempted to solicit student support. Superintendent Albert was notified of the class discussions by 
a board member. After investigation by the school attorney, Albert, on April 6, ordered plaintiff's 
suspension pending the outcome of the termination proceedings. 
Subsequent to a hearing before the Board, commencing April 17, the suspension of April 6 
was approved and plaintiff was terminated, based on the following Findings of Fact and 
Conclusions of Law: 
111 The illnesses of David E. Holso (diabetes and ileostomy) interfere with his professional 
~ responsibility in the classroom and cause him to be absent from classes for substantial periods of 
time. On the occasions of his absences, he has failed to notify the principal's office and 
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the absences result in inattention to school work by the students. Mr. Holso has not carefully 
observed his diet and has on occasion not carefully controlled his diabetic condition. Mr. Holso 
failed to follow the direction of the principal that he notify the principal's office each time he found it 
necessary to leave his room during a class period. 
"2 Mr. Holso failed to complete and hand in a specific assignment of work required by his superior, 
Mrs. Betty Shurley. He was reminded to do so on several occasions at meetings by Mrs. Shurley 
vJb and by his principal, Glenn Gregson. The assignment was the preparation of a class outline or 
syllabus which was to be a significant part of a booklet designed to coordinate the curriculum of 
English classes from kindergarten through 12th grade in Newcastle schools. Mr. Holso did not 
complete or hand in this work until six days after his notice of termination was given and after the 
va booklet was assembled without his work. Mr. Holso admitted that he failed to cooperate with the 
head of the English department and failed to hold a high school English teachers meeting that he 
was directed to hold. The failure to hold the meeting was not excused by any facts shown. 
"3 Mr. Holso's grading is questionable and the record of the grades he has given shows an 
excessive number of D's and F's over the last seven years, all of which indicates that his teaching 
is inadequate. 
"A teacher's right to grade any particular paper or student as the teacher sees fit to do should not 
be limited but Mr. Holso's grading, when studied over the last seven years, shows such an 
unusually excessive number of F's and D's that it indicates that he has been and is an inadequate 
~ teacher. 
"4 On April 3, 1975, David E. Holso spent the major part of the 3rd, 4th, 5th and 6th period classes 
talking to his students in those classes about the specific grounds for his termination. The 
discussions were initiated by him and were not initiated by questions from the students. In his 
second period class he also initiated the discussion but spent less time talking about the matter. 
On April 3, 1975, although no specific charge of immorality had been made in the notice of 
termination, he injected that problem into the discussion he initiated with the students." 
"CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
"1 Mr. Holso's illness and his failure properly to care for his health interfered with his performance 
i..iiP in the classroom to the extent that it is good and sufficient cause for his termination. 
"2 Mr. Holso, because of his failure to perform specific assignments of his superiors, his failure to 
cooperate and his failure to hold a meeting as directed by his superior and his failure to notify the 
principal's office each time it was necessary for him to leave his classroom was insubordinate and 
such insubordination is sufficient cause for his termination. 
113 The record of the grades Mr. Holso has given over the last seven years shows an unusually 
excessive number of F's and D's and it indicates that he is and has been an inadequate teacher 
and that fact is good and sufficient cause for terminating his contract. 
"4 Mr. Holso's actions in the classroom on April 3, 1975, constituted unprofessional conduct and 
were not necessary to control or teach his students. His actions were good and sufficient cause to 
remove him from the classroom and suspend him for the remainder of the year. To place him back 
in the classroom after his students have had to testify in his proceeding would, in this particular 
case, not be in the best interest of the students. We approve the suspension of David E. Holso 
that was made on April 6, 1975." 
Confronted with the district court's judgment reversing the Board's decision, and awarding 
plaintiff damages, we will consider the following issues: 
1. Whether the Board's decision to terminate and suspend plaintiff was supported by substantial 
evidence; 
2. Whether the district court erred in finding tort liability on the part of the Board; 
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3. Whether the district court erred in finding that Albert had violated 42 U.S.C. § 1983; 
4. Whether the district court erred in assessing damages and attorney's fees against Albert. 
"GOOD CAUSE11 FOR TERMINATION 
When contemplating appeals pertaining to the termination of a continuing contract teacher, 
this court is committed to the view that not only must there be "good cause11 and substantial 
evidence in support of the charges, but, in addition, the facts to sustain such charges must bear 
reasonable relationship to the teacher's fitness or capacity to perform his duties in that position. 
Powell v. Board of Trustees of Crook County School District No. 1, Wyo., 550 P.2d 1112, 1119. 
See, Monahan v. Board of Trustees of Elementary School District No. 9, Wyo., 486 P.2d 235,237; 
and Roush v. Sweetwater County School District No. 1, Wyo., 497 P.2d 540, 542. In Board of 
Trustees, Laramie County School District No. 1 v. Spiegel, Wyo., 549 P.2d 1161, we addressed a 
situation where the district court had reversed a school board's determination, and we held 
" ' ... that the only direct items of evidence against him, all of which were admitted to, and 
corrected, by him, were so trivial and so remote from the date of the hearing that they did not 
justify termination, and that to base termination on those incidents would be oppressively harsh; .. 
. ' "549 P.2d at 1177. 
We set out the appropriate standards for reviewing such decisions in Spiegel, and they, 
therefore, need not be repeated here. 
In the instant case, the district court entered the following findings: 
"1. That the finding that Plaintiff's illnesses (diabetes and ileostomy) interfered with his 
professional responsibility in the classroom and cau~~d him lo be absent from his classes for 
substantial periods of time is not supported by substantial evidence. 
"2. As to the finding that Plaintiff's actions in regard to Mrs. Shurley constitute insubordination, it is 
questionable whether the actions listed constitute insubordination, and in any event, the actions 
listed are not such as to constitute good cause for termination of Plaintiffs continuing contract. 
"3. That the finding that Plaintiff's grading was questionable is not supported by substantial 
evidence and to terminate his contract without further facts would be arbitrary. 
@ "4. That in regard to the finding that Plaintiff discussed his termination with students on April 3, 
1975, this was a difficult time for both Plaintiff and the School District and whether Plaintiffs 
statements were in response to questions from students or not, there is no evidence that his 
statements in any way harmed the students or damaged their education and under all of the 
~ circumstances, Plaintiff's actions do not constitute good cause to terminate or suspend him." 
HEALTH 
The testimony before the Board was that on only two occasions one, one and one-half years, 
and the other two and one-half years, prior to the hearing had plaintiff's health interfered with his 
classroom duties. The School District Rules provide that each year a teacher is granted ten days' 
sick leave, and plaintiff never exceeded this limit. The evidence was that plaintiff had left his 
classroom unattended for brief periods to take care of his ileostomy. Plaintiff's doctor testified that 
plaintiffs severe diabetic condition was under pretty good control. We must agree with the trial 
court that these trivial incidents do not establish cause for the termination and, therefore, do not 
~ support the finding of the Board. Board of Trustees v. Spiegel, supra. 
GRADING 
Exhibits compiled by Superintendent Albert disclosed that plaintiff historically gave more D 
and F grades than would appear on a normal probability curve. No 
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grade analysis was made for the 1974-1975 school year which immediately preceded the non-
renewal of plaintiffs contract. The school district has no formal grading policy, nor was the plaintiff 
ever told to grade "on the curve. 11 Cause for termination cannot be established by proof of the 
violation of standards that do not exist. Again, we agree with the district court's conclusion. We will 
~ return to this area when discussing the § 1983 action against Superintendent Albert. 
CLASS DISCUSSION 
We have already set forth most of the evidence concerning this allegation. In addition to the 
circumstances that these discussions did take place, there was uncontradicted testimony before 
VIP the Board, by the substitute who filled in for the plaintiff after his suspension, that no adverse 
impacts were observed in the plaintiffs classes. Furthermore, several other teachers testified that 
the plaintiffs approach in responding to rumors was not necessarily inappropriate. We must 
sustain the district court's finding. The incident is too trivial and detached from the teacher's ability 
and fitness to perform his duties. Powell v. Board of Trustees, supra; Monahan v. Board of 
Trustees, supra; Roush v. Sweetwater County School District, Supra; and Board of Trustees v. 
Spiegel, supra. 
INSUBORDINATION 
We have taken this allegation out of order because the Board places its greatest reliance to 
~ justify the termination on this charge. We are here concerned with essentially two incidents both 
involving the plaintiffs superior in the English Department, Mrs. Betty Shurley. The first, and most 
important, incident relates to plaintiff's failure to timely submit a class outline. All English teachers 
were requested to turn in these outlines by October 25, 1974, but Mr. Holso failed to do so until 
March 19, 1975, and testified at the Board hearing that he had simply forgotten about the 
assignment. Mrs. Shurley testified that she was not too concerned about Mr. Holso's lack of 
attention to the problem until January, 1975, at which time she wished to compile the outlines into 
book form. Mrs. Shurley notified other teachers in January to turn in their outlines, but did not 
make this request of the plaintiff. She did, however, contact Gregson and Albert and they asked 
Mr. Holso to turn in the assignment. 
The second incident involved a request by Mrs. Shurley of the plaintiff, asking that he call and 
hold an English meeting in November, 197 4, at which time Mrs. Shurley planned to be away from 
the school. Plaintiff attempted to comply with this assignment but was unable to do so because of 
scheduling conflicts encountered by the other teachers. 
Principal Gregson testified at the Board hearing that he was aware of a conflict between 
plaintiff and Mrs. Shurley, but felt it went back to a difference in educational philosophy. Mrs. 
Shurley and Mr. Holso were conscious of their differences, and, on March 11, 1975, they met with 
Gregson to discuss and attempt to resolve them. As a result of the meeting, Mrs. Shurley related 
at the Board hearing that even though the plaintiff had not fully cooperated with her, some 
progress had been made in establishing rapport, and she had not actively sought Mr. Helsa's 
termination. 
" Insubordination," as a ground for suspension, dismissal or termination under§ 21-7-110, 
W.S.1977 (§ 21.1-160, W.S.1957, 1975 Cum.Supp.), is, as yet, an undefined term. [21 Other 
courts have embraced the following definition: 
" ... 'constant or continuing intentional refusal to obey a direct or implied order, reasonable in 
nature, and given by and with proper authority.' 11 Ray v. Minneapolis Board of Education, Special 
School District No. 1, 295 Minn. 13,202 N.W.2d 375,378, 
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citing Shockley v. Board of Education, 51 Del. 537, 541, 149 A.2d 331, 334, reversed on other 
grounds, 52 Del. 237, 155 A.2d 323. 
Certain jurisdictions have held that "insubordination" includes a willful refusal of a teacher to 
obey reasonable rules and regulations. State Tenure Commission v. Madison County Board of 
Education, 282 Ala. 658, 213 So.2d 823,834. The better-reasoned decisions place emphasis on 
the presence of a persistent course of willful defiance. See, e. g., Fernald v. City of Ellsworth 
Superintending School Committee, Me., 342 A.2d 704, 708; and Johnson v. United School District 
Joint School Board, 201 Pa.Super. 117, 191 A.2d 897, 901. See, generally, 78 A.L.R.3d 83, 
"Dismissal of Teachers 'Insubordination' 11 (1977). We embrace these definitions and concepts. To 
constitute insubordination as a cause for termination, it must be established that the teacher 
embarked upon a persistent course of willful defiance. 
We agree with the district court that applying the accepted definitions of 11insubordination" 
there is no substantial evidence of misconduct in this respect. We have before us two isolated 
incidents of a failure to carry out a superior's request, arising from at most a lack of communication 
which had improved by the time the Board held its hearing. There was no substantial evidence of 
a persistent course of conduct characterized by willful defiance. 
The district court properly ordered plaintiff's reinstatement with back pay and benefits. 
BOARD'S LIABILITY IN TORT 
Plaintiff contends that he is entitled to compensatory and punitive damages because of the 
~ Board's malicious interference with his professional career. Liability, according to the plaintiff, 
arises from the Board's alleged action in seeking to carry out Albert's threat made when he told the 
plaintiff: 
11When I get through with you there won't be a school in the country that will offer you a teaching 
job. 11 
The gravamen of this cause of action as set out in plaintiff's brief is the "unlawful tortious 
interference By a third person with the right of another to dispose of his labor." (Emphasis 
supplied) 
Appropriately labeled, plaintiff is seeking relief for "interference with prospective advantage," 
as opposed to "interference with contractual relations." Prosser, Law of Torts,§§ 129 and 130 (4th 
Ed. 1971 ). These separate causes of action tend to merge, except that the latter is aimed at the 
protection of the "probable expectancies" of life, such as future contractual relations. Prosser, 
supra, § 130, at 950. The Court of Appeals of Washington, in Olson v. Scholes, 17 Wash.App. 
vj 383, 563 P.2d 1275, 1279-1280, summarized the elements of such actions while at the same time 
implicitly indicating how the actions arise from common foundations as follows: 
" ... The theory advanced is that stated in Restatement of Torts§ 766 (1939), as follows: 
"(O)ne who, without a privilege to do so, induces or otherwise purposely causes a third person not 
to 
(a) perform a contract with another, or 
(b) enter into or continue a business relation with another 
is liable to the other for the harm caused thereby. 
The tort as defined in the Restatement is divided into two parts: (a) dealing with the cause of 
action arising when a third person induces a breach of contract, and (b) dealing with the cause of 
action which arises when a third person induces one person not to enter into a contract with 
another. The first subsection deals with present relationships, and the second with future 
relc:1liunships. The elements of the tort have been stated as: 
l.:iP (1) the existence of a valid contractual relationship or business expectancy; 
(2) knowledge of the relationship or expectancy on the part of the interferor; 
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(3) intentional interference inducing or causing a breach or termination of the relationship or 
expectancy; and 
(4) resultant damage to the party whose relationship or expectancy has been disrupted. 
See King v. Seattle, 84 Wash.2d 239, 525 P.2d 228 (1974); Scymanski v. Dufault, 80 Wash.2d 77, 
491 P.2d 1050 (1971); Corinthian Corp. v. White & Bollard, Inc., 74 Wash.2d 50,442 P.2d 950 
(1968), and Ca/born v. Knudtzon, 65 Wash.2d 157, 396 P.2d 148 (1964), inter alia." 
See, also, 45 Am.Jur.2d, Interference, §§ 50 and 51; and 86 C.J.S. Torts § 43. 
These theories, however, do not apply to actions between parties to an existing contract they 
lie only against outsiders who interfere with the contractual expectancies of others. Olson v. 
Scholes, supra. An employer-employee relationship existed at the time of the alleged tortious acts, 
and, therefore, no recovery against the Board can be based upon the tort theory of interference 
with prospective advantage. We hold that the district court erred in entering a judgment against the 
Board on the basis of this theory. 
Indeed, we have said that a judgment will be affirmed on any legal ground appearing in the 
record. P & M Cattle Co. v. Holler, Wyo., 559 P.2d 1019, 1024, inter alia. We are unable, however, 
to find any such grounds in this case. See, Durst v. School District No. 2 of Niobrara County, 39 
Wyo. 442, 273 P. 675, which precludes recovery of damages to the business reputation or for 
mental suffering by a wrongfully di~c.:harged school teacher. See generally, 78 C.J.S. Schools and 
School Districts§ 216. We reach no decision with respect to the propriety of a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 
cause of action against the Board, since that issue was not raised below. [3] 
ALBERT'S LIABILITY UNDER 42 U.S.C. § 1983 
All parties apparently concede, and we agree, that the courts of this state have concurrent 
jurisdiction with federal courts over civil-rights actions filed pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. See 
Endress v. Brookdale Community College, 144 N.J.Super. 109, 364 A.2d 1080, 1092; and 
McClanahan v. Cochise College, 25 Ariz.App. 13, 540 P.2d 744, reh. den. 25 Ariz.App. 233, 542 
P.2d 426. See, also Brody v. Leamy, 90 Misc.2d 1, 393 N.Y.S.2d 243, 247-257. 
Albert contends, however, that since he had no statutory power to terminate the plaintiff, his 
conduct cannot come within the state action envisioned by 42 U.S.C. § 1983. At the root of 
Albert's argument is the belief that he is entitled to the defense, consisting of a qualified, good-faith 
immunity, announced in Wood v. Strickland, 420 U.S. 308, 95 S.Ct. 992, 43 L.Ed.2d 214. 
Defendant Albert's contention is without merit to the extent that it emphasizes his statutory duties 
as definitive of the parameters of his liability. On the contrary, we find that§ 1983 is concerned 
with the degree of participation in a deprivation of constitutional rights. An individual's status as a 
school superintendent does not, in itself, protect his or her activities in the context here 
considered. See, e. g., Endress v. Brookdale Community College, supra, at 1095; Stoddard v. 
School District No. 1, Lincoln County, Wyoming, D. Wyo., 429 F.Supp. 890, 894; Aumillerv. 
University of Delaware, D.Del., 434 F.Supp. 1273; and Smith v. Losee, 10 Cir., 485 F.2d 334, 344, 
cert. den. 417 U.S. 908, 94 S.Ct. 2604, 41 L.Ed.2d 212. 
We proceed, then, to the two pivotal issues with respect to the superintendent's liability under 
§ 1983, which can be said to be: 
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1. Whether Albert's recommendation of termination was predicated, at least in part, on 
constitutionally impermissible reasons? 
2. Whether Albert was entitled to the qualified, good-faith immunity defense? _ 
We hold that the district court correctly answered lhe first question in the affirmative. The 
record clearly discloses evidence to the effect that plaintiff's alleged immorality was a significant 
reason ror Albert's recommendation. As stated in Stoddard v. School District No. 1, supra: 
" ... The right to be free from unwarranted governmental intrusions into one's privacy is a 
fundamental constitutional right, Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557, 89 S.Ct. 1243, 22 L.Ed.2d 542 
(1969), and such right of privacy embraces the right of an individual to attend church or not, to 
determine his or her own physical proportions, and to determine with whom he or she will 
associate .... 11 429 F.Supp., at 892. 
The record is equally clear that the plaintiffs grading methods were seriously questioned by 
~ Albert, even though there was no grading policy or standards in the district. As succinctly stated by 
the district court: 
" ... Plaintiff could not constitutionally be terminated for use of a teaching method with which the 
superintendent disagreed, at least in the absence of clear prior warning that such a method was 
impermissible. Keefe vs. Geanakos, 418 F.2d 359, 362 (1st Cir. 1969); Parducci vs. Ruckland, 
(Rutland) 316 F.Supp. 352, 356 (Mid.Dis.Ala.1970); Mailloux vs. Kiley, 323 F.Supp. 1387 
(D.Mass.1971), affirmed 448 F.2d 1242 (1st Cir. 1971); Webb vs. Lake Mills Community School 
District, 344 F.Supp. 791 (N.D.lowa 1972); Sterzing vs. Ft. Bend Independent School District, 376 
F.Supp. 657 (S.D.Tex.1972), affirmed 496 F.2d 92 (5th Cir. 1974); Moore vs. Gaston County 
Board of Education, 357 F.Supp. 1037, 1040 (W.D.North Carolina 1973)." 
Turning to the so-called immorality issue, there is ample evidence in the record from which the 
court could have found that plaintiffs constitutionally protected conduct was a motivating factor in 
Albert's decision to recommend termination. Plaintiff, therefore, successfully carried his burden of 
\dD showing that his conduct was constitutionally protected, and that such conduct was a "substantial 
factor' in Albert's recommendation. See, Mt. Healthy City School District v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274, 
97 S.Ct. 568, 50 L.Ed.2d 471. Given the lack of other sustainable reasons for Albert's 
recommendation of termination, we fail to see how Albert has sustained His burden of showing by 
a preponderance of the evidence that he would have reached the same decision concerning 
Holso's termination in the absence of the protected conduct as required by the Mt. Healthy case. 
Even if such a showing had been made, it appears that only the scope of relief would have been 
affected [4] and that aspect of the cause of action against Albert is not really a question. 
Secondly, we find that the district court's implicit rejection of Albert's 
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defense of qualified, good-faith immunity was also correct. In order to qualify for this defense, 
Albert must demonstrate by a preponderance of the evidence (1) that he acted without malicious 
intention to deprive the plaintiff of his constitutional rights or cause him to suffer other injury, and 
\@ (2) that he did not know and reasonably need not have known that his conduct violated the 
constitutional rights of the party affected. Aumiller v. University of Delaware, supra, at 1307, and 
Skehan v. Board of Trustees of Bloomsburg State College, 3 Cir., 538 F.2d 53, 60-62. U.S. cert. 
den. The district court expressly found actual malice to have existed in Albert's conduct 
presumably based, at least in part, on his threat to the plaintiff. The record supports such a finding, 
thus precluding Albert's entitlement to the defense. See, Smith v. Losee, supra. Cf. Vanderzanden 
v. Lowell School District No. 71, D.Ore., 369 F.Supp. 67, 75. See, also, Endress v. Brookdale 
Community College, supra, at 1095. Albert knew, or should have known, that the action he took 
would cause a deprivation of plaintiffs constitutional right to privacy. 
v;j DAMAGES AND ATTORNEY'S FEES 
Plaintiff had requested in his action against Albert compensatory damages for injury to his 
professional reputation and for pain and suffering as a result of defendant Albert's actions. There 
is little question that once a constitutional violation is made out under § 1983, a plaintiff may 
recover damages for emotional distress, embarrassment and humiliation. Aumiller v. University of 
Delaware, supra, at 1310; Endress v. Brookdale Community College, supra, at 1097-1098; and 
Stoddard v. School District No. 1, supra, at 892. In appropriate cases, punitive damages are also 
recoverable. See, Silver v. Cormier, 1 O Cir., 529 F .2d 161, 163-164; and Smith v. Losee, supra. In 
order to recover such damages, the plaintiff need only show (1) that he in fact suffered such 
damages; and (2) that defendant's actions proximately caused plaintiffs injury. Aumiller v. 
University of Delaware, supra. There is adequate evidence in the record to support plaintiffs 
allegations that his opportunities to pursue his career have been substantially reduced and his 
confidence and relationships with others within and without the school district have been affected 
by reason of Albert's actions. We hold that the district court's judgment against defendant Albert, in 
the amount of $2,500.00, should be affirmed. Since we find no liability on the part of the Board, we 
reverse the judgment, in the amount of $5,000.00, against its members in their official capacity. 
Finally, plaintiff sought and recovered attorney's fees against Albert, pursuant to 42 U.S.C.A. 
§ 1988, as amended [51 , in the amount of $2, 172.55. The federal act, known as the Civil Rights 
Attorney's Fees Awards Act of 1976, makes the award of fees discretionary, and has been applied 
retroactively to § 1983 cases pending at the time of its enactment. See, e. g., Rainey v. Jackson 
State College, 5 Cir., 551 F.2d 672. The district court did not abuse its discretion in making this 
award particularly in light of the fact that the parties stipulated that a reasonable attorney's fee for 
the entire case would be $4,345.10. We will, therefore, affirm the attorney's fee award against 
Albert. For the reasons previously stated herein, the award of attorney's fees as punitive damages 
against the Board is reversed. 
Affirmed in part and reversed in part, and remanded to the trial court for entry of 
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judgment which is consistent with this opinion. 
RAPER, Justice, with whom THOMAS, Justice, joins, concurring in part and dissenting in part. 
I concur in affirmance of the district court's judgment reinstating the plaintiff and awarding him 
back pay and fringe benefits lost. I also concur in reversal of the district court's finding of liability 
and judgment against the board of trustees, awarding damages of $5,000.00 for a claimed tort 
along with attorney fees of $2, 172.55, as punitive damages. In the reversal aspect, I concur for 
different reasons than those set out in the major opinion, with which I disagree. I dissent as to the 
affirmance of the district court's finding of liability and award of $2,500.00 compensatory damages, 
along with the attorney's fees of $2, 172.55 as punitive damages, against the school 
superintendent, Albert. I join in the dissent of Justice Thomas. Such a precedent set by the 
majority is insidious in its inequity of holding a school administrator solely and personally liable for 
grounds of discharge or termination of a school teacher when the school board is the only body 
having authority to discharge or terminate and it, after due process proceedings, made the 
decision of termination. 
There is no need to apply any exception to relief under the tort rule with respect to 
11interference with prospective advantage" as ground for relieving the school board of liability that 
point should not be reached. The school board has total immunity under state law in the type 
action filed against it. The board members, as the alter ego of the school district, have as a 
governing body, immunity when sued as here, in their official capacities and not individually. 
Section 1-35-102, W.S.1977, provides: 
<i "The defense of governmental immunity shall be waived to the extent of the limits of liability 
insurance carried by the governmental entity. This seGtion c1pplies lo any governmental body or 
agency in the state securing liability insurance coverage." 
In this case there was no insurance covering the tort claimed. School districts have only been 
Ii) authorized to carry liability insurance on motor vehicles 1 § 21-3-126, W.S.1977, and against bodily 
injury or death in other cases,§§ 21-3-128 and 21-3-129, W.S.1977. Those statutory sections 
provide, either directly or indirectly, that if such insurance had not been obtained, the provisions 
were not intended to create any liability upon school districts. Such provisions are consistent with 
the rulings of this court in Collins v. Memorial Hospital of Sheridan County, Wyo.1974, 521 P.2d 
1339, and Fagan v. Summers, Wyo.1972, 498 P.2d 1227, holding tort liability to exist only to the 
extent of insurance coverage. 
I am satisfied that the decision of the court has taken away from the administration of schools 
in this state a necessary element of flexibility in the exercise of official discretion in management. 
~ By placing the entire burden of the plaintiff's termination on the superintendent of schools, Albert, 
and holding him personally liable, he and others similarly situated will, in all likelihood, no longer 
be able to fully serve the interests of the public. Under the pressure of risks of money judgments 
against them, personally, to be paid from their own pocketbooks, they will simply not recommend 
termination, regardless of their good faith belief that some persons should no longer be retained 
on a school faculty. I consider it significant that the trial judge found neither bad faith nor malice on 
the superintendent's part but did find that the board of trustees acted "knowingly, intentionally, and 
maliciously" in its discharge of the plaintiff. (I disagree with that finding as to the board because of 
the absence of any evidence to support it but we need not reach that point because of reversal of 
~ the judgment against the board.) Just as Judge Barrett said in his dissent in Smith v. Losee, 10 
Cir. 1973, 485 F.2d 334, cert. den. 417 U.S. 908, 94 S.Ct. 2604, 41 L.Ed.2d 212, a case involving 
school administrators who recommend a denial of tenure, "I simply cannot be a party to such a 
result." 
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I find some of the thoughts just expressed echoed in Wood v. Strickland, 1975, 420 U.S. 308, 
95 S.Ct. 992, 43 L.Ed.2d 214, reh. den. 421 U.S. 921, 95 S.Ct. 1589, 43 L.Ed.2d 790, decided 
after Smith v. Losee, Supra, where it was claimed that school administrators acted 
unconstitutionally toward students in violation of§ 1983. While I am convinced that the United 
States Supreme Court still left not clearly defined the exterior boundaries of official immunity, its 
pronouncements in that case protect the defendant, Albert, in this case. The Court acknowledged 
that strong public policy reasons dictate that school administrators should have some protection 
from tort liability. That case reasoned the liability for every action found subsequently to have been 
~ violative of constitutional rights and to have caused compensable injury would unfairly impo~e 
upon the school decisionmaker the burden of mistakes made in good faith during the course of 
exercising discretion within the scope of his official duties. Denying a measure of immunity would 
contribute not to principled and fearless decision making but to intimidation. The Court in Wood 
recognized that imposition of monetary costs for errors that were not unreasonable in the light of 
all circumstances would deter even the most conscientious decisionmaker from independently 
expressing his judgment forcefully, and in a manner best serving the long-term interests of the 
school and the students. As for the Wood Court's objective, its announced aim was to grant an 
immunity which school offidnls would understand; that good faith action, taken in the fulfillment of 
their responsibilities within the bounds of reason under the circumstances, will not be punitthed 
and they need not exercise tlleir discretion with undue timidity. The Court then went on to quote 
from Scheuerv. Rhodes, 1974, 416 U.S. 232, 94 S.Ct. 1683, 40 L.Ed.2d 90: 
" '* * * Implicit in the idea that officials have some immunity absolute or qualified for their acts, is a 
recognition that they may err. The concept of immunity assumes this and goes on to assume that 
it is better to risk some error and possible injury from such error than not to decide or act at all.' 
Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. at 241-242, 94 S.Ct., at 1689 (40 L.Ed.2d 90) (footnote omitted)." 
The Wood case then went on to establish a rather indistinct standard but one which 
nevertheless shields Albert. A school official must act sincerely with a belief he is doing right but at 
the same time his act cannot be justified by ignorance or disregard of settled indisputable 
constitutional rights or by the presence of actual malice. 
The first so-called constitutional violation raised here does not in fact exist. The charges, 
signed by Albert, filed against the plaintiff, recommending dismissal, did not even allege immorality 
on the part of plaintiff as a ground. The board's order of termination did not recite that reason as a 
ground for termination though it was brought out during the course of the administrative hearing. 
The board's order in that regard was as follows: 
"4 On April 3, 1975, David E. Holso spent the major part of the 3rd, 4th, 5th and 6th period classes 
talking to his students in those classes about the specific grounds for his termination. The 
discussions were initiated by him and were not initiated by questions from the students. In his 
second period class he also initiated the discussion but spent less time talking about the matter. 
On April 3, 1975, although no specific charge of immorality had been made in the notice of 
termination, he injected that problem into the discussion he initiated with the students. 11 
My reconstruction of the record from both the administrative proceedings and the trial 
transcript leads me to the conclusion that any suggestion of immorality by Holso arose from within 
the board itself because of complaints from members of the public. At a board meeting prior to 
initiation of the termination proceedings, a member of the board of trustees asked the others, 
referring to the apparent close relationship between the plaintiff and a female teacher, "(H)ow do 
you explain to your daughter when she comes home and asks about a situation like this." 
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The quoted part of the preceding paragraph was brought out during the voir dire of the board 
by plaintitrs counsel, before commencement of the administrative hearing. There is no evidence 
whatsoever that any question of Holso's immorality was initiated by the defendant Albert. He did 
testify at the administrative hearing that he had seen Holso's car parked overnight at the home of 
the female teacher. Prior to the hearing, he had never so advised the board. At the trial, the 
member of the school board first raising the question, testified more to the point: 
"I said, if an unmarried female teacher and an unmarried male teacher are supposedly sleeping 
together, and your daughter asks about it, how do you explain it?" 
Neither the students nor the public knew that Holso's behavior and association with Miss 
@ Brookover was in fact innocent; that they had stayed with a married couple on their trip. By his 
own admissions, his car was parked overnight at Miss Brookover's on quile a number of 
occasions. One student, cnllr.d by Holso, said he told them, "Well, that they were just staying 
together or something." Deremfanl's counsel did not do too well straightening that out with his 
~ leading question that the witness did not mean that, the response being "Huh-uh." 
Not one witness testified that the defendant Albert stirred up immorality as a ground for 
termination. Although there is no question but what he thoughl morality was an important 
professional attribute in a leacher's position and that any suggestion of immorality was damaging 
to a school, its educational standards and students. He was not mi~lc:1ken in his view of 
significance. This court has said so, as had other authority. 
In Tracy v. School District No. 22_. Sheridan County, Wyo., Wyo.1952, 70 Wyo. 1,243 P.2d 
932, reh. den. 247 P.2d 153, quoting from Baird v. School Dist. No. 2b, Fremont County, 1930, 41 
Wyo. 451, 472, 287 P. 308, 315, this court recognized the responsibility of a teacher: 
~ "'It was said in City of Crawfordsville v. Hays, 42 Ind. 200, that a teacher agrees "by necessary 
implication, that while he continues in such employment, his moral conduct shall be in all respects 
exemplary and beyond just reproach. " And not merely good character, but also a good reputation 
is essential to the greatest usefulness in such a position. Freeman v. Inhabitants of Bourne, 170 
Mass. 289, 49 N.E. 435, 39 LR.A. 510. lntrusted as the teacher is with the education of the young, 
it becomes of primary importance that the principles of right living be by him instilled into them by 
his example and by his conduct.' 11 
That policy of this court was once again summarized in Jergeson v. Board of Trustees of 
School District No. 7, Sheridan County, Wyo.1970, 476 P.2d 481, 487, as follows: 
"***(A) teacher agrees by necessary implication that while he continues in his employment his 
moral conduct shall be in all respects exemplary and beyond just reproach; that entrusted as the 
teacher is with the education of the young, it becomes of primary importance that the principles of 
right living be by him instilled into them by his example and by his conduct. 11 
is In the last cited case this court quoted favorably from Hamilton and Mort, The Law and Public 
Education, 1941, pp. 358-359: 
"The peculiar relationship between the teacher and his pupils is such that it is highly important that 
the character of the teacher be above reproach. It is well settled. therefore, that a teacher may be 
dismissed for immorality or misconduct. The Court of Appeals of Kentucky has said that both 
parents and pupils regard the teacher as an exemplar whose conduct might be followed by his 
pupils, and the law by necessary intendment demands that he should not engage in conduct which 
would invite criticism and suspicions of immorality. Even charges of or reputation for immorality, 
although not supported by full proof, might in some cases, be sufficient ground for removal. 
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Not merely good character but good reputation is essential to the greatest usefulness of the 
teacher in the schools. For example, the indictment of a superintendent of schools for adultery, 
followed by conviction, is sufficient grounds for his dismissal even though the conviction is 
subsequently set aside. It requires no extended argument to convince one that a teacher upon 
whom rests a well grounded suspicion of immorality cannot be an effective teacher of public 
school pupils. The board is not bound to form a judgment as to the truth or falsity of the charges. 11 
(Footnotes omitted.) [1] 
See also Durst v. School District No. 2 of Niobrara County, 1929, 39 Wyo. 442,449, 273 P. 
675,678. 
The majority has now abandoned those worthwhile concepts and relegated a teacher's 
conduct outside the schoolhouse to his own private business, when it sets out the holding of this 
court to be the following: 
11 
'The right to be free from unwarranted governmental intrusions into one's privacy is a 
fundamental constitutional right, Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557, 89 S.Ct. 1243, 22 L.Ed.2d 542 
(1969), and such right of privacy embraces the right of an individual to attend church or not, to 
determine his or her own physical proportions, and to determine with whom he or she will 
associate.' 11 
Stoddard v. School District No. 1, Lincoln County, Wyoming, U.S.D.C.Wyo.1977, 429 F.Supp. 890, 
from which the foregoing quotation was taken, did not involve a question of teacher immorality. 
Stanley v. Georgia, Cited within the quotation, involved the constitutionality of an obscenity statute 
in which the defendant, not a school teacher, was charged with the crime of possession of an 
obscene film and the court merely held that the State has no business telling a man, sitting alone 
in his own house, what books he may read or what films he may watch. 
I cannot see that plaintiffs conduct is constitutionally protected on the basis of any authority 
cited. I can find no law or case which holds that a school teacher has a constitutional right to be 
immoral or give the appearance of immorality. If there is such a right, it is in the case of a school 
teacher subordinate to the public interest. 
Wishart v. McDonald, 1 Cir. 1972, 500 F.2d 1110, is illustrative of the usual court attitude toward 
the limits of privacy. In that § 1983 proceeding a school teacher had been discharged for conduct 
unbecoming a teacher. The conduct by a small-town teacher was carried on in public view on his 
property, located in the town where he taught. He took a mannequin he had constructed, draped in 
a negligee, into his front yard where in a lewd and suggestive manner he had dressed, undressed 
and caressed it. The teacher claimed the school committee was punishing him for constitutionally 
protected private conduct and that the reason was unrelated to the educational process or to the 
working relationship within the educational institution. The court disagreed and held that the 
conduct would serve as a role-model for young children and his image as a school teacher gravely 
jeopardized. 
In Sullivan v. Meade County Independent School District No. 101, U.S.D.C., S.D.1975, 387 
F.Supp. 1237, affd cause remanded for dismissal 530 F.2d 799, it was held that discharge of a 
teacher for her conduct in living with a boyfriend without benefit of matrimony was not unrelated to 
the educational process or to working relationships within the educational institution, where there 
was strong community reaction. The plaintiff claimed that her relationship with the boyfriend was 
constitutionally protected within the meaning of the right to privacy. The court held that such a right 
of privacy 
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is not present because a school board may legitimately inquire into the integrity of its teachers. 
@ Immoral conduct sets a bad example for the young, impressionable people being taught. 
The federal courts have repeatedly held that a state has a vital concern in the integrity of its 
schools and school authorities have a right and duty to screen officials, teachers and employees 
as to their fitness to maintain the integrity of the schools. Beilan v. Board of Public Education, 
School District of Philadelphia, 1958, 357 U.S. 399, 78 S.Cl. 1317, 2 L.Ed.2d 1414, cert. den. 358 
U.S. 858, 79 S.Ct. 10, 3 L.Ed.2d 91; Adler v. Board of Education of City of New York, 1952, 342 
U.S. 485, 72 S.Ct. 380, 96 L.Ed. 517, 27 A.L.R.2d 472; Jenkyns v. Board of Education of District 
of Columbia, D.C. Cir. 1961, 111 U.S.App.D.C. 64,294 F.2d 260; James v. West Virginia Board of 
Regents, U.S.D.C., S.D.W. Va.1971, 322 F.Supp. 217, affd 448 F.2d 785. 
In Beilan the Supreme Court of the United States approved the utterances of the Supreme 
Court of Pennsylvania in Horosko v. Mt. Pleasant Twp. School District, 1939, 335 Pa. 369, 6 A.2d 
866, stated when speaking of immorality as inconsistent with moral rectitude: 
" 'If the fact be that she "now commands neither the respect nor the good will of the community" 
vi> and if the record shows that effect to be the result of her conduct within the clause quoted, it will 
be conclusive evidence of incompetency. It has always been the recognized duty of the teacher to 
conduct himself in such way as to command the respect and good will of the community, though 
one result of the choice of a teacher's vocation may be to deprive him of the same freedom of 
action enjoyed by persons in other vocations. Educators have always regarded the example set by 
the teacher as of great importance***.' 11 
The court in the case before us would now grant full freedom of immoral conduct to teachers 
and repeal, as to conduct off the school grounds, the immorality provision of§ 21-7-110(a), 
W.S.1977: 
"(a) The board may suspend or dismiss any teacher for incompetency, neglect of duty, Immorality, 
insubordination, or any other good or just cause. (Emphasis added.) 
That Albert was in good faith is evidenced by his conference with the school attorney, whose 
opinion was sought before ever giving notice of termination. He was advised there were sufficient 
grounds to pursue termination. Counsel so testified at the trial. One who takes the advice of 
counsel before instituting a criminal prosecution, and who places before such counsel all the facts 
and who acts in good faith on the opinion of counsel, has probable cause, and is not liable in an 
action for malicious prosecution. Boyerv. Bugher, 1911, 19 Wyo. 463, 120 P. 171. Certainly if that 
is evidence of good faith when initiating a criminal prosecution, it ought to be in a civil case, as 
well. I consider good cause to be as defined in Wood v. Strickland, Supra. 
The matter of morality here was taken up with counsel. Albert indicated there had been some 
complaints about Holso being seen as much as he was with Miss Brookover. Gregson, the school 
principal, said they had gone hunting together. Counsel advised that the evidence to support such 
ground was rather weak, so for that reason was never charged. It was therefore concluded, upon 
recommendation of counsel that the morality question would not be pursued and was not, other 
than in the finding and conclusion of the board that it was not a matter which a teacher should take 
up with his students, on school time. Members of the board in their testimony at the trial stated that 
the plaintiff ought to be teaching and not use his time taking up her personal problems with his 
students, an action about which parents had complained to the board. 
At trial, one of four members of the board of trustees, called by the plaintiff as a witness, 
testified that any question of the morality of the plaintiff played no part on the board's decision to 
terminate plaintiff. A study of the transcript of the administrative 
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hearing and trial discloses that any question of plaintiffs morality originated within the board itself 
and not with the defendant-superintendent of schools. The overwhelming Evidence, with none to 
the contrary, is that immorality was not formally charged, not considered and not found to be any 
basis for the plaintiffs-teacher's termination. The plaintiff has dragged that question in as nothing 
more than a red herring, as some perfidious, secret reason for the plaintiffs termination. 
With respect to plaintiffs harsh grading system, I find no case which considers grading in 
whatever method the teacher's whims and fancy lead him as a protected constitutional right. That 
is fallacious on its very face. Contrary to the statement of the majority that the plaintiff had no 
notice of any school standard, the evidence was that the probability curve was basic elementary 
instruction to all teachers and well known within the profession. In addition, every teacher in the 
Weston County school system was issued a standard "Class Record Book" published by School 
Form and Supply Company, received as an exhibit, which contained the following table of 
suggested marking systems: 
ME.ANS OF EXPRESSING MARKS PERCENT OF PUPILS-----------------------------
------------------------------------------- Letter Numerical Normal 
PossibleQuality System Value[*] Percentage Distribution Variation-------
Excellent A 5 94 to 100 7 0 to 15Good B 4 87 to 93 24 15 to 30Average C 
3 80 to 86 38 30 to 50Pass D 2 75 to 79 24 15 to 30Fail F 1 Below 75 7 O 
to 15-------------------------------------------------------------------
-----[*] For daily marks------------------------------------------------
The only variation from the table appears in the school regulations fixing "Fail" at 70, rather 
than 75. The plaintiff's grading varied to a considerable extent in an inordinate number of "D's11 and 
failures, causing many complaints to the school board by parents and students of Holso's classes, 
complaints not registered with respect to the classes of other teachers within the system. 
The majority classifies the complete exemption from control in the area of grading as 
"academic freedom." That is an utter distortion of the term and its application. The term refers to 
the text and manner of teaching. Not one single case cited in the majority opinion dealt with 
grading as a protected constitutional right but related to subjects and methods covering vulgarity, 
literary garbage, the popular synonym for sexual intercourse, use of profanity and drinking in 
school plays, race and prejudice in interracial marriage and personal agnosticism. It will probably 
come as a tremendous surprise to the teaching profession, lawyers, scholars, parents and children 
that teachers have a complete license to flunk students willy-nilly because the Constitution says 
they can. Members of the board testifying at trial stated that the most common complaint against 
~ Holso, heard for four or five years and upon which they received rumbles from parents, was on his 
grading system. 
It must be realized that a board of trustees is elected by the people of the district to represent 
them in school matters. When there are complaints to be made or questions to be asked by 
~ parents and others, the trustees are contacted. At least three matters that were involved in this 
case arose within the board in that fashion. The plaintiffs grading system was the subject of the 
most complaints to the board from parents. The question of Holso's discussion of his personal 
problem, particularly his extracurricular association with a female teacher, Hr• s~ by a conveying of 
Lhal inrormation by students to their parents and thence to the board. The child of one school 
board member was a student in one of the classes of Holso, in which the matter was discussed. 
The school board member arranged to have his child taken from the 
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class because of any possible effect upon the proceedings. Finally, the matter of Holso's morality 
~ arose by contacts with the board, from students and the public, not from the school 
superintendent. 
The Only testimony that places the blame for the plaintiff's troubles on the defendant Albert 
came from the plaintiff himself. The plaintiff testified he believed the superintendent was 
responsible for all his troubles because 111 received the letter by the undersheriff, I believe the term 
is, and he said Mr. Albert had directed him to deliver the letter to me, and Mr. Albert's signature 
was on the letter." The superintendent serves only in a ministerial capacity when he initiates a 
proceeding for suspension, dismissal or termination of a teacher. Section 21.1-160(b ), W.S.1957, 
1975 Cum.Supp.(§ 21-7-110(b}, W.S.1977), provides: 
"(b) Written notice. Suspension or dismissal proceedings Shall be initiated by the superintendent 
or any member of the board delivering to the teacher a written notice thereof, together with written 
reasons therefor. 11 (Emphasis added.) 
Section 21.1-156(a}, W.S.1957, 1975 Cum.Supp.(§ 21-7-106(a), W.S.1977), provides: 
\@ "(a) A continuing contract teacher shall be notified of a recommendation of termination by the 
superintendent or any member of the board by giving such teacher written notice thereof, together 
with written reasons therefor on or before March 15 of any year." 
The fact that the superintendent or a board member signs a notice has no connotations of 
malice or bad faith any more than a prosecuting attorney signing a criminal complaint or criminal 
information or the foreman of a grand jury signing an indictment. One cannot just manufacture a 
constitutional violation and infer malice from the fact that the superintendent is required by statute 
to sign a notice of termination. If that is to be the law, then a superintendent is helpless to perform 
his duty. 
~ The majority is placing the entire impact on its decision on a superintendent who had no 
authority to terminate Holso. Only the school board had the statutory authority to terminate the 
teacher. He was, in fact, terminated by the board, not the superintendent. Albert's signing of the 
notice was not even a recommendation yet even if it was, it could not deprive the plaintiff of any 
right, privilege or immunity secured to him by the Constitution and laws of the United States. In a 
like case, it was held a teacher is not entitled to relief against the superintendent of the school 
district for that reason. Vandersanden v. Lowell School District No. 71, U.S.D.C., D.Or.1973, 369 
F.Supp. 67. 
When asked at the trial of the case before us on cross-examination why he thought the board 
was malicious, the plaintiff teacher replied: 
111 believe the school board intended the school board and the superintendent intended to do me 
harm, because they were unhappy with my individualism as a man. They were unhappy with me 
as a person. And, they thought, we gave you an offer to quietly resign and gel out, and you 
challenge us now we're going to put you in your place." 
The majority points to the following testimony of the plaintiff to show bad faith and malice of 
the defendant: "he (Albert) made references to the fact that when this is completed, you won't be 
getting a job. You will be lucky if you get you will not get a job any place." In the first place, there is 
no corroboration of that statement, though it seems to have been purportedly made during a 
conference when Gregson, the school principal, was present; he did not remember. The 
defendant-superintendent Albert denies the statement. In the second place, I construe that to be 
more or less a statement of a fact of life. I rather suspect that a school board or school 
superintendent might be hesitant about a teacher who has been through a termination proceeding. 
Thirdly, there is no evidence that the superintendent or anyone else took any further action to 
blacklist the plaintiff at any place or time or under any circumstances. I will discuss this later as 
related to damages. 
The first point I have made with respect to the two foregoing supposedly constitutional 
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grounds (immorality and grades) is that there was board basis for its dissatisfaction with Holso in 
those areas. More than that, however, there was basis for the other grounds for termination and 
their cumulative effect points to a teacher that a school board could reasonably believe was 
inadequate and not in the best interests of the school district to retain. I want to briefly mention 
those other grounds. 
The majority places its principal reliance upon the fact that plaintiff did not exceed his sick 
leave and anything else was trivial. That is an understatement of the facts. It is regrettable that Mr. 
Holso is afflicted as he is with a "severe" case of diabetes and the disabilities associated with a 
colonectomy. [21 On at least two occasions during classroom periods, he had attacks of 
hypoglycemia, too low a blood sugar content, causing him to go into a coma. As a result, it was 
necessary that students run to the school office for help. As a matter of fact, the administrative 
hearing was delayed because Holso developed hypoglycemia and had to be taken to the hospital 
where he was admitted to the emergency room in a semicomatose state and beginning to have 
mild convulsive seizures. 
With respect to the ileostomy, special attention must be given to body evacuation. According 
to plaintiffs own testimony, it is not a matter that can wait and he frequently must leave the 
classroom to dispose of waste. That may require anywhere from an average 5-10 minutes to 20 
minutes. It was not that school authorities were intolerant or insensitive to Mr. Holso's health 
problems. He was assigned to a classroom very near the school office and instructed to notify 
someone there that his class was unattended, when necessary to relieve himself. That is what he 
~ failed to do. The finding of the board very well summarizes the difficulty and it has factual basis. [3] 
In Fisher v. Church of St. Mary, Wyo.1972, 497 P.2d 882, this court held that contracts to 
perform personal services are made on the implied condition that the party employed shall be 
Ii) capable of performing the contract, so thal a disability caused by physical condition will operate as 
a discharge, termination of the contract or excuse for nonperformance. The court went on to hold 
that such a disability must be material and an illness of long duration, which renders an employee 
unable to substantially perform, thus permitting the employer to treat the agreement as terminated. 
The significant holding of this court, however, is that whether justification exists for termination of a 
contract under the facts and circumstances of a particular case is usually A question of fact for the 
fact finder. 
In the Church of St. Mary case, this court held that a disability of long duration, causing 
serious inconvenience or injury to the church school was sufficient reason for termination of the 
~ teachers contract. In the case before us, the fact finder is the school board created to find those 
facts and make that decision. While I might have a different view, reasonable minds can differ as 
to whether Holso's permanent physical condition materially interfered with the substantial 
performance of his contract. There was something more than a scintilla of evidence to support the 
board's decision and it was of such relevance that a reasonable mind might accept it as adequate 
to support a conclusion. That is all that is required. Howard v. Lindmier, 1950, 67 Wyo. 78, 87, 214 
P.2d 737, 740. It is not the 
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business of this court to substitute our judgment for that of the school board. Shenefield v. 
Sheridan County School District No. 1, Wyo.1976, 544 P.2d 870, and the cases there collected. 
See also Baird v. School Dist. No. 25, Fremont County, supra. 
There was also a factual basis within plaintitrs failure to perform work assigned by his 
superior: 
~ "2 Mr. Holso failed to complete and hand in specific assignment of work required by his superior, 
Mrs. Betty Shurley. He was reminded to do so on several occasions at meetings by Mrs. Shurley 
and his principal, Glenn Gregson. The assignment was the preparation of a class outline or 
syllabus which was to be a significant part of a booklet designed to coordinate the curriculum of 
English classes from kindergarten through 12th grade in Newcastle schools. Mr. Holso did not 
complete or hand in this work until six days after his notice of termination was given and after the 
booklet was assembled without his work. Mr. Holso admitted that he failed to cooperate with the 
head of the English department and failed to hold a high school English teachers meeting that he 
was directed to hold. The failure to hold the meeting was not excused by any facts shown." 
I have no argument with the majority's statement of the rule that in order to be a ground for 
discharge, insubordination must be of a continuing nature "a persistent course of willful defiance." 
However, in this case, it adds fuel to the fire of dissatisfaction of the school board with this 
particular teacher. It adds credence and support to the board's participation in proceeding toward 
his removal for the good of the school system concerned. 
Within the ambit of Wood v. Strickland, supra, the school board had good cause as did the 
superintendent to move toward the removal of Helson. In Prebble v. Brodrick, 10 Cir. 1976, 535 
F.2d 605, a University of Wyoming teacher case, the court recognized Wood and summarized the 
rule of that case as follows: 
11 
* * * The Court ruled that a school board member is not immune from damages under § 1983 if 
he knew or reasonably should have known that the action he took within his sphere of official 
responsibility would violate the constitutional rights of the student, or if he took the action with 
malicious intention to cause a deprivation of constitutional rights or other injury to the student; a 
compensatory award is appropriate only if he acted with such an impermissible motivation or with 
such disregard of the student's clearly established constitutional rights that his action cannot 
reasonably be characterized as being in good faith. Id. at 322, 95 S.Ct. at 1000-01, 43 L.Ed.2d at 
225. 11 
The Tenth Circuit then proceeded to apply it to a teacher case and affirmed the discharge. 
Wood applies to school authorities other than the board of trustees. There is in the case before us 
no impermissible motivation nor such clearly established constitutional rights that either the action 
of the board or the superintendent cannot reasonably be characterized as being in good faith. 
The plaintiff in all three causes of the complaint as amended charged that the board of 
trustees and the superintendent acted "jointly and severally" in not only a constitutionally 
prohibited discharge under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 but also under the tort concept by which the majority 
relieves the board of trustees of liability. The trial judge in his form of judgment also held against 
the superintendent not only under § 1983 but also on the tort approach. It is my view that there is 
not only no § 1983 claim but also none for the tort, 11malicious interference with opportunity to 
pursue his professional career", or "interference with prospective advantage" as labeled by the 
majority. If the court is going to apply that doctrine, then we must also examine it as to the 
defendant Albert. As pointed out previously, the trial judge in that phase found the school board 
malicious but failed to find the superintendent malicious. If the application of that rule is not 
discussed, there will be left the appearance of and tacit approval by this court of an inapplicable 
doctrine erroneously applied. 
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As I see the majority opinion, the tort rule it applies is taken from § 766, p. 49, Restatement of 
the Law of Torts (1939): 
"* * * (O)ne who, Without a privilege to do so, induces or otherwise purposely causes a third 
person not to 
"(a) perform a contract with another, or 
"(b) enter into or continue a business relation with another 
"is liable to the other for the harm caused thereby." 
The words, "without a privilege to do so" means that it applies to outsiders. Albert is not an 
outsider but one charged with an efficient operation of the district's school system. He is no more a 
stranger than the school board. It is within the scope of his duties to recommend termination of a 
teacher's contract and he must be given some latitude in doing so. He falls within the privilege 
provisions of subsequent sections of the Restatement of the Law of Torts,§§ 770, pp. 81-82, and 
772, pp. 85-87. In Wartensleben v. Willey, Wyo.1966, 415 P.2d 613, this court recognized the 
W element of privilege to purposely cause another not to perform a contract. 
I have searched the available references and have not found where the tort theory advanced 
by the plaintiff and the trial court has been generally utilized in connection with the termination or 
discharge of public employees. There are literally hundreds and hundreds of reported cases on 
~ the subject of liability for procuring breach of contract. See the comprehensive annotation on the 
subject in 26 A.L.R.2d 1227 and equally imposing array of cited cases in the Later Case Service, 
with pocket supplement, to that annotation; supplements to Restatement of the Law of Torts; 
Torts, West's Digest System, Key No. 12. 
I found four cases which could be identified by title or case notes applicable to school 
teachers and none are favorable to plaintiff. Widger v. Central School District No. 1 of Towns of 
Ellicottville, Great Valley, East Otto, Franklinville, Humphrey and Mansfield, Cattaraugus County, 
1964, 20 A.D.2d 296, 247 N.Y.S.2d 364, dealt with a cause of action for tortious intervention with 
contract rights. The court stated the general rule to be that one acting within the scope of his 
~ employment, who induces a breach of contract, is not liable in damages to the other party to the 
contract. The court cited Greyhound Corporation v. Commercial Casualty Ins. Co., 1940, 259 A.O. 
317, 19 N.Y.S.2d 239, cited in the A.L.R.2d annotation, 26 A.L.R.2d 1270, as standing for the 
general rule that officers, directors or employees of a corporation are not liable for a breach of the 
corporation's contract on the theory that they induced such breach. It is noted in that annotation as 
a reason that it would be anomalous indeed to hold an agent liable for a tort committed within the 
scope of his authority when liability does not attach to the principal for the same tort committed on 
his behalf and presumably for his benefit. 
Another case is Cavemo v. Fellows, 1938, 300 Mass. 331, 15 N.E.2d 483. In that decision the 
teacher, as plaintiff, had difficulty with the school principal over failure to furnish school news 
material to the local newspaper. Her immediate teacher supervisor, the principal, was defendant. 
The principal became angry and said he would see to it that plaintiff would live in some other 
place, indicating discharge. The plaintiff testified further that the principal said to her, "I shall see 
·~ whether Miss Harris and I, or you will remain longer in the Gloucester High School." The matter 
was reported to the superintendent, who recommended to the school committee (equivalent of a 
board of trustees) that because of that and the plaintiff's nervous condition, she be terminated. 
The court in Caverno Pointed out that when malice or malevolence is the only reason for the 
action and there is no other justifiable purpose, it must be answered for. However, the court 
pointed out that the evidence did not show that the malevolence, rather than a purpose to perform 
a duty, was the defendant's sole or even dominant purpose in the actions taken toward dismissal 
of the plaintiff. The court concluded that statements made to the plaintiff were 
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~ not sufficient to show unlawful interference. Generally, the case holds the actions taken by the 
teacher's immediate supervisor, the principal or superintendent, were actuated by no more than a 
desire to promote the interests of the school and were not actuated by ill will or a purpose to harm 
the teacher. I consider the superintendent's position in the case before us to be identical to the 
position of the superintendent in Caverno in which it was noted that the superintendent was 
following normal statutory provisions for proceedings against the teacher, leading to her dismissal, 
and that he was doing no more than performing his duty as superintendent to properly promote the 
interests of the school. 
A third case found is Bullock v. Joint Class'~" School District, No. 241, Idaho, Adams and 
Lewis Counties, 75 Idaho 304, 272 P.2d 292. There the teacher refused to be transferred to 
another school so was discharged by the trustees, upon recommendation of the district 
superintendent. The plaintiff complained that the superintendent threatened to harm her teaching 
certificate and see that she never taught in the state again if she refused to accept a transfer. The 
court held there to be no cause of action in tort against the superintendent, in the absence of any 
acts or things done by him or the trustees to carry out the threat, with resulting injury to the 
plaintiff. The court further held that the superintendent was acting in his official capacity, within his 
authority and with full approval of the board, nor did he do any wrongful or illegal act in order to 
accomplish the termination of the contract. The threats were considered wholly extraneous matter. 
The plaintitrs claim of tortious interference with his contract has been judicially considered yet 
more recently. In a similar case, Perry v. Apache Junction Elementary School District,# 43, 1973, 
20 Ariz.App. 561, 514 P.2d 514, pet. rev. den. 111 Ariz. 1, 522 P.2d 761, a discharged school 
principal charged that members of the school board and superintendent had conspired to bring 
about the wrongful termination of her employment. Affirming dismissal of the claim on motion for 
summary judgment, the Arizona court said: 
11We must now consider the conspiracy to procure appellant's breach of contract. A school board 
member is an agent of the school board, Webster v. Heywood, 21 Ariz. 550, 192 P. 1069 (1920), 
and the superintendent is obviously an employee of lhe board. It has been held that agents and 
employees of a corporation cannot conspire with their corporate principal or employer when acting 
in their official capacities on behalf of the corporation and not as individuals for their individual 
advantage. Wise v. Southern Pacific Company, 223 Cal.App.2d 50, 35 Cal.Rptr. 652 (1963). 
"We think the rule expressed by the California court is applicable here. Being in a confidential 
relationship with the board the actions of the members and the superintendent were privileged. 
Wise v. Southern Pacific Company, supra. We can find no facts alleged indicating that appellees 
were acting for their individual advantage." 
The holdings of Caverno and Bullock are consistent with the holdings of this court with respect 
to malice as a motivating factor. The want of probable cause may not be inferred from malice. 
Steadman v. Topham, 1959, 80 Wyo. 63, 338 P.2d 820; Henning v. Miller, 1932, 44 Wyo. 114, 8 
P.2d 825, reh. den. 44 Wyo. 114, 14 P.2d 437; McIntosh v. Wales, 1913, 21 Wyo. 397, 134 P. 
274, Ann.Gas. 1916C 273; Boyer v. Bugher, supra. Even though used in malicious prosecution 
cases, that statement of reason and logic is applicable in the case before us where the plaintiff, 
with the approval of the majority, seeks to punish the defendant for giving him notice of 
termination. 
Even assuming that Albert's statement to Holso that he would find some difficulty finding a job 
after these proceedings was a threat relied with indications of malice, which I disclaim to be the 
case, probable cause existed for instituting the termination proceeding, as in this opinion 
demonstrated. 
Since I find no basis for a holding favorable to plaintiff, I would allow no damages 
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beyond those to restore him his lost salary and fringe benefils. Even if plaintiff were to be allowed 
recovery of something beyond that, it could be no more than nominal. He proved no at;lual 
damages for any asserted conslilulional violations, other than the cost of 'phone calls made after 
~ terminalion by the board. There was no evidence whatsoever that any member of the board of the 
defendant Albert made any adverse report or recommendation to any prospective employer or that 
any prospective employer turned down the plaintiff because of his termination by the board. Nor is 
there any evidence that the defendant Albert circulated word to anybody that plainliff should not be 
employed or that he made any active effort whatsoever to impugn the plaintiff. Plaintiff is still on 
the job; he can have no loss for any future employment disadvantage! 
The holding of the court in this case establishes a system of rewards for the unsatisfactory 
teacher to be paid as a penalty personally by the school superintendent. If he attempts to upgrade 
the professional teaching staff of the school under his management and a court decides the 
evidence is insufficient, though present, he is at once charged with malice and a violation of the 
teacher's constitutional rights and malice, stripped of his discretionary authority and exposed to a 
personal money judgment. Courts do not hold an unsuccessful plaintiff liable for failing to prove his 
case, so I see no reason to do so where the eventual outcome of an administrative proceeding 
results in its reversal. 
Words spoken during the course of judicial proceedings have historically been privileged. In 
School District No. 11, Laramie County v. Donahue, 1940, 55 Wyo. 220, 97 P.2d 663, the 
defendant sought damages against the plaintiff because in the pleadings it was alleged that the 
defendant was insolvent, and thus libeled. This court approved the following language: 
~ 11 'Then we take the rule to be well settled by the authorities, that words spoken in the course of 
judicial proceedings, though they are such as impute crime to another, and therefore if spoken 
elsewhere, would import malice and be actionable in themselves, are not actionable, if they are 
applicable and pertinent to the subject of inquiry. The question, therefore, in such cases is not 
~ whether the words spoken are true, not whether they are actionable in themselves, but whether 
they were spoken in the course of judicial proceedings, and whether they were relevant and 
pertinent to the cause or subject of inquiry.' 11 
By the Administrative Procedure Act, administrative proceedings have been given the dignity 
of at least quasi-judicial proceedings. There is little reason why Albert's testimony should not be 
protected from that point of view. The term "judicial proceeding" is not restricted to trials but 
includes every proceeding of a judicial nature before a court or official clothed with judicial or 
quasi-judicial power. Richeson v. Kessler, 1953, 73 Idaho 548,255 P.2d 707; Ramstead v. 
Morgan, 1959, 219 Or. 383, 347 P.2d 594; for many other cases, see West's Digest System, Libel 
~ and Slander, kk38 and 39. The majority takes the view that Albert is liable because in the 
administrative proceeding, he expressed the view that Holso's conduct bore an important 
relationship to the function of education. If such an opinion is to be stifled and a liability affixed, 
then the judicial function is being destroyed. The charges were relevant and pertinent to the 
subject of inquiry with respect to Helsa's fitness as a teacher in a public school and the 
superintendent should not be condemned for them. 
The proposition and reason for such a rule is excellently stated in Petroni v. Board of Regents, 
1977, 115 Ariz. 562,566 P.2d 1038, rev. den.: 
"***Decisions on the granting of academic tenure necessarily have a long range effect on the 
character of the state's educational institutions. If the officials responsible for recommending 
whether a permanent position should be granted are exposed each time they make a negative 
evaluation to the possibility of a jury trial on their motives and the truthfulness of their statements 
or the 
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accuracy of their opinions, the risk inherent in all but the most extreme cases would tend to 
deprive the governing body of the candor essential to an accurate appraisal of the applicant's 
qualifications. It is not for the protection of the public officer but for the protection of the public that 
absolute immunity is recognized in these circumstances. See Hughes v. Bizzell, 189 Oki. 4 72, 117 
P.2d 763 (1941)." 
Even if we apply only a qualified immunity, as apparently .does the Supreme Court of the 
United States, the statements of Albert related to a professional distaste, well supported by the 
courts, for a teacher bringing disrepute upon the educational system, rather than any personal 
animosity. 
However I look at it, I cannot accept what appears to me as an arbitrary view of the majority 
that since the administrative decision of termination has been reversed, a liability at once must be 
assessed against the superintendent. I would suggest that the trial judge may even have a 
different attitude if he could see that there was no official school board liability and the whole 
onerous burden is thrust upon the superintendent. While I consider the plaintiffs physical condition 
a burden upon the school system, at the same time, he has value as a teacher and it does not 
substantially interfere with his performance of duty, though presenting an extremely close 
question. The plaintiffs grading can be corrected. He made a serious mistake of judgment in 
discussing his personal problems, particularly the one he elected to talk about. There, again, it 
does not appear that it was a matter of habitual practice with him, as was his isolated instance of 
insubordination. Any question of morality was not a ground for termination, either charged or 
found. 
The board had good cause, as did the superintendent to explore those variances from 
accepted teacher behavior as grounds for termination but should not be penalized for doing so. If 
every authorized legal action looking toward termination carries with it the risk of personal liability, 
the public and its schools will suffer, because those in charge will avoid the weeding process 
necessary to eliminate the unfit, the incompetent and discourage upgrading academic personnel. 
I would only affirm the district court on its reversal of the termination and allow no other 
recovery. 
THOMAS, Justice, concurring in part and dissenting in part, with whom RAPER, J., joins. 
While I agree with the result reached in the majority opinion affirming the district court with 
respect to Helsa's termination and reversing the judgment against the School Board for damages, 
I must dissent from the conclusion of the Court to affirm the judgment against A. L. Albert. 
However much any of us may object to Albert's conduct in this matter, our response to his conduct 
is limited by the dual strictures of the law and reason. 
The elements of a cause of action under title 42, U.S.C. § 1983 are: 
1. That the "defendant act under color of' state or local law, and 
2. That the plaintiff be subjected to a "deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured 
by the Constitution and laws. 11 
Adickes v. S. H. Kress and Co., 398 U.S. 144, 90 S.Ct. 1598, 26 L.Ed.2d 142 (1970); Prebble v. 
Brodrick, 535 F.2d 605 (10th Cir. 1976); Smith v. Young Men's Christian Association of 
Montgomery, Inc., 462 F.2d 634 (5th Cir. 1972); Sigler v. Lowrie, 404 F.2d 659 (8th Cir. 1969); 
Marland v. Heyse, 315 F.2d 312 (1oth Cir. 1963); Stringerv. Dilger, 313 F.2d 536 (1oth Cir. 1963); 
Marshall v. ~awyer, 301 F.2d 639 (9th Cir. 1962); Williams v. Hot Shoppes, Inc., 110 
U.S.App.D.C. 358, 293 F.2d 835 (1961); Baron v. Carson, 410 F.Supp. 299 (N.D.111.1976); 
Davidson v. Dixon, 386 F.Supp. 482 (D.Del.1974); Ames v. Vavreck, 356 F.Supp. 931 
(D.Minn.1973); Flood v. Margis, 322 F.Supp. 1086 (E.D.Wis.1971 ). See particularly Lombard v. 
Board of Education of the City of New York, 407 F.Supp. 1166 (E.D.N.Y.1976). 
In setting fo11h these elements, and in the results which are reached, the cases, including 
those cited in the majority opinion, 
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~ contemplate and encompass an actual deprivation of a constitutional right. This is a limitation upon 
the federal rule of liability which we are applying, and since it is a federal rule of liability a state 
court is not justified in extending the limits of the rule which the federal authorities announce. 
The district court in this instance, and the majority of this Court, do not describe an actual 
deprivation of Holso's constitutional right of freedom of ·association. It must be noted that the 
majority describes what A. L. Albert did as 11attempting to deprive plaintiff of his teaching career on 
the basis of constitutionally impermissible reasons." Several courts have pointed to the necessity 
for a causal relationship between the conduct of a defendant and the deprivation of the 
constitutionally protected right asserted by the plaintiff. Hoffman v. Halden, 268 F.2d 280, 296 (9th 
Cir. 1959); Cuiksa v. City of Mansfield, 250 F .2d 700 (6th Cir. 1957); Kenney v. Fox, 232 F .2d 288 
(6th Cir. 1956); Whittington v. Johnston, 201 F.2d 810 (5th Cir. 1953). The factual circumstances 
in these cases differ from this case, but the reasoning relating to the concept of proximate 
causation is quite apt. 
The majority of the Court assumes that the focus of Holso's action is a complaint anent the 
deprivation of his right to freely associate with whom he pleases. In actuality his cause of action is 
related to his property right in his employment, and in demonstrating his right to recover under 
Title 42 U.S.C. § 1983 it is incumbent upon Heise to show that he lost his job because he 
exercised his constitutional right freely to associate. In fact that was not a ground which was relied 
~ upon by the School Board for his discharge, and the district court did not find that it was either an 
actual or concealed basis for his discharge. It follows that Albert did not succeed in causing Holso 
to be deprived of his job for that constitutionally impermissible reason, and the legal effect of that 
circumstance is that the tort described in Title 42 U.S.C. § 1983, was not committed. Liability for 
damages does not follow when a tort is not committed. 
I am dismayed by the effect of this decision because while the Court does not say that 
immorality is constitutionally protected conduct so far as a teacher is concerned the effect of the 
ruling may be substantially the same. Under this decision, whenever a school administrator is 
informed of circumstances which may manifest immoral conduct he investigates that situation and 
reports it to the school board at his peril. If he is wrong, he is subject to suit. If he is right, the 
teacher will be discharged. I hope that school administrators are blessed with the courage and 
commitment to pursue their responsibilities in the face of that peril, but I fear that not all will be 
possessed of that degree of courage and commitment. My witness is that the performance by 
school administrators of an appropriate aspect of their duties is chilled substantially by this 
extension of the federal tort to cover attempted conduct rather than consummated conduct. 
With respect to the grading practices these were a ground for discharge by the Board. I 
cannot agree that a teacher's grading practices are constitutionally protected conduct. No case is 
cited in the majority opinion which so holds. Reason dictates that evaluation of students is 
something quite different from instruction of students. The rationale which the courts have 
structured relative to the concept of academic freedom is lhat it is a species of free speech which 
is protected by the First Amendment. E.g., Board of Regents of State Colleges v. Roth, 408 U.S. 
564, 92 S.Ct. 2701, 33 L.Ed.2d 548 (1972); Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Comrnunity School 
Disltict, 393 U.S. 503, 89 S.Ct. 733, 21 L.Ed.2d 731 (1969); Pickering v. Board of Education of 
Township High School District 205, Will County, Illinois, 391 U.S. 563, 88 S.Ct. 1731, 20 L.Ed.2d 
811 (1968); Keyishian v. Board of Regents, 385 U.S. 589, 87 S.Ct. 675, 17 L.Ed.2d 629 (1967); 
Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479, 81 S.Ct. 247, 5 L.Ed.2d 231 (1960); Keefe v. Geanakos, 418 
F.2d 359 (1st Cir. 1969); Webb v. Lake Mills Community School District, 344 F.Supp. 791 
(N.D.lowa 1972); Mail/ouxv. Kiley, 323 F.Supp.1387 (D.Mass.1971); Parducciv. Rutland, 316 
F.Supp. 352 (M.D.Ala.1970). 
In developing this rationale the courts have emphasized the necessity of protecting the free 
communication of ideas in an academic 
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setting. Grading or evaluation of students is not a function that involves the communication of 
ideas, and for that reason grading does not logically fit within the protection of the First 
Amendment. Every student under our system of public education has an interest in a grade which 
is at least equal if not paramount to the interest of the teacher in that grade. If the grade is to be 
challenged it likely must be done through the channel of administrative authority within the school. 
The student or the administrative authority must assume the burden of demonstrating that the 
grade was erroneous, but to foreclose relief by protecting the teacher's grading practice under the 
First Amendment is not fair. 
Since I conclude that Holso's discharge by the School Board was not caused by Albert insofar 
as the protected right to freedom of association is concerned ( see Mt. Healthy City School District 
Board of Education v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274, 97 S.Ct. 568, 50 L.Ed.2d 471 (1977)), and since I 
conclude that the grading practice which was a ground for discharge is not constitutionally 
protected conduct, I am convinced that Albert did not commit the tort described in Title 42 U.S.C. § 
1983. Since the tort was not committed there is no basis for Albert's liability, and the judgment 
against Albert personally should be reversed. He has been punished without due process of law. 
Notes: 
[1142 U.S.C. § 1983 provides: 
"Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any 
~ State or Territory, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other 
person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities 
secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in 
equity, or other proper proceeding for redress." 
[21 Section 21-7-110, W.S.1977, provides in pertinent part that 
11(a) The board may suspend or dismiss any teacher for incompetency, neglect of duty, immorality, 
insubordination or any other good or just cause." 
[3] We would be remiss, however, in failing to note the recent United States Supreme Court's 
decision, which held that local government entities, including school boards, are "persons11 under§ 
~ 1983 and, therefore, not entitled to absolute immunity for actions, taken pursuant to an official 
policy, resulting in a constitutional tort. Monell v. Department of Social Services of the City of New 
York, -- U.S.----, 98 S.Ct. 2018, 56 L.Ed.2d 611 (decided June 6, 1978). 
[4] As slated in Aumiller v. University of Delaware, supra, at 1303: 
"The existence of a collateral justification for defendants' actions possibly may be relevant to the 
Scope of relief afforded to Aumiller, particularly regarding the appropriateness of reinstatement as 
a remedy. In Mt. Healthy City School District v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274, 97 S.Ct. 568, 50 L.Ed.2d 471 
(1977), the Supreme Court recently indicated that once a plaintiff has shown that his conduct was 
constitutionally protected and was a motivating factor in the defendants' decision not to rehire him, 
then defendants can limit plaintiffs remedy by demonstrating by a preponderance of the evidence 
that they would have reached the same decision even in the absence of the violation of the 
protected right. If this burden is satisfied, the Supreme Court indicated that the plaintiff would not 
be entitled to reinstatement as a remedy. The purpose of the remedy in such a context is to 
~ restore the plaintiff to the position he would have been in but for the constitutional violation, but not 
to place him in a better position than if no violation had occurred." 
We agree with this interpretation of the Mt. Healthy decision. 
[S] 42 U.S.C. § 1988, as amended, provides in pertinent part: 
" ... In any action or proceeding to enforce a provision of sections 1977, 1978, 1980, and 1981 of 
the Revised Statutes (42 uses§§ 1981-1983, 1985, 1986), title IX of Public Law 92-318 (20 
uses§§ 1681 et seq.), or in any civil action or proceeding, by or on behalf of the United States of 
America, to enforce, or charging a violation of, a provision of the United States Internal Revenue 
Code (26 uses §§ 1 et seq.), or title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 ( 42 uses §§ 2000d et 
~ seq.), the court, in its discretion, may allow the prevailing party, other than the United States, a 
reasonable attorney's fee as part of the costs." 42 uses § 1988, 1977, Cum.Supp. 
[11 One of the authors, Robert R. Hamilton, was Dean of the Law School, University of Wyoming, 
for many years. He is a recognized authority on school law. The cited book came out as a Second 
Edition in 1959; the same statement appears at page 397 thereof. Dean Hamilton also authored 
Legal Rights and Remedies of Teachers, 1956; at pp. 46-47, the same theme is discussed and 
made clear that a higher standard of conduct is required of teachers than others. 
[21 The entire colon is removed surgically and the small intestine is brought out through the 
abdomen in what is called an ileostomy. The latter procedure requires that a small plastic bag be 
attached to the skin in order to allow the patient to eliminate body waste. 
[3] "1 The illnesses of David E. Holso (diabetes and ileostomy) interfere with his professional 
responsibility in the classroom and cause him to be absent from classes for substantial periods of 
time. On the occasions of his absences, he has failed to notify the principal's office and the 
absences result in inattention to school work by the students. Mr. Holso has not carefully observed 
his diet and has on occasion not carefully controlled his diabetic condition. Mr. Holso failed to 
follow the direction of the principal that he notify the principal's office each time he found it 
necessary to leave his room during a class period." 
for many years. He is a recognized authority on school law. The cited book came out as a Second 
Edition in 1959; the same statement appears at page 397 thereof. Dean Hamilton also authored 
Legal Rights and Remedies of Teachers, 1956; at pp. 46-47, the same theme is discussed and 
made clear that a higher standard of conduct is required of teachers than others. 
[21 The entire colon is removed surgically and the small intestine is brought out through the 
abdomen in what is called an ileostomy. The latter procedure requires that a small plastic bag be 
attached to the skin in order to allow the patient to eliminate body waste. 
[3] "1 The illnesses of David E. Holso (diabetes and ileostomy) interfere with his professional 
responsibility in the classroom and cause him to be absent from classes for substantial periods of 
time. On the occasions of his absences, he has failed to notify the principal's office and the 
absences result in inattention to school work by the students. Mr. Holso has not carefully observed 
his diet and has on occasion not carefully controlled his diabetic condition. Mr. Holso failed to 
follow the direction of the principal that he notify the principal's office each time he found it 
necessary to leave his room during a class period." 
427 So.2d 134 (Miss. 1983), 53613, Jackson v. Hazlehurst Mun. Separate School Dist. r*I div.c1 
{text-align: center} r*I 
Page 134 
427 So.2d 134 (Miss. 1983) 
Tommy JACKSON 
v. 
HAZLEHURST MUNICIPAL SEPARATE SCHOOL DISIBICT. 
No. 53613. 
Supreme Court of Mississippi. 
February 23, 1983 
Page 135 
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Before BROOM, ROY NOBLE LEE and PRATHER, JJ. 
ROY NOBLE LEE, Justice, for the court: 
Tommy Jackson has appealed from an adverse decision of the Hazlehurst Municipal 
Separate School District to renew his contract for employment as a science teacher in the school 
for the 1981-82 school year, which was affirmed by the Chancery Court of Copiah County, 
Honorable Mike Carr, presiding. He assigns three errors in the trial below, and they may be 
consolidated into one question containing three sub-questions: 
The chancery court erred in affirming the Board of Trustees' decision not to renew appellant's 
contract because {a) irrelevant and prejudicial evidence concerning past incidents of 
insubordination was admitted, (b) the Board's decision is arbitrary, capricious and not supported 
by substantial evidence, and (c) the Board's decision for non-renewal of the contract resulted from 
. . . . ·. . 
appellant's membership in a. labor union. · 
The record reflects that appellant had been employed as a science teacher at the Parrish Jr. 
High School in Hazlehurst, Mississippi, for nineteen years, and, on March 16~ 1981, he received a 
formal written notice that his contract of employment would not be renewed for the ensuing 1981-
82 school year. He was advised of his right to have a hearing before the school board under the 
School Employment Procedures Law of 1977, and of his right to a written explanation for non-
renewal of the contract, if he requested same. Appellant asked for both procedures, and received 
the following written reasons for non-renewal: 
1. Violations of Item 4, Page 2 of "Mississippi Public Schools Contract for Employment, n 
specifically, insubordination. 
a. Direct refusal to comply with an assignment of duty made by Principal Fred Gordy for the 
night of a Junior High School football game, on or about October 23, 1979. Mr. Jackson was 
directed to assist in supervision of the students at the game and was given a written assignment of 
the duty by Mr. Gordy. Mr. Jackson responded by crumpling the paper on which the assignment 
was written, throwing it on the floor and telling Mr. Gordy that he would not comply with the 
assignment; and Mr. Jackson did not comply with the assignment of duty. 
~b. Direct refusal to comply with the assignment of duty made by Principal Fred Gordy on or 
about Wednesday, December 17, 1980, to observe student behavior on the Junior High campus 
during mid-morning break, during examinations. At the time of the refusal, Mr. Jackson was on 
probation for violation of the sick leave policy of the Hazlehurst Municipal Separate School District 
and for violation of Item 4, Page 2 of the teacher contract signed by him, and dated May 16, 1980. 
The hearing before the school board was held on April 13, 1981, and both parties were 
present with their attorneys. Appellant's attorney moved the Board to strike and exclude all 
evidence pertaining to (1)(a) of the written notice, since such matter related to the year 1979 and 
did not involve the contract period 1981-82. The motion was overruled. 
Without detailing the evidence reflected by the record, it is sufficient to state that proof of the 
reasons set forth in the letter of non-reemployment was made by the school district Appellant 
introduced evidence claiming the incidents enumerated were unreasonable. 
(a) Appellant contends that the school board erred in admitting the matters set forth in (1)(a) 
of the letter in that they were irrelevant and prejudicial concerning past incidents of 
insubordination. 
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The intent of the School Employment Procedures Law of 1977 is expressed in Mississippi 
Code Annotated Sec. 37-9-101 (Supp.1982), effective from and after July 1, 1977: 
It is the intent of the legislature to establish procedures for providing public school employees 
with notice of the reasons for not offering an employee a renewal of his contract, to provide an 
opportunity for the employee to present matters in extenuation or exculpation to enable the board 
~ to determine whether the recommendation of nonemployment is a proper employment decision 
and not contrary to law, and not to establish a system of tenure or require that all decisions of 
nonreemployment be based upon cause with respect to employment in the school district. 
(Emphasis added). 
The thrust of appellant's brief is to the effect that he was· terminated in his employment with 
the school board and most of the authorities he cites relates to the termination of an existing or 
continuing contract. Section 37-9-101, supra, specifically states that a teacher does not have 
tenure, viz, he does not have the absolute right for renewal of his contract where there is no fault 
on his part. This Court has so held in Calhoun County Board of Education v. Hamblin, 360 So.2d 
~ 1236 (Miss.1978); Holliday v. Wast Point Mun. Sep. Sch. Dist., 401 So.2d 1296 (Miss.1981 ); and 
Cox v. Thomas, 403 So.2d 135 (Miss.1981 ). In Calhoun County Board of Education, quoting from 
McCormick v. Attala County Board of Education, 407 F.Supp. 586 (N.D.Miss.1976), the Court 
said: 
In Mississippi, state law does not provide for a system of job tenure for public school teachers 
[citations omitted]. The defendants [Board of Education] had the lawful right not to rehire the 
plaintiff for any reason, or for no reason at all, upon expiration of the contract, so long as her 
constitutional rights were not violated .... [407 F.Supp. at 594]. 
The Court further said: 
The burden of proof at the hearing is not on the superintendent or principal, as the case may 
be, as it would be in a tenure situation. Lamar County School Board v. Saul, 359 So.2d 350 
(Miss.1978). Once the Superintendent has given a demonstrable reason for nonreemployment 
(before the hearing), the burden at the hearing is upon the employee to prove affirmatively and 
conclusively that the reasons relied upon by the School Board have no basis in fact. [360 So.2d at 
1240]. 
The 1979 Incident of Insubordination was not placed in appellant's personnel file. However, .-
the proof is clear by the school board that the incident did occur and we are of the opinion that it 
was relevant to facts Involving renewal of the contract, which the school board was not bound to 
tender unless impermissible constitutional reasons existed. In a hearing such as the one here. the 
school board is not bound by rules of evidence and procedure as in a trial court where an 
experienced judge presides over the hearing. Mississippi Code Annotated Sec. 37-9-111 (5) 
(Supp.1982) provides: 
(5) In conducting a hearing, the board or hearing officer shall not be boµnd by common law or 
by statutory rules of evidence or by technical or formal rules of procedure except as provided in 
sections 37-9-101 to 37-9-113, but may consider such hearing in such manner as best to ascertain 
the rights of the parties; provided, however, hearsay evidence, if admitted, shall not be the sole 
basis for the determination of facts by the board or hearing officer. 
There was no error in admitting evidence of the 1979 incident. 
(b) Appellant next contends that the Board's decision was arbitrary, capricious, and 
unsupported by substantial evidence. 
The finding of the school board was stated in its order following: 
1. Violations of Item 4, Page 2 of "Mississippi Public Schools Contract for Employment°, 
specifically, insubordination. 
a. Direct refusal to comply with an assignment of duty made by Principal Fred Gor~y for the 
night of a Junior High School football game, on or 
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about October 23, 1979. Mr. Jackson was directed to assist in supervision of the students at the 
game and was given a written asslgnmen~ of the duty by Mr. Gordy. Mr. Jackson responded by 
crumpling the paper on which the assignment was written, throwing it on the floor and telling Mr. 
Gordy that he would not comply with the assignment; and Mr. Jackson did not comply with the 
assignment of duty. 
b. Direct refusal to comply with the assignment of duty made by Principal Fr~d Gordy on or 
about Wednesday, December 17, 1980, to observe student behavior on the Junior High campus 
during mid-morning break, during examinations. At the time of the refusal, Mr. Jackson was on 
probation for violation of the sick leave policy of the Hazlehurst Municipal Separate School District 
and for violation of Item 4, Page 2 of the teacher contract signed by him, and dated May 16, 1980. 
In Sims v. Holly Springs Mun. Sep. Sch. Dist., 414 So.2d 431, 435 (Miss.1982), involving 
termination of a teachers contract, the Court discussed insubordination in the following language: 
We find no definition of insubordination in our cases under our statutes. Among the definitions 
we have found, and one which we approve, is contained in Ray v. Minneapolis Board of Ed., Spec. 
Sch. District No. 1,295 Minn. 13,202 N.W.2d 375 (1972), and is: 
A 0constant or continuing intentional refusal to obey a direct or implied order, reasonable in nature, 
and given by and with proper authority." 
We are further of the opinion and hold that insubordination as so defined is 11other good cause 11 
within the meaning of Mississippi Code Annotated section 37-9-59 (Supp.1981). 
We are of the opinion that the school board's decision was not arbitrary, capricious and 
unsupported by substantial evidence, and that the lower court was bound by the finding of the 
school board. 
(c) Appellant last contends that the decision of the school board was based principally on 
appellant's membership in a labor union. He had the constitutional right to join the American 
Federation of Teachers union, which was designated as a collective bargaining representative for 
teachers in the Hazlehurst Municipal Separate School District, and to engage in union activities. 
Refusal to renew appellant's contract for that reason would be an impermissible violation of his 
Rrst Amendment constitutional rights. Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593, 92 S.Ct. 2694, 33 
L.Ed.2d 570 (1972); Pickering v. Board of Education, 391 U.S. 563, 88 S.Ct. 1731, 20 L.Ed.2d 811 
(1968). 
The evidence indicates that five out of thirty teachers' contracts were not renewed by appellee 
for the 1981-82 school year. Four of the five contracts not renewed related to members of the AFT 
union. The officials of the school district positively testified that membership of the teachers in the 
~ union did not enter into the non-renewal of the contracts and that such memberships did not 
influence them in declining to renew the contracts. The burden was upon the appellant to prove 
that the predominant reason for non-renewal of his contract was due to membership in, or 
connection with, the labor union, and he wholly failed to meet that burden. Mt. Healthy City Board 
of Education v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274, 97 S.Ct. 568, 50 L.Ed.2d 471 (1977). [11 
. There being no reversible error in the proceedings below, the judgment of the lower court is 
affirmed. 
AFFIRMED. 
PATTERSON, C.J., WALKER and BROOM, P.JJ., and BOWLING, HAWKINS, DAN M. LEE, 
~ PRATHER and ROBERTSON, JJ., concur. 
Notes: 
[11 The Court also noted that a non-tenured teacher could be dismissed by a school board for no 
reason, but that a teacher was entitled to reinstatement if he could prove that the decision not to 
rehire was based on the teacher's exercise of constitutional rights. 
30 Or.App. 855 (Or.App. 1977), N. Clackamas Sch. Dist. Etc. v. Fair Dism. App. Bd. r*I div.c1 
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PERCURIAM. 
Petitioner asserts on appeal that the final order of the Fair Dismissal Appeals Board is 
internally inconsistent and not supported by substantial evidence. We disagree. 
Petitioner also objects to the admission of certain evidence on the ground that it is irrelevant. 
We find that the evidence may be relevant and in any event its admission was not prejudicial. 
Affirmed. 
THORNTON, Judge, specially concurring. 
In my view the Fair Dismissal Appeals Board's order overturning the dismissal is internally 
inconsistent to some degree. However, I would affirm on the ground that the Board found that the 
school district failed to establish that the teacher was guilty of insubordination by wilfully and 
intentionally violating school district policy against the physical punishment of pupils, and there is 
substantial evidence, viz., the teacher's own testimony, which if believed would support this 
finding. This is essentially what the Board's order boils down to. 
The operative facts were that teacher John Smith was dismissed by the school district for 
insubordination in that he allegedly disobeyed standing policy governing physical punishment of 
pupils. A total of six separate incidents was set forth in the letter of dismissal from the 
superintendent. 
The Board found, inter alia, that the incidents involving the striking of students Brown and 
Lock in 1972 
11 
* * * do not appear to have been serious violations of the school district's disciplinary policies. * * 
* a 
In its ultimate findings of fact the Board stated: 
"John Smith may have violated school district policy with respect to student discipline in principle, 
with 
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respect to the incidents charged in 1972. These incidents justified the warning given to the teacher 
on October 31, 1972." 
However, In Its conclusions of law the Board stated: 
"The facts relied upon to support the recommendation of the district superintendent (for dismissal) 
~ are not true and substantiated and do not justify the statutory grounds cited for the dismissal. * * * 
II 
I have difficulty in harmonizing these findings and conclusions. It seems to me that if the 
Board found, as quoted above, Lhal the teacher struck students Brown and Lock, as charged, it 
could not subsequently conclude as a matter of law that "(t)he facts relied upon to support the 
recommendation of the dislrict superintendent are not true and substantiated,° and setting aside 
the school district's action on this ground. To me the above order suffers from the same infirmity 
as the orders Issued by the public Employe Relations Board in Phillips v. State Bd. of Higher Ed., 
7 Or.App. 588,490 P.2d 1005 (1971), Sup.Ct. review denied (1972), and Thompson v. Secretary 
of State, 19 Or.App. 74, 526 P.2d 621, Sup.Ct. review denied (1974). This court reversed and 
remanded in both of the above cases. 
As to the merits, briefly stated my reasoning in affirming is as follows: 
The term "insubordination11 is not defined in the Fair Dismissal Law or elsewhere in our 
statutes, so far as I can find. In Barnes v. Fair Dismissal Appeals Bd., 25 Or.App. 177,548 P.2d 
988, Sup.Ct. review denied (1976), although we were not called upon to define the term, we 
affirmed the order of the Board which in tum had upheld a charge by a school district that the 
teacher had a 'been insubordinate by continually and repeatedly refusing to adhere to district policy 
and administrative directives in the use of physical discipline with students * * * .1 a 
In other jurisdictions "insubordination" has been defined as including the wilful refusal of a 
teacher to obey the rules and regulations of his or her employing 
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board of education. State Tenure Com'n v. Madison County Board of Ed., 282 Ala. 658, 213 So.2d 
823 (1968). It has also been held to imply a general course of defiant, mutinous, disrespectful or 
contumacious conduct as (567 P.2d 1093] distinguished from disobedience, which connotes a 
specific violation of an order or prohibition. Coomes v. State Personnel Board, 215 Cal.App.2d 
770, 30 Cal.Rptr. 639 {1963). 
As I see it, "insubordinationa as used in ORS 342.865(1)(c) means an intentional and wilful 
~ refusal to obey, or disobedience of, an order or directive which a school board is authorized to give 
and entitled to have obeyed. 
On this record, the two 1972 incidents, for which he was warned and which were the only 
ones proved according to the Board, standing alone, would not be sufficient to establish 
insubordination. 
· 14 7 S.E.2d 620 (S.C. 1966), 18479, Porter v. Pepsi-Cola Bottling Co. of Columbia/**/ div.c1 {text-
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LEWIS, Justice. 
The plaintiff, sales manager of defendant Pepsi-Cola Bottling Company of Columbia, South 
Carolina, Inc., was [247 S.C. 373] discharged from his employment for alleged insubordination in 
failing to carry out instructions of his superiors with regard to union activities among employees of 
the company. This appeal involves a determination of the effect of the discharge of plaintiff for 
such reason upon his right to recover accrued benefits under a profit sharing plan established 
solely by the employer for its employees. 
The defendant Pepsi-Cola Company entered into a profit sharing plan and trust agreement in 
1958 providing for the payment of certain benefits to its eligible employees upon termination of 
their employment or retirement. It provided for contributions by the employer from its profits each 
year to a trust fund out of which benefits were payable. The plan further provided that if any 
employee is discharged by the employer 'because of such employee's insubordination, gross 
inefficiency proven dishonesty, commission of misdemeanor or felony or other misconduct• his 
benefits under the plan are forfeited and all rights thereunder terminated. 
The plaintiff was employed by the defendant Pepsi-Cola Company for approximately 25 years. 
He was discharged on October 29, 1963 for alleged insubordination. At the time of his discharge 
the plaintiff was a member of the supervisory personnel of the company, occupying the position of 
sales manager. 
After his discharge, plaintiff brought this action against the defendant Pepsi-Cola Company 
and the trustees of the profit sharing plan to recover accrued benefits thereunder. The defendants 
denied plaintiff's right to recover upon the ground that he had been discharged from his 
employment for insubordination and therefore forfeited all rights to benefits under the plan. The 
trial in the lower court resulted in a verdict in favor of the plaintiff. 
At appropriate stages of the trial, defendants made motions for nonsuit, directed verdict, 
judgment notwithstanding the verdict or in the alternative for a new trial. The motions were denied, 
and the defendants have appealed from the rulings thereon. 
[247 S.C. 374] While several questions have been raised by the exceptions, the only one 
which we need consider is whether the evidence conclusively showed that the action of the 
employer in terminating plaintiff's employment precluded his recovery of benefits under the profit 
sharing plan, so as to have required the direction of a verdict in favor of the defendants by the 
~ lower court. 
It is conceded that the terms of the profit sharing agreement are binding on the parties, 
including the conditions stated therein relative to eligibility of employees to receive benefits: and 
that plaintiff, upon termination of his employment with defendant Pepsi-Cola Company, was 
eligible to receive benefits under the plan, unless his employment was properly terminated for one 
of the foregoing disqualifying reasons. Admittedly, plaintiff's discharge arose out of his activities in 
connection with efforts being made by the Teamsters Union to organize the employees of the 
defendant Pepsi-Cola Company. The material facts leading to his discharge are not in dispute. 
The company management opposed the efforts of the union to organize its employees and this 
fact was communicated to plaintiff. He was a part of the supervisory personnel, inegligible to 
become a member of the union, and was instructed by his superiors to keep them advised of any 
union activities. Although plaintiff had knowledge of the activities of the union in connection with 
the organization of the company's employees, he not only failed and 
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refused to inform his superiors thereof but met with union representatives on several occasions 
and personally signed a union car<i. Upon learning of the plaintiff's actions in connection with the 
union and his failure to report any knowledge of union activities to his superiors, as he had been 
instructed to do, the company discharged the plaintiff for insubordination. 
Insubordination is generally held to import a wilful or intentional disregard of the lawful and 
reasonable instructions of the employer. Freeman v. King Pontiacf.247 S.C. 375] Co., 236 S.C. 
335, 114 S.E.2d 478. The following from 35 Am.Jur., Section 44, page 478, is quoted with 
approval in the cited case: 
'Among the fundamental duties of the employee is the obligation to yield obedience to all 
reasonable rules, orders, and instructions of the employer, and wilful or intentional disobedience 
thereof, as a general rule, justifies a recission of the contract of service and the peremptory 
dismissal of the employee, whether the disobedience consists in a disregard of the express 
provisions of the contract, general rules or instructions, or particular commands. This rule is not 
~ restricted to employees in subordinate positions, but applies to those employed in executive or 
supervisory capacities, although with respect to the latter it is recognized that they are not bound 
to such strict adherence to directions as is one whose employment involves the exercise of less 
degree of responsiblity and discretion. The fact that an employee holds a position of authority over 
others, involving the exercise of executory and supervisory powers, does not relieve him from the 
duty of obedience to orders of the superiors.' 
The record conclusively shows that the plaintiff, in his supervisory position, was, in effect, a 
part of management and ineligible to become a member or the union. He knew that management 
opposed the union. He had been instructed to report to his superiors any union activities which 
came to his knowledge. However, in direct opposition to the position of management, of which he 
was a part, upon a matter considered of vital importance to the company, the plaintiff secretly met 
with union representatives, signed a union card, and refused to report such activities to his 
superiors. The reason given by plaintiff for his actions was that he considered it best for the 
business. Such conduct on the part of the plaintiff constituted a wilful and intentional disobedience 
of the employer's instructions and constituted insubordination. His discharge for such reason 
amounted to a forfeiture of all benefits under the terms of the profit sharing plan. 
[247 S.C. 376) The plaintiff contends, however, that the action by the employer, in discharging 
the plaintiff because of his activities in connection with the labor union, was illegal under our Right 
to Work Law and the Federal Taft-Hartley Act, and therefore could not operate to deprive the 
plaintiff of benefits due him under the profit sharing plan. 
It must be kept in mind that we are not here dealing with the activities of an employee eligible 
to become a member of the labor union, but with a sales manager, ineligible to join, who was 
management's direct contact with the employees under him. The company's employees were not 
at the time organized by the union. The union was simply engaged in organizational efforts. The 
employer opposed the union, as it had a right to do. In so doing, the company's general manager 
had instructed his supervisory personnel, including the plaintiff, to keep him advised of any 
information coming to them about the union's efforts to organize the employees. This was not an 
inquiry into the manner in which the labor union coducted its internal affairs, nor was it prying into 
union affairs 
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or spying on union membership. It was a legitimate inquiry by the employer, within permissible 
bounds, to proper persons, about a matter considered of importance to the company and with 
which the company had a right to expect its management personnel to comply. 
As a part of the management of the company, ineligible to join the union, the plaintiff had no 
right to promote the organization of the union in direct opposition to the known policies of 
management which he represented. This was not a restraint upon plaintiff's right to join a union 
because he was ineligible to join. The fact that the plaintiff was discharged, in part, for his union 
activities could not deprive any other employee of his legitimate right to join a union or affect the 
exercise of any such right, because the support of management in efforts of the union to organize 
employees of the company is not one of the rights guaranteed by the law. 
[247 S.C. 377) Since the evidence conclusively shows that the plaintiff was properly 
discharged because of insubordination, he was ineligible to receive benefits under the profit 
sharing plan, and the lower court should have directed a verdict in favor of the defendants. 
We have carefully reviewed the authorities cited by plaintiff in support of his position, but find 
them inapplicable to the present factual situation. 
Finally, the plaintiff C<?~t~nds that his discharge for alleged insubordination cannot operate as 
a forfeiture of his rights because there was no compliance with the provisions of the plan which 
required that any action of the company pursuant to the terms thereof shall be evidenced by a 
certified resolution of the Board of Directors of the company and notice in writing by the 
administrative committee to the trustees. 
The administration of the profit sharing plan herein is placed in an 'administrative committee' 
which is given the power to determine all questions which arise under the plan, including the 
eligibility of employees to participate therein. The agreement or plan provides that 'Any 
detennination or action of the Company pursuant to the provisions of this Agreement shall be 
evidenced by a resolution of the Board of Directors of the Company certified to the Trustees by the 
~ Secretary or an Assistant Secretary under the corporate seal of the Company. * * * All notices, 
advices. directions and instructions to given by the Committee to the Trustees as provided in this 
Agreement shall be In writing and signed In the name of the Committee by a majority of the 
members of the Committee***.' 
The agreement under which the profit sharing plan was set up clearly shows that the 
foregoing administrative procedures were designed solely to protect the trustees in the 
disbursement of funds entrusted to their care and to provide an orderly administration of the plan 
by requiring that action taken by the company and the administrative[247 S.C. 378] committee, 
upon which the Trustees were required to act, must be certified in writing by the proper officials. 
These provisions, requiring that written notice of the action of the company and the administrative 
committee be given to the trustees, were not intended to affect the merits of an employee's claim. 
It is undisputed in this case that the plaintiff was discharged for insubordination, that the 
administrative committee denied his claim for that reason, and that he had notice of such action. 
The fact that written notice was not given to the trustees of such action in no way prejudiced any 
right of the plaintiff. 
The judgment herein is accordingly reversed and the cause remanded for entry of judgment in 
favor of the defendants. 
MOSS, BUSSEY and BRAILSFORD, JJ., concur. 
202 N.W.2d 375 (Minn. 1972), 43544, Ray v. Minneapolis Board of Ed., Spec. Sch. Dist. No. 1 /**/ 
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Syllabus 
[295 Minn. 13] 1. The district court in reviewing the decision of a school board discharging a 
teacher for insubordination is limited to asking whether the determination was arbitrary, 
oppressive, unreasonable, fraudulent, under an erroneous theory of law, or without evidence to 
support it. 
2. An examination of the record indicates the trial court's findings are sustained by the 
evidence. 
[295 Minn. 14] Smith, Juster, Feikema, Haskvitz & Casserly, Minneapolis, for appellant. 
Lindquist & Vennum and N. L Newhall, Minneapolis, for respondent. 
Heard before KNUTSON, C.J., and TODD, MacLAUGHLIN, and SCHULTZ, JJ. 
HAROLD W. SCHULTZ, Justice.[*] 
This is an appeal from an order of the Hennepin County District Court affirming a decision of 
the Minneapolis Board of Education discharging a teacher. 
The issue presented is whether there is substantial evidence1 considering the record as a 
whole, to sustain the school board's finding that appellant was guilty of insubordination. 
On June 24, 1971, the school board, pursuant to Minn.St. 125.17, subd. 4, discharged Glenn 
Ray for insubordination. Section 125.17, subd. 4, provides in part: 
'Causes for the discharge or demotion of a teacher either during or after the probationary period 
shall be: 
'(1) Immoral character, conduct unbecoming a teacher, or insubordination.' 
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The discharge followed a public hearing held at appellant's request and was expressly stated 
to be without prejudice to his application for employment for the 1971--1972 school year and to his 
reemployment as a new teacher at the step and lane to which he would otherwise have been 
entitled, but without tenure. Appellant then sought review of the school board1s decision by 
certiorari. After a hearing, the district court affirmed the school board1s decision, and this appeal 
followed. 
Appellant is a well-qualified Minneapolis high school teacher. He entered that system in 1964 
and taught Russian and social studies at Edison High School until the date of his discharge. His 
discharge was precipitated by the fact that the North Central [295 Minn. 15] Association of 
Colleges and Secondary Schools was conducting an evaluatlon of foreign languages and social 
studies departments in Minneapolis and St. Paul high schools. As part of this study, all teachers in 
each of those departments were required to fill out an 8-page form. 
Appellant was first requested in the fall of 1970 to complete and return the forms. In January 
1971, he was asked by Mr. Frank Janes, who was in charge of the North Central program for the 
{fl Minneapolis district, to tum in his form for foreign languages. In filling out that form, appellant 
attacked Janes for requesting that the form be completed. In addition, appellant did not respond to 
all of the questions. He failed to answer questions regarding 'Teacher Load and Assigned Duties,' 
'Preparation and Experience,• and 'Professional Activities.' In February 1971, appellant told the 
North Central evaluation team that if the team attended his class, he would leave the room. As a 
result, the team did not visit his class. When his principal asked him to complete the social studies 
form, he again did not fill it out completely, leaving some questions blank, answering some in an 
unresponsive fashion and in a way not useful to the evaluation. When requested, he refused to 
complete the form, asking his supervisor not to harass him again. Appellant was finally advised by 
~ Mr. Nathaniel Ober, associate superintendent of schools, that his failure to comply with the 
requirements would be regarded as an act of insubordination and dealt with accordingly. 
Subsequently, Dr. Harry N. Vakos, assistant superintendent, warned him that insubordination was 
one of the statutory grounds for dismissal. In April, appellant again refused to fill out and make 
available his social studies form. He was thereafter notified of his discharge. A public hearing by 
the school board followed, after which the board made findings of fact, conclusions of law, and its 
decision of discharge for insubordination. 
Appellant does not challenge most of the findings of the board. He does not, however, agree 
that he was insubordinate within the meaning of Minn.St. 125.17, subd. 4. He contends that the 
~ [295 Minn. 16] administration did not have proper authority from the school board to issue 
directives in regard to the evaluation forms. He also contends that his rights under the First 
Amendment of the United States Constitution have been violated. 
There does not appear to be any substance to the claim that appellant's constitutional rights 
have been violated. He was not discharged because of anything he said or wrote. He could have 
filled out the forms and made any criticism that he wanted to make. He could have used any other 
means to criticize North Central or the administration. He was discharged because he deliberately 
chose, in the face of repeated directives, not to cooperate in a program which was part of his 
responsibility as a teacher. We agree with the trial court that there Is no issue here of freedom of 
~ speech. 
The school board in its findings determined that the orders and directives issued to appellant 
were reasonable and that the school board had delegated to the administration 
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the authority to issue such orders and directives in the interest of the school district. It further 
determined that the administration had acted properly and within its authority in ordering appellant 
to comply with the evaluation study, which is a part of the educational program of the Minneapolis 
schools. 
In reviewing the discharge, the district court is limited to asking whether the determination was 
arbitrary, oppressive, unreasonable, fraudulent, under an erroneous theory of law, or without 
evidence to support it. State ex rel. Ging v. Board of Education, 213 Minn. 550, 7 N. W.2d 544 
(1942). 
The trial court, having considered the transcript of the proceedings, the exhibits, the findings 
of fact, conclusions, and decision of the school board, and the arguments of counsel, did properly 
affirm the decision of the board. The issue here is not freedom of speech, or the qualifications of 
the teacher, Glenn Ray, or the value of the North Central evaluation study. The issue is whether 
there is substantial evidence, considering the [295 Minn. 17] record as a whole, to sustain the 
school board's finding of insubordination. 
There is no statutory or common-law definition of insubordination in Minnesota. However, the 
parties have agreed that the following is a proper definition: Insubordination is a 'constant or 
continuing intentional refusal to obey a direct or implied order, reasonable in nature, and given by 
and with proper authority.• Shockley v. Board of Education, 51 Del. 537, 541, 149 A.2d 331, 334, 
reversed on other grounds, 52 Del. 237, 155 A.2d 323 (1959). 
There is no question but that appellant had ample opportunity to fill out the evaluation forms 
and that his responses were purposely and intentionally incomplete, uncooperative, unresponsive, 
and argumentative. The decision of the school board and the concurrence of the trial court that 
such conduct was insubordination is a proper determination and must be affirmed. 
Affirmed. 
Notes: 
[*] Acting as Justice of the Supreme Court by appointment pursuant to Minn.Const. art. 6, § 2, and 
Minn.St. 2. 724, subd. 2. 
149 A.2d 331 (Del.Super. 1959), Shockley v. Board of Educ., Laurel Special School Dist. r•t 
div.c1 {text-align: center} r*I 
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STOREY, Judge. 
The above matter is before me on appeal from the decision of the Board of Education of the 
Laurel Special School District [51 Del. 539] terminating the services of the appellant, Shockley, as 
of June 30, 1958, the end of the 1957-1958 school year. 
Appellant, Shockley, had been continuously employed by the Laurel Special School District 
since September 1, 1950, as a certified professional employee, and had acquired teacher tenure 
status under the provisions of Section 1403, 14 Delaware Code 1953. 
On April 22, 1958, appellant was recommended for renewal of his contract of employment for 
the school year 1958-1959 by Superintendent Elder of the Laurel Special School District. The 
Board of Education of said District, on April 24, 1958, refused to accept Superintendent Elders 
recommendation for renewal of appellant's contract of employment for the following school year. 
va After the Board meeting on April 24, 1958, Superintendent Elder, for reason or reasons best 
'" 
known to himself, changed his mind and at the meeting of the Board held the next day, on April 
25th, 1958, recommended the termination of the appellant's services as of June 30, 1958. 
Under date of April 28, 1958, appellant received a registered letter from said Board of 
Education notifying him of the decision of the Board to terminate his services as of June 30, 1958, 
for the reason of 'willful and persistent insubordination'. 
Appellant requested hearing on the charges, and the hearing was held on May 20 and 21, 
1958 at the North Elementary School. 
The decision of the said Board of Education, after a hearing, was that appellant, Shockley, 
had been guilty of 'willful and persistent insubordination', within the meaning of Section 1411, 14 
Delaware Code, 1953, and that his services were terminated as of June 30, 1958. 
The questions presented for consideration are as follows: 
[51 Del. 540] 1. Is the Board's decision to terminate appellant's services 'supported by 
substantial evidence' of 'willful and persistent insubordination' within the meaning of the teacher 
tenure law? 
2. Did the Board deny appellant a substantial right by excluding 'pertinent' testimony at the 
hearing? 
3. Did the Board's refusal to permit appellant to make and to continue to make an offer of 
proof deny appellant a substantial right? 
Question No. 1 presented above will first be considered. 
Section 1414 of 14 Delaware Code of 1953 provides that on appeal the Court shall sustain 
any Board action, findings and conclusions supported by substantial evidence. 
Is the action, finding and conclusion of the Board in the instant case supported by substantial 
evidence? The Delaware statute does not define the words 'willful and persistent insubordination'. 
The following are considered proper definitions for the purposes of this case: 
The word willful' has various meanings and is used to denote the quality of an act or the 
intent with which it is done. It is frequently used in the sense of intentionally, willingly, designedly, 
or with set purpose. Words and Phrases, Willful, Vol. 45. 
The word 'persistent' has been defined to mean 'continuing or constant'. Horosko v. Mount 
Pleasant Tp. School Dist., 135 Pa.Super. 102, 4 A.2d 601. 
'Insubordination' was defined in State ex rel. Richardson v. Board of Regents of University of 
Nevada, 70 Nev. 347,269 P.2d 265,276, in the following language: 
'From the many definitions found in the cases we may say without 
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greater elaboration that 'insubordination' imports a willful disregard of express or implied 
directions, or such a defiant attitude as to be equivalent thereto. 'Rebellious', 'mutinous',[51 Del. 
541] and 'disobedient' are often quoted as definitions or synonyms of 1insubordinate 11 • 
In State ex rel. Steele v. Board of Education, 252 Ala. 254, 40 So.2d 689, 695, the Court had 
this to say: 
~he term 'insubordination' is not defined In the statute, but unquestionably it Includes the willful 
refusal of a teacher to obey the reasonable rules and regulations of his or her employing board of 
education.' 
As stated above, our Delaware statute does not define the words 'willful and persistent 
insubordination', but after an examination of the cases, I am persuaded that a fair and reasonable 
definition is as follows: 
'A constant or continuing Intentional refusal to obey a direct or implied order, reasonable in nature, 
and given by and with proper authority .1 
Necessity does not require that I recite any substantial part of the record, which is both long 
and conflicting. Suffice It to say, Superintendent Elder knew that appellant had not been teaching 
during the school year 1957-1958. There were several conversations and discussions at various 
places in the school between Superintendent Elder and the appellant relating to appellant's duties 
and teaching assignments. According to the record, however, there were no instructions to 
appellant that reasonably could be construed as an order to teach at any time, either express or 
implied .. 
Revisions were made in certain teaching schedules which were unsatisfactory to both 
Superintendent Elder and to appellant and there was the suggestion in the memorandum of 
February 10, 1958, the pertinent part of which stated 'just one thing which seems to require 
improvement'-that appellant take over Parker's Ninth Grade Social Studies Class and another 
class, for a total of two classes. No stated time for doing so was suggested to appellant, and 
shortly after the February 1 oth memorandum, [51 Del. 542] Superintendent Elder granted 
appellant permission to attend a conference of the National Association of Secondary School 
Principals in Indianapolis, Indiana, from which he returned on February 19, 1958. 
Furthermore, on appellant's return from Indianapolis, he was directed by Superintendent 
Elder to conduct certain teacher tests in lhe school, and apparently nothing of any consequence 
~ was done or said about the teaching until after the tests had been concluded about April 15th. 
On April 18th, Superintendent Elder addressed a registered letter to the appellant, the 
pertinent part of which is as follows: 'Any reasons for your inability or unwillingness to carry out 
this assignment should now become a matter of record 1• 
The letter" of April 18th was not answered by appellant in writing, but its contents were 
discussed with Superintendent Elder on April 24th, at which time Superintendent Elder inquired 
whether appellant had started to teach, and appellant replied that it would be impractical with only 
twenty-seven school days remaining in the school year. 
Even in the conversation of April 24th, Superintendent Elder did not order the appellant to 
lJP teach. 
At the Board meeting of April 22nd, two days before, Superintendent Elder had 
recommended that appellant's contract be renewed for another year. On April 25th, 
Superintendent Elder reversed himself and recommended that appellant's services be terminated 
as of June 30, 1958. 
According to the record, Superintendent Elder admits that he never gave a direct order to the 
appellant to teach, and the record does not disclose, therefore, that the appellant disobeyed an 
order to teach. 
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~ A fair reading of the record indicates that it was not until the April 24th meeting of the Board 
of Education of the Laurel Special School District that the decision was reached to charge the 
appellant with 'willful and persistent insubordination'. 
[51 Del. 543] Superintendent Elder testified as to the reasons for the charge as follows: 
'First, his failure to answer the registered communication of April 18th. 
'Second, his conversation with me of April 24th in which he stated that he was not teaching 
classes. 
'Third, that it was impractical for him to do so.• 
From the standpoint of the school children, it is obvious that it would be impractical to change 
~ teachers with only twenty-seven school days remaining, when such change was not required by 
an emergency, such as death, automobile accident, or something of that nature. Even if 
Superintendent Elder had ordered the appellant to teach the remaining twenty-seven days, (and 
according to the record, Superintendent Elder admits that he did not give a direct order to the 
appellant to teach), it would manifestly have been unfair to the school children in the classes 
involved, and, therefore, under the circumstances, an unreasonable order. Failure to obey an 
unreasonable order would not sustain a charge of 'insubordination'. Kostanzer v. State ex rel. 
Ramsey, 205 Ind. 536, 187 N.E. 337. 
If the decision of the Board of Education of the Lau rel Special School District is supported by 
substantial evidence, the decision must be affinned. 
A leading Supreme Court case in point. LeTourneau v. Consolidated Fisheries Company, 4 
Terry 540. 51 A.2d 862. 867, defines the Delaware law on the subject. Judge Speakman, in 
speaking for the Court said: 
'In those cases, such as the instant one, in which the civil law procedure is followed, this Court 
ordinarily, upon appeal, will not disturb a finding on the facts by a lower court, in this instance The 
Industrial Accident Board, if it appears from the record that there was evidence to support the 
finding. The reason for the rule generally observed by reviewing courts, is that [51 Del. 544] the 
trial court sees and hears the witnesses, and is, therefore, the better able to determine the credit 
and weight to be given their testimony.• 
Both counsel for the appellant and the appellee cite with approval the case of Morton v. 
Mooney, 97 Mont. 1, 33 P.2d 262, 265, which states the rules as follows: 
'Substantial evidence is such as will convince reasonable men and on which such reasonable men 
may not reasonably differ as to whether it establishes the plaintiffs case, and, if all reasonable 
men must conclude that the evidence does not establish such case, then it is not substantial 
evidence.' 
The rule of law set forth in the Morton-Mooney case is entirely consistent with that enunciated 
in the LeToumeau-Consolidated Fisheries Company case, and, therefore, may be properly cited in 
support of the substantial evidence rule as laid down by the decisional law of this State. 
As heretofore pointed out, there were conversations, discussions and suggestions; a 
memorandum and a letter. In no instance was there a direct order given to the appellant. The 
memorandum of February 10th merely contained a suggestion of improvement and the letter of 
April 18th suggested that if there were reasons for not teaching, that he make them a matter of 
record. Even if it could be considered that the inquiry on April 24th as to whether he had begun to 
teach was an implied order to teach, it was, in the opinion of the Court as previously pointed out, 
unreasonable for the reasons stated, and non-compliance therewith would not have constituted an 
insubordinate act. 
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The appellant's status as a school principal and teacher was never too clearly defined, but it 
is apparent from the record that appellant could have been more cooperative in this regard. The 
record Indicates that Superintendent Elder was aware of this fact. Under the circumstances, it was 
the duty of the Superintendent, as the duly constituted representative of the Laurel [51 Del. 545] 
Board of Education, to properly clarify the appellant's status, and issue to him as occasions 
required, directions and orders in such language that there could be no doubt but that the failure to 
obey them would subject the appellant to a sustainable charge of 'willful and persistent 
insubordination'. This, according to the record, Superintendent Elder failed to do. 
The burden in this case is upon the Board of Education, and that burden is accentuated by 
the fact that the said Board is not only the complainant and the prosecutor, but the judge as well. 
In such situations, the substantial evidence rule is to be zealously guarded and protected. In re 
~I 
Larsen, 17 N.J.Super. 564, 86 A.2d 430, 436. 
Superior Court Judge William J. Brennan, Jr., now Associate Justice of the United States 
Supreme Court, had this to say, in the case of In re Larsen, supra: 
'Are we precluded when applying the substantial evidence test from taking into account the 
implications of the merger of functions, merely because the Legislature has combined the 
functions in the Director? I think not. The measure of our duty is to set aside any administrative 
decision when we 'cannot conscientiously find that the evidence supporting that decision Is 
substantial, when viewed in the light that the record in its entirety furnishes,***'. 'The 
substantiality of evidence must take into account whatever in the record fairly detracts from its 
weight." 
Decisions of administrative boards of such character require a careful study and 
consideration of the whole record, with all its inferences and implications, to make sure that there 
is substantial evidence or evidence on which 'men may not reasonably differ• to support the 
Boards decision. 
The Court well stated in State ex rel. Steele v. Board of Education of Fairfield, supra [252 Ala. 
254, 40 So.2d 695], as follows: 
[51 Del. 546] 'The anomaly in procedure which permits the board of education, an administrative 
body, to serve in the triple capacity of complainant, prosecutor, and judge makes it vitally 
necessary that in reviewing administrative decisions courts zealously examine the record with the 
view to protecting the fundamental rights of the parties * * *.' 
After a careful consideration of all the evidence, and applying the definition of 'willful and 
persistent insubordination• adopted herein, I have reached the conclusion that the said Board of 
Education has not met the burden of proving its case against the appellant with such substantial 
evidence as will convince reasonable men and on which such men may not reasonably differ. 
The action of the said Board of Education must, therefore, be reversed. 
Necessity does not require that the Court pass upon appellant's reasons Nos. 2 and 3. 
The decision of the Board of Education of Laurel Special School District is reversed and the 
Board of Education of said District is directed to fully reinstate appellant, and to pay to him all 
salary lost as a result of his temporary dismissal. 
Order on presentation. 
40 So.2d 689 (Ala. 1949), 6 Div. 732, State ex rel. Steele v. Board of Ed. of Fairfield r*I div.c1 
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LAWSON, Justice. 
The appellant Maenetta Steele was a tenure school teacher, that is, she had attained a 
continuing service status.§ 352, Title 52, Code 1940. After a hearing, as required by§ 357, Title 
52, Code 1940, the Board of Education of Fairfield, her employing board of education, cancelled 
her contract of employment on a charge of insubordination. 
She began this action of mandamus In the court below to require appellees to reinstate her 
as a school teacher under the provisions of § 358, Title 52, Code 1940, as amended, which 
section is as follows: 'The action of the employing board of education, if made in compliance with 
the provisions of this chapter, and unless arbitrarily unjust1 shall be final and conclusive. Whether 
such action complies with the provisions of this chapter, and whether such action is arbitrarily 
unjust, may be reviewed by petition for mandamus filed in the county where said school system is 
located. No action at law shall lie for the recovery of damages for the breach of any employment 
contract of a teacher in the public schools. 1 
The trial court denied the peremptory writ of mandamus. Motion for new trial having been 
overruled, Maenetta Steele has appealed to this court. 
Submission was on brief, hence we will consider only those insistences made in appellant1s 
brief. Those assignments of error not insisted on in appellant's brief are treated as waived. 
Louisville & Nashville R. Co. v. Holland, 173 Ala. 675, 55 So. 1001. 
Appellant's first insistence is that the order or resolution cancelling her contract of 
employment is void and of no effect for the reason that she was not notified of such action until 
June 2, 1947, and that under the provisions of § 360, Title 52, Code 1940, as amended, she was 
entitled to notice of such cancellation not later than the first day of May, 1947. 
§ 360, Title 52, Code 1940, as originally written read as follows: 1Any teacher in the public 
schools, whether in continuing service status or not, shall be deemed re-employed for the 
succeeding school year at the same salary, unless the employing board of education shall cause 
notice in writing to be given said teacher on or before the last day of the term of the school in 
which the teacher is employed; provided, however, that in no case shall such notice be given the 
teacher later than the first day of May of the termination of such employment, and such teacher 
shall be presumed to have accepted such employment unless he or she shall 
Page 692 
~ notify the employing board of education in writing to the contrary on or before the first day of June.' 
Section 360, Title 52, Code 1940, was amended in 1945, General Acts, 1945, p. 646, by 
adding thereto the following: 7he employing board of education shall not cancel the contract of 
any teacher in continuing service status, nor cause notice of non-employment to be given to any 
teacher whether In continuing service status or not except by a vote of majority of its members 
evidenced by the minute entries of said board made prior to or at the time of any such action.' 
In treating this first contention of appellant, we are not concerned directly with the 1945 
amendment, so when mention is made hereinafter of § 360, Title 52, Code 1940, we have 
reference to the provisions contained in said section as orlglnally enacted unless specific 
reference is made to the amendatory provisions. 
We are called upon here to determine whether the provisions of § 360, Title 52, [252 Ala. 
258] Code 1940, to the effect that a teacher is deemed re-employed for the ensuing year unless 
the employing board of education gives written notice to the teacher of the termination of his or her 
employment on or before the last day of the term of the school and in no event later than the first 
day of May, were intended to apply when the employlr,g board of education cancels the contract of 
a teacher in continuing service status in accordance with the procedural requirements of§ 357, 
Title 52, Code 1940. 
As a result of the enactment of the Teacher Tenure Law, two classes of teachers have been 
viJ created: those who have attained a continuing service status and who may be referred to 
hereinafter as tenure teachers, and those who have not attained that status and who may be 
referred to hereinafter as probationary teachers. 
The contract of a tenure teacher by virtue of the statute, § 353, Trtle 52, Code 1940, remains 
in full force and effect until the parties enter into a new contract or the existing contract is 
cancelled because of the existence of one of the grounds set out in § 356, Title 52, and in strict 
compliance with the procedural requirements provided in§ 357, Title 52, Code 1940. In other 
words, an employing board of education, by virtue of the Teacher Tenure Law, is without authority 
to summarily terminate the employment of a tenure teacher at the end of a school year. 
But an employing board of education does have the authority to summarily terminate the 
employment of a probationary teacher at the expiration of the period covered by the contract, 
usually a year. Whittington v. Barbour County Board of Education, 250 Ala. 692, 36 So.2d 83. 
We are of the opinion that§ 357, Title 52, Code 1940, governs exclusively in so far as 
notice and other procedural requirements are concerned in the cancellation of a contract of a 
tenure teacher, and that§ 360, Title 52, Code 1940, controls as to the termination of employment 
of a probationary teacher. 
We think it clear that the provisions of § 360, Title 52, Code 1940, were incorporated into the 
Teacher Tenure Law for the purpose of requiring employing boards of education who were not 
going to reemploy probationary teachers to give such teachers sufficient notice of that fact that 
they might have time to seek employment elsewhere. But, as before indicated, employing boards 
of education are without authority to summarily terminate the employment of a tenure teacher, 
hence such notice as is provided for in § 360, Title 52, Code 1940, would be abortive as to such a 
teacher. 
It is true that§ 360, Title 52, Code 1940, contains language susceptible of the construction 
that its requirements as to notice, etc., apply to all teachers, for it says 'any teacher in the public 
schools, whether in continuing service status or not***.' But we think it clear that in using that 
language the legislature intended merely to emphasize the fact that the provisions of that section 
applied to those teachers who were not in continuing service status, for with one or possibly 
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two exceptions all the preceding sections of the Tenure Law relate exclusively to tenure teachers. 
Termination of employment and cancellation of an existing contract are entirely different 
matters. The latter can be done only for cause and that cause may arise at any time. Certainly the 
legislature did not intend to limit the right of an employing board of education to cancel the contract 
of a teacher for cause to any specific time during the year, and yet such would be the result if § 
360, Title 52, Code 1940, is given the construction as contended for by counsel for appellant. 
We hold, therefore, that the provisions of § 360, Title 52, Code 1940, as originally written, 
apply only to probationary teachers and have no application to tenure teachers, hence there is no 
merit in appellant's contention that the order or resolution of her employing board of education 
cancelling her contract, under date of May 27, 1947, and of which she had notice on June 2, 1947, 
is void and of no effect because not taken prior to May 1, 1947. 
[252 Ala. 259] In reaching this conclusion we have given consideration to the case of 
Holcombe v. County Board of Education of Marion County et al., 242 Ala. 20, 4 So.2d 503, and to 
the case of Brown v. Board of Education of Blount County, 242 Ala. 154, 5 So.2d 629. But what 
was said in those cases as to the effect of§ 360, Title 52, Code 1940, must be considered in the 
light of the issues there presented. Both of those cases involved the question as to whether or not 
the employment of probationary teachers had been correctly terminated. 
Appellant insists that due process of law was not observed in the hearing and that the 
hearing was not held in accordance with the requirements of§ 357, Title 52, supra, in that she was 
not permitted to present evidence bearing upon the reasons for the proposed cancellation of her 
contract and that, therefore, the order or resolution cancelling her contract was void and of no 
effect and, hence, the trial court erred in not granting the peremptory writ of mandamus. 
The appellant was charged with insubordination upon the ground that she refused twice to 
take a mental ability test which was required by a rule or regulation of the employing board of 
education. 
At the hearing the following undisputed facts were made to appear: That the employing 
board of education on or about February 27, 1947, adopted and entered on its minutes a rule 
requiring all classroom teachers to take a mental ability test; that this test was presented to the 
teachers of the various schools under the jurisdiction of the board on or about March 25, 1947, 
without any notice having been given them that they were to take the test; that on that date some 
of the teachers took the test, others refused, and still others merely signed their names to the 
papers on which the questions appeared and returned the papers without answering the 
questions; that Maenetta Steele was in the latter group and that she was the only teacher at her 
school who did not take the test. 
The Superintendent of Education testified that he gave all the teachers who did not take the 
~ test when it was first presented an opportunity to take it at a later date; that at the time of the 
hearing all the teachers had taken the test except Maenetta Steele, but that she refused to avail 
herself of that opportunity when it was given her. As to his refusal to permit Maenetta Steele to 
take the test at a later date, he stated: 'Maybe a week later after I had given her the second and 
third chance she came back to my office and wanted to know if I would give her another chance to 
take the test, and I said 'No, you have had two chances already and have refused, and you will not 
be given another chance. 11 He was corroborated in his statement that Maenetta Steele refused a 
second time to take a test by a Mrs. Gregory who, it appears, was the Superintendent's secretary. 
Maenetta Steele, testifying in her own behalf, admitted that she did not answer the questions 
14P when they were presented to her on March 25, 1947, but she denied that she was ever given 
another opportunity to take the test at a latter date. As to the event which transpired subsequent to 
March 25, 1947, in connection with the test, she stated: That on the following morning, March 
26th, 
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the Superintendent asked her why she didn't take the test, but did not offer to give her another 
opportunity to do so; that on April 11, 1947, she was summoned to the office of the 
Superintendent, who told her that she had not told him she was 'head of a union' (She was at that 
time temporary president of the teachers' union.) and at that time the Superintendent also told her 
\ii that she was 'guilty of insubordination and the board felt that I would do better work under better 
circumstances' and asked her to resign; that on April 17, 1947, she requested an opportunity to 
take the test, but her request was denied, although on that day other teachers who had not taken 
the test on March 25 were given a chance to take it. Maenetta Steele also stated that prior to this 
incident there had never been any complaint about her work or any charge that she had not 
complied with the rules and regulations of the board and the orders of her superiors, although she 
had been in the school system of the city of Fairfield for five years. 
Maenetta Steele was permitted to show, by the testimony of Alfreda Gray, who [252 Ala. 
260] was also a teacher in the Fairfield schools, that the latter had not taken the test on March 25, 
1947, and that she had been permitted to take it on April 16, 1947. A statement of two other 
teachers to the same effect was let Into the record. 
A probationary teacher testified that she was a member of the 'union' and that she had been 
notified that her contract of employment was terminated; that in the conversation with the 
Superintendent he stated that an example would have to be made of some of the teachers. 
The Superintendent thereafter stated that the union had nothing to do with the giving of the 
tests. 
As we understand the brief filed here on her behalf, appellant's insistence that the hearing 
was not conducted in accordance with the provisions of § 357, Title 52, supra, and that, therefore, 
the order or resolution cancelling her contract was void, was based on the following 
circumstances: 
(1) The refusal of the Superintendent of Education to answer questions propounded to him 
by her counsel seeking to show that the Superintendent did not approve of the teachers' unions. 
(2) The refusal of the Superintendent of Education to answer questions propounded to him 
by counsel for appellant seeking to show that although he had refused to grant appellant's request 
to take the test, he had permitted other teachers to do so altho~gh they had not taken the test 
when it was first submitted to them on March 25, 1947. 
(3) The action of the board of education in refusing to permit the introduction into evidence of 
the minutes of the board of education showing the rule or regulation of February 27, 1947, 
requiring teachers to take the mental ability test. 
As before indicated, under the provisions of§ 358, Title 52, Code 1940, as amended, the 
trial court's right to review the action of the employing board of education was limited to two 
considerations, first, whether such action was taken in accordance with the requirements of the 
Teacher Tenure Law, and, second, whether such action was arbitrarily unjust. If either of those 
conditions existed then due process was not observed. Where, as here, a purported hearing was 
held after notice, the circuit court's review is limited to the proceedings before the board of 
education. In such a case the hearing of the mandamus proceeding is not a trial de nova. Gainer 
v. Board of Education of Jefferson County et al., 250 Ala. 256, 33 So.2d 880. 
The question is, did the trial court err in refusing to grant the peremptory writ of mandamus 
under its limited review because of the circumstances above enumerated, when those 
circumstances are considered in connection with the other proceedings at the hearing? 
The answer to the question here presented requires a consideration of the nature, functions, 
and modus operandi of boards of education, and some of the distinctions between administrative 
tribunals and judicial tribunals. 
A board of education is a part of the executive department, but in the operation of our public 
school system it exercises not only purely administrative functions, but others of a legisiative 
character, 
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and still others of a quasi-judicial character. Of the administrative type are the hiring of teachers, 
their assignment in the school system, and the management and control of school property. Of the 
legislative type are the making of rules and regulations and the determination of policies governing 
the hiring and assignment of teachers, and the use of school property Of the quasi--judicial type is 
the power to hear and determine proceedings for the cancellation of contracts of tenure teachers. 
Although a board of education In the exercise of such powers of cancellation acts as a 
quasi-judicial body, it does not thereby lose its identity as an administrative body and become a 
court to the extent that the regularity of its action is to be tested by strict legal rules prevailing in 
court proceedings. 
While no particular form of procedure is prescribed for such hearings, due process must be 
observed. Such is the rule generally as to hearings provided for by statute before administrative 
agencies. Morgan v. United States, 304 U.S. 1, 58 S.Ct. 773, 82 L.Ed. 1129; lnterstate[252 Ala. 
261] Commerce Commission v. Louisville & Nashville R.R. Co., 227 U.S. 88, 33 S.Ct. 185, 57 
LEd. 431; Alabama Electric Cooperative, Inc., et al. v. Alabama Power Co., Ala.Sup., 36 So.2d 
523; Alabama Power Co. v. City of Fort Payne, 237 Ala. 459, 187 So. 632, 123 A.LR. 1337. 
The anomaly in procedure which permits the board of education, an administrative body, to 
serve in the triple capacity of complainant, prosecutor, and judge makes it vitally necessary that in 
~ reviewing administrative decisions courts zealously examine the record with the view to protecting 
the fundamental rights of the parties, lest the rule against arbitrariness and oppressiveness 
become a mere shibboleth. An appeal not being provided for, the review by mandamus must not 
be permitted to degenerate into a mock ceremony. The least that the courts can do is to hold high 
the torch of 'fair play' which the highest court of our land has made the guiding light of 
administrative justice. Morgan v. United States, supra. 
On the other hand, courts cannot, under the guise of existing judicial power, usurp merely 
administrative functions by setting aside an order of an administrative agency made within the 
scope of the power delegated to it, upon the ground that such power was inexpediently exercised. 
Interstate Commerce Commission v. Illinois Central Ry. Co., 215 U.S. 452, 470, 30 S.Ct. 155, 160, 
54 LEd. 280; Greco v. Roper, 145 Ohio St. 243, 61 N.E.2d 307. 
One of the statutory grounds for the cancellation of a contract of a tenure teacher is 
'insubordination.' § 356, Title 52, Code 1940. The term 'insubordination' is not defined in the 
statute, but unquestionably it Includes the willful refusal of a teacher to obey the reasonable rules 
and regulations of his or her employing board of education. 
The City Board of Education of Fairfield had the statutory authority to prescribe rules and 
regulations for the conduct of the teachers In schools under its jurisdiction. § 167, Title 52, Code 
1940. There is no contention made here that the rule adopted by the Fairfield Board of Education 
~ on February 27, 1947, and with which we are here concerned, was unreasonable. We think it 
shows on its face that it is a reasonable rule. 
Members of the board of education are not expected to devote their entire time to school 
affairs. From necessity, they act to a large degree upon the advice and recommendations of their 
chief executive officer, the Superintendent of Education. Having adopted the rule that all 
classroom teachers must take a mental ability test, the board looked to the Superintendent for the 
enforcement of this rule. The members of the board did not give the test and hence, any 
Information which they received as to the conduct of Maenetta Steele in relation to the test must 
have come from the Superintendent and It was, no doubt, upon his advice and recommendation 
~ that the board adopted a resolution on April 25, 1947, to the effect that consideration would be 
given on May 27, 1947, to the cancellation of her contract on the ground of Insubordination. In 
passing such a resolution the 
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board acted In an administrative capacity and not as a judicial tribunal. Such resolution was not a 
finding that Maenetta Steele was guilty of the conduct charged. Such a finding could not be made 
until May 27, 1947, and until a hearing had been held if requested by Maenetta Steele. 
As above pointed out, such a hearing was requested and held. Although at this hearir,g 
Maenetta Steele was entitled to present evidence tending to refute the charge made against her, 
such hearing was not solely for the benefit of the teacher. It also served the purpose of enabling 
the board of education to hear both sides of the case for, as before pointed out, their prior action 
could only have resulted from information furnished them by the Superintendent. 
Maenetta Steele admitted that she did not take the test when it was first presented to her on 
March 25. 1947. and although she denied that she was ever given another opportunity to do so, 
there is ample evidence to support a finding that she had been given that chance. 
On the other hand, the Superintendent admitted that Maenetta Steele requested that she be 
permitted to take the test [252 Ala. 262] sometime prior to the date on which the board Instituted 
these proceedings, but that he refused to permit her to do so. It also appears from statements of 
other teachers that they were given that chance on or about the very day that Maenetta Steele's 
request was refused. 
The teacher, Maenetta Steele, sought to show that the reason why the Superintendent 
permitted other teachers to subsequently take the test and refused her that privilege was because 
he had a personal dislike for her due to her activity in the union. Although the Superintendent 
made the statement that the union had nothing to do with the test, yet he refused to answer 
questions propounded to him by counsel for Maenetta Steele as to whether he approved of 
teachers organizing into a teachers' union. Likewise he refused to answer questions as to whether 
he had permitted other teachers to take the test who had either refused or failed to do so when it 
was first given on March 25th. 
We think that, in view of the nature of the other evidence presented at the hearing, Maenetta 
Steele was entitled to have the Superintendent answer these questions. His answers thereto could 
have materially affected the final decision of the board of education. We cannot say that the board 
of education would have cancelled Maenetta Steele's contract if the Superintendent of Education 
had admitted that he had subsequently permitted other teachers to take the test and that he did 
disapprove of teachers organizing into teachers' unions, since the board might have found that his 
refusal to grant Maenetta Steele's request to take the test was based on her union activities. She 
was not charged with having violated any rule or regulation of the board of education purporting to 
prohibit teachers engaging in union activities. The charge was insubordination. We think the 
record tends to show that Maenetta Steele was treated differently from other teachers and 
therefore we feel that while Maenetta Steele was permitted to give evidence at the hearing, she 
was prevented from presenting evidence tending to show that the proceedings to cancel her 
contract were motivated by personal reasons. Section 356, Title 52, Code 1940, expressly 
provides that the cancellation of a teacher's contract may not be made for political or personal 
reasons. 
The judgment of the trial court is reversed and the cause is remanded to that court, with 
directions to issue a peremptory writ of mandamus ordering the employing board of education to 
vacate the order cancelling the contract of Maenetta Steele and to reinstate her as a teacher in the 
school system of the City of Fairfield as of the beginning of the school year 1947-1948, subject to 
the result of another hearing under§ 357, Title 52, Code of 1940. State ex rel. Ging v. Board of 
Education of City of Duluth, 213 Minn. 550, 7 N.W.2d 544; Ford Motor Co. v. National Labor 
Relations Board, 305 U.S. 364, 374, 59 S.Ct. 301, 307, 83 L.Ed. 221. 
Reversed and remanded with directions. 
BROWN, FOSTER, and STAKELY, JJ., concur. 
